Watkins v. Capital City Bank
| Decision Date | 11 April 2016 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 5:14-CV-107 (MTT) |
| Parties | GENEVA L. WATKINS, Plaintiff, v. CAPITAL CITY BANK and L.P. KEEN INSURANCE AGENCY, INC., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Georgia |
Defendant Capital City Bank ("the Bank") has moved for sanctions pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 against Plaintiff Geneva Watkins, seeking an order awarding attorney's fees and enjoining the Watkins family and their corporations from re-litigating their claim regarding force-placed insurance, requiring all of their future pleadings to be accompanied by an affidavit attesting that the claims are novel, and directing them to seek leave of court before filing against the Bank again. (Doc. 70). For the following reasons, the motion is GRANTED in part.
The facts have been addressed at length in the Court's Order granting summary judgment to the Bank. (Doc. 86). Essentially, Geneva, her husband Robert Watkins, their daughter Samantha Watkins, and two corporations they own, Doge, Inc. and Mathews, Wilson, & Mathews, Inc., have filed a series of lawsuits against the Bank since 2004. Several of these suits include claims about fraudulent force-placed insurance.1 They have not prevailed in any of these cases. (Docs. 55-15; 55-23; 77 at 29-45).
Geneva and Doge, Inc. originally filed this suit in Gwinnett State Court in 2006. (Doc. 55-1 at 3-7). On August 4, 2008, the state court denied the Bank's motion for summary judgment on the force-placed insurance claim. (Doc. 22-2 at 2-4). Not long before that, Robert filed suit against the Bank in this Court, asserting claims involving force-placed insurance. (Doc. 55-14). Doge, Inc. raised similar claims in a suit against the Bank filed in Bibb Superior Court in August 2009. (Doc. 55-22). Because the two state court cases involved "the same or similar issues," the Gwinnett County case was stayed pending the resolution of the Bibb County case and the federal case. (Doc. 24-3 at 4). After this Court, Judge Royal presiding, ruled that Robert's fraudulent force-placed insurance claim was barred by the statute of limitations and Bibb Superior Court ruled that Doge, Inc.'s claim was barred for the same reason, the Bank moved to lift the stay and renewed its motion for summary judgment, citing res judicata. (Docs. 24-3; 55-15; 55-23). Geneva voluntarily dismissed the Gwinnett County suit on the eve of a hearing on the renewed motion for summary judgment. (Docs. 22-2 at 6; 67 at 12:5-9, 15:4-7). She re-filed in this court on March 10, 2014. (Doc. 1).
As discussed in this Court's Order granting summary judgment to the Bank, the undisputed facts established that Robert is the driving force behind the Watkins familylitigation, regardless of the named plaintiff in these cases. (Doc. 86 at 11 & n.11). At the motion hearing, counsel for Geneva confirmed this, telling the Court, (Doc. 99 at 6:7-8). Specifically, with regard to the force-placed insurance claim, it is clear that it is a single claim that has been asserted again and again by different family members or companies. Since the Order granting summary judgment was entered, Robert has filed two pro se motions in this case despite not being a party, one of which admits that the family's force-placed insurance claim has been litigated before. (Docs. 90, 91).
Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(1)-(3). "'Rule 11 applies to pro se plaintiffs, but the court must take into account the plaintiff's pro se status when determining whether the filing was reasonable.'"2 Meidinger v. Healthcare Indus. Oligopoly, 391 F. App'x 777, 778 (11th Cir. 2010) (quoting Thomas v. Evans, 880 F.2d 1235, 1240 (11th Cir. 1989)).
"The objective standard for testing conduct under Rule 11 is reasonableness under the circumstances and what was reasonable to believe at the time the pleading was submitted." Baker v. Alderman, 158 F.3d 516, 524 (11th Cir. 1998) (internal quotation marks and footnote omitted). There is a two-step inquiry: "(1) whether the party's claims are objectively frivolous; and (2) whether the person who signed the pleadings should have been aware that they were frivolous." Id. If there is a violation, the Court may impose sanctions. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(1). The purpose of Rule 11 sanctions is "to deter repetition of the conduct or comparable conduct by others similarly situated." Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(4).
The Bank argues that the Watkins family and their corporations are subject to sanctions because they have filed at least nineteen cases stemming from one foreclosure and were warned by both Judge Dudley H. Bowen, Jr. in the Southern District of Georgia and this Court that their conduct may warrant sanctions.3 (Doc. 70 at 1, 2). The Bank contends that the "repetitive lawsuits" have impaired this Court's ability to carry out its duties. (Id. at 5-6). Furthermore, these suits "routinely force [the] Bank to interrupt its business affairs to address needless litigation." (Id. at 6). The Bank points out that it has spent hundreds of thousands of dollars defending these suits. (Id.).
Specifically, the Bank points to sanctionable conduct in violation of Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(1)-(3) because (1) the force-placed insurance claim was presented for an improper purpose because the Watkins family knew about the alleged fraud by 2000 at the latest and because the claim had already been litigated in other courts; (2) the claim was not warranted by existing law because the statute of limitations for fraud as well as the principles of res judicata and collateral estoppel are well-settled; and (3) there is no evidentiary support for the factual contentions presented. (Id. at 6-7). As relief, the Bank requests that the Court enter an order enjoining the Watkins family and their corporations from re-litigating their claim regarding force-placed insurance, requiring all of their future pleadings to be accompanied by an affidavit attesting that the claims are novel, and directing them to seek leave of the court before filing against the Bank again. (Id. at 8). It also requests an award of attorney's fees and costs. (Id. at 10).
Geneva responds that her claim was not objectively frivolous and thus cannot be the subject of sanctions because she had evidence she believed supported her claim when she renewed her suit in this court. (Docs. 74 at 1, 2-3; 99 at 16:1-4). She explains that she "possessed a Judge's order establishing that the statute of limitations did not begin to run until 2004 and an affidavit from a qualified expert that substantiates every claim she made about fraudulent force-placed insurance." (Id. at 2-3). She argues that this case was filed in 2006 and thus is just the second filed by the family. (Id. at 2). Finally, she says she has never been the named plaintiff in a case about force-placed insurance against the Bank. (Id. at 2).
Geneva's arguments fail to acknowledge the undisputed facts in this case. When she refiled this action in this Court, the force-placed insurance claim had been at leasttwice litigated and resolved adversely to the Watkins family.4 Thus, even though the state court had denied the Bank's first motion for summary judgment and even if Geneva had an expert supporting the merits of her claim, the fact remains that her claim was barred when filed. The fact that she was not the named plaintiff in the prior adjudications, for the reasons discussed in the Court's Order granting summary judgment to the Bank, is immaterial. Nor is the Court persuaded by Geneva's argument that she did not know the suit was frivolous because "the narrative that she understands is a narrative that is filtered through Robert" and that she is just an "unwitting passenger" who does what Robert tells her to do. (Doc. 99 at 6:10-11, 13:25, 14:6-7). That she allows herself to be influenced by Robert does not absolve her of her Rule 11 responsibilities. In any event, the Bank's Rule 11 notice informed her that her claims had been previously litigated and thus were barred by res judicata and collateral estoppel. (Doc. 70-1 at 5-6). Finally, the family's broader litigation history supports sanctions. All their claims against the Bank have been rejected again and again yet they continue to file cases litigating the same issues. Accordingly, sanctions for the violation of Rule 11 are appropriate.
To determine a reasonable amount of attorney's fees, Bivens v. Wrap It Up, Inc., 548 F.3d 1348, 1350 (11th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). "A reasonable hourly rate is the prevailing market rate in the relevant legal community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skills, experience, and reputation." Norman v. Hous. Auth. of City of Montgomery, 836 F.2d 1292, 1396 (11th Cir. 1988). The court may also make an award based on its own experience. Id. at 1303.
To support the request for attorney's fees and expenses, the Bank submitted an...
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