Watkins v. County Court.
| Decision Date | 04 February 1888 |
| Citation | 30 W.Va. 657 |
| Parties | Watkins v. County Court. |
| Court | West Virginia Supreme Court |
A County Court is not responsible in damages, at the suit of an individual, for injuries sustained by him in consequence of the neglect of the County Court, or any of its officers or agents, to perform any duty enjoined by law, unless such action against it was, expressly or by necessary implication, given by statute, (p. 658.)
If a dead tree, standing within five feet of a public road, falls upon a person travelling along such road, the County Court can not be sued by such person because of the injuries he sustained by the falling of such tree upon him. (p. 6G3.)
Statement of the case by Green, Judoe:
This was an action on the case, brought in the Circuit Court of Preston on March 16th, 1883, against the CountyCourt of Preston, to recover for injuries sustained by the plaintiff by the falling upon him, while travelling along a public road in said county, of a dead tree which had been for many years standing within five feet of the edge of a road, in an inclosed field, which tree the surveyor of the road had for many years known was so decayed as to be liable at any time to fall across the road. The plaintiff was severely injured on March 21st, 1882, by this tree falling upon him as above stated; one of his legs being broken, and his breastbone and back being also permanently injured. He was confined to his bed for a month, and to his room for two months longer, and paid physician's bills for attending him to the amount of $35. After a year, when this suit was brought, he was still unable to do much work, and it was probable that these injuries would trouble him more and more as long as he lived.
If this was a good cause of action, the declaration would have been good, it being in proper form. It was demurred to by the defendant, and the demurrer was overruled. The plaintiff proved the above facts, and the defendant demurred to the evidence. The jury assessed the plaintiff's damages at $340.00, subject to the opinion of the court on the demurrer to the evidence. The plaintiff asked for a new trial because of the inadequacy of the damages assessed. The court overruled his motion. On April 19th, 1885, the court sustained the demurrer to the plaintiff's evidence, and rendered judgment that the plaintiff take nothing by his suit, and the defendant recover of him his costs. From this judgment a writ of error has been awarded the plaintiff.
P. J. Crogan for plaintiff in error.
Neil J. Fortney for defendant in error.
The only legal question involved in this case is whether on March 22, 1882, a County Court in this State was responsible to an individual in damages for an injury sustained by him from the falling on him of a dead tree, while travelling along a public road in the county; it being shown that this dead tree had been standing in an inclosed field adjoining the public road, within five feet of the edge of the road, for many years, and that it had been known to the surveyor of the road for years that it was so much decayed that it might at any time fall across the road.
The County Court of each county was then, as it is now, a corporation. See section 1, ch. 39, Code 1887, p. 275. The County Courts, by statute, were, as they are now, required to cause any road, bridge, or public landing belonging to them to be kept in good repair and condition. See section 23, ch. 39, Code 1887, p. 284. The County Court, as required by our constitution, appoints a surveyor of roads for each precinct in the county. Section 4, ch. 43, Code 1887, p. 317. On March 22, 1882, among other duties of the surveyor of roads was this: that "he shall superintend the county roads and bridges, cause the same to be put in good order and repair, of the proper width, well drained, and to be cleared and kept clear of rocks, falling timber, land-slides, and other obstructions." On March 25, 1882, this law was amended, and made to read as it now does: "He shall superintend the county roads and bridges, cause the same to be put in good condition and repair, of the proper width, well drained, and to be cleared and kept clear of rocks, falling timber, land-slides, carcases of dead animals, and other obstruction, and remove all dead timber standing within thirty feet thereof."
By statute-law which has always been in force in this State, it is provided that "any person who sustains an injury to his person or property by reason of a public road or bridge in a county being out of repair may recover all damages sustained by him by reason of such injury, in an action on the case, in any court of competent jurisdiction, against the County Court." This being the extent of the liability in damages to any person imposed by statute for neglect of duty in reference to the public roads, either by a County Court, or by a surveyor of roads appointed by a County Court, can the County Court be subjected by suit to the payment of damages, in any other case than that specified in the statute, because of injury resulting from a neglect of duty by it, or by its surveyor of roads, such, for instance, as the failure of the surveyor of roads "to remove all dead timber standing within thirty feet of a public road," a duty now expressly imposed upon him, and which it is claimed was impliedly imposed upon him on March 22, 1882?
The counties are political divisions of the State, created for public convenience; and to the County Courts, by our constitution and laws, are committed certain legislative, executive, and judicial powers directly connectec. with the local affairs of the county. These powers, as well as the limits of the county, may be increased or diminished at the pleasure of the Legislature, so far as that body is not restrained by the constitution; and it does habitually exercise such control over the County Courts, and over all county agents appointed by them requiring such public duties and functions to be performed by them as it deems proper. It is true that County Courts are declared to be corporations, and, as such, they may be sued; but being political corporations, created thus, and organized for political purposes connected with the administration of the State government, they obviously differ entirely from private corporations, and are es- sentially different from towns and cities, which are municipal corporations proper, and which are called into existence by either the solicitation or procurement of the persons composing them, for the promotion of their local convenience and private advantage. Counties, on the other hand, and County Courts, are corporations in the State, and are created almost exclusively with a view to the policy of the State at large, and to carry out this general public policy. See Hamilton v. Mighels, 7 Ohio St. 109, and Talbots v. Queen Anne Co., 50 Md. 245.
If a private corporation or an individual owe a duty to a person, and he is directly injured by the neglect of such duty, such person so injured would by the common-law have right of action against such private corporation or individual, as the case might be, for damages for an injury the immediate consequence of the neglect of such duty. Private corporations, when they are chartered in consideration of certain privileges and immunities conferred on them for their private advantage, or that of the individual corporators, assume to perform certain duties for the advantage of individuals in the community; and if, through the neglect to perform such duties, an individual to whom such corporation owes such duty suffers an injury as the immediate consequence of such neglect, as a matter of course he may recover of it, in an action on the case by the common law, the damages he has thus sustained from its negligence, or from the negligence of its servants or agents.
But it would seem to follow from the fact that as counties or County Courts, or other political corporations who manage their affairs, are created, not for any private advantage, but almost exclusively with a view to the policy of the State, and charged by law with the superintendence and administration of the local affairs of a county, as a mode of carrying out such public policy, they would not be liable in damages for any neglect of a public duty to any individual who had directly suffered an injury from such neglect, unless the statute had, expressly or by necessary implication, made them responsible as corporations. At common-law, such political corporation or such county would not be liable in any civil suit for damages resulting from a neglect of any public duty. And, in accordance with these views, it has been almost universally held, both in England and in this country, that neither a county, nor a political corporation managing its local affairs, causing public roads and bridges to be made and kept in repair, public school-houses to be built and kept in repair, and other public duties to be performed, are never liable, as corporations, to be sued by any individual for damages sustained by their neglect to perform such duties, or by the neglect of public officers or agents appointed by them to perform such duties, except when they are made responsible as corporations, either expressly or by necessary implication, for damages resulting from neglect of the duty. It was so held in Askew v. Sale Co., 54 Ala. 639; Granger v. Pulaski Co., 26 Ark. 37; Cromwell v. Sonoma Co., 25 Cal. 313; Larkin v. County of Saginaw, 11 Mich. 88; Brabham v. Supervisors, 54 Miss. 363; Reardon v. St. Louis Co., 36 Mo. 555.
The same views have been sustained in decisions...
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