Watkins v. Greene Metro. Hous. Auth.
| Decision Date | 04 September 2019 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 3:19-cv-179 |
| Citation | 397 F.Supp.3d 1103 |
| Parties | Tonya WATKINS, Plaintiff, v. GREENE METROPOLITAN HOUSING AUTHORITY, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Ohio |
Kelli Ann Bartlett, Dayton, OH, for Plaintiff.
Jennifer Elizabeth Marietta, Marietta Law, LLC, Xenia, OH, for Defendants.
ORDER AND ENTRY GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND REINSTATING PLAINTIFF'S SECTION 8 VOUCHER DURING THE PENDENCY OF THIS LAWSUIT
This civil consent case is before the Court on Plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction. Doc. 2. Defendants filed a memorandum in opposition. Doc. 6. Thereafter, Plaintiff filed a reply. Doc. 8. The Court has carefully considered all of the foregoing,1 and Plaintiff's motion is ripe for decision.
Plaintiff Tonya Watkins has participated in the Section 8 Housing Choice Voucher Program ("HCVP") for close to five years.
Doc. 2-2 at PageID 40. She has an approximate monthly income of $1,100.00 per month. Id. Four minor children live with Plaintiff in her household. Id. at 41. One of her children stopped receiving a Supplemental Security Income ("SSI") check in May 2019, decreasing the household income by approximately $770.00. Id. The market rent for her residence is $625.00. Id. Through the HCVP, Plaintiff was responsible for thirty percent of her adjusted monthly income for rent while Defendant, Greene Metropolitan Housing Authority ("GMHA"), paid a subsidy for the remaining portion. Id ; 24 C.F.R. § 982.1.
Plaintiff is legally married to DeWayne Watkins. Doc 2-2 at PageID 41. Mr. Watkins moved out of Plaintiff's home approximately four years ago when the couple separated and he is not listed on her HCVP voucher. Id. In October 2017, he applied to be a participant in the HCVP administered by GMHA, and Plaintiff's address was listed as contact information during that process. Id. When Plaintiff received mail from GMHA on Mr. Watkins's behalf regarding his application to the HCVP, she believed that she had only been listed as an emergency contact. Id.
In Mid-August 2018, Plaintiff reported to GMHA that Mr. Watkins was moving back into her residence and that she wished to add him to her lease. Id. On August 22, 2018, GMHA issued a Section 8 Notice of Termination of Benefits to Plaintiff, which proposed to terminate her participation in the Section 8 HCVP. Doc 1-1 at PageID 10. The notice stated the grounds for the proposed termination as follows: "Violation of Family Obligations: allowing unauthorized individual (Mr. Watkins) to use your address; Violation of voucher #4 and 24 CFR § 982.552." Id.
Plaintiff timely requested a hearing to contest the termination of her housing subsidy, and a hearing was held on September 5, 2018 before hearing officer Mary Jo Beatty, L.S.W. Doc 1-2 PageID 20. GMHA issued a decision on September 12, 2018, upholding the termination of Plaintiff's participation in the HCVP. Id. Specifically, the hearing officer concluded: Id. at PageID 20. Plaintiff, proceeding with this assistance of Legal Aid of Western Ohio ("LAWO"), then filed suit with this Court, challenging the termination of her voucher. Doc. 1. She also filed a preliminary injunction seeking the reinstatement of her Section 8 voucher during the pendency of this suit. Doc. 2.
"A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy which should be granted only if the movant carries his or her burden of proving that the circumstances clearly demand it." Overstreet v. Lexington-Fayette Urban Cty. Gov't , 305 F.3d 566, 573 (6th Cir. 2002) (internal citations omitted). "The purpose of a preliminary injunction is simply to preserve the status quo[,]" United States v. Edward Rose & Sons , 384 F.3d 258, 261 (6th Cir. 2004), i.e. , "to preserve the parties' relative positions in order to prevent irreparable injury prior to trial." Montgomery v. Carr , 848 F. Supp. 770, 779 (S.D. Ohio 1993).
In deciding whether a preliminary injunction should issue, four factors must be examined: (1) whether the movant has shown a strong likelihood of success on the merits; (2) whether the movant will suffer irreparable harm if the injunction is not issued; (3) whether the issuance of the injunction would cause substantial harm to others; and (4) whether the public interest would be served by issuing the injunction." Overstreet , 305 F.3d at 573. "These factors are not prerequisites, but are factors that are to be balanced against each other." Id. ; but cf. Friendship Materials, Inc. v. Mich. Brick, Inc. , 679 F.2d 100, 103 (6th Cir. 1982) ().
The Court first addresses whether Plaintiff has shown a strong likelihood of succeeding on the merits of her claims. Plaintiff alleges that the termination of her voucher was unlawful because (1) the reason for termination was not permitted by applicable regulations, and (2) she received inadequate notice of such reason in violation of her procedural due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.
As noted above, Plaintiff received notice regarding the termination of her voucher for a purported "Violation of Family Obligation" and, specifically, for "allowing [an] unauthorized individual (Mr. Watkins) to use [her] address." Doc. 1-1 at PageID 13. The notice cites "voucher #4" and 24 C.F.R. § 982.552. Id. It remains unclear to the Court what reference to "voucher #4" means, but certainly 24 C.F.R. § 982.552 is the applicable federal regulation setting forth a list of grounds upon which a Public Housing Authority ("PHA"), such as GMHA, can rely on to terminate Section 8 vouchers. Grounds for termination include circumstances were, as listed on the notice at issue here, a "family violates any family obligations under the program" as set forth in 24 C.F.R. § 982.551. See 24 C.F.R. § 982.552(c)(1)(i).
The family obligations set forth in § 982.551 include obligations regarding the "use and occupancy" of the housing unit provided. None of the obligations in that regulation, however, prohibit a voucher recipient from permitting another individual to use the address to receive mail -- that is, unless, of course, the use of the mail is related to fraud or drug-related criminal activity, none of which appears to be at issue here.2 See 24 C.F.R. § 982.551. Thus, from the undersigned's perspective, a termination of Plaintiff's voucher for this reason alone would be improper. 24 C.F.R. § 982.54(a) (); see also Coe v. Hous. Auth. of Milwaukee , No. 14-cv-0022, 2016 WL 393955, at *5, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11477, at *10 (E.D. Wis. Feb 1, 2016) ().
However, as argued by Defendants, Plaintiff's voucher was also terminated because she permitted Mr. Watkins "to stay at her federally subsidized rental home." Doc. 1-2 at PageID 20. The family obligations set forth in federal regulations includes the requirement that "[t]he composition of the assisted family residing in the unit must be approved by the PHA" and that "[t]he family must request PHA approval to add any other family member as an occupant of the unit."
24 C.F.R. § 982.551(h)(2). In other words, "[n]o other person [i.e. , nobody but members of the assisted family] may reside in the unit[.]" Id. The undersigned concludes that permitting Mr. Watkins to stay at her address would be a lawful purpose for terminating Plaintiff's voucher. Accord Coe , 2016 WL 393955, at *5, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11477, at *10 ().
The remaining question, then, is whether Plaintiff received adequate notice that Defendants sought to terminate her voucher for allowing Mr. Watkins to reside at her address. The Due Process Clause imposes restraints on governmental decisions that deprive individuals of liberty or property interests. Mathews v. Eldridge , 424 U.S. 319, 335, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976). The specific restraints and procedures that are due turn on a consideration of: "[f]irst, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail." Id. Applying these factors, the Supreme Court has determined that when the government terminates an individual's interest in the continued receipt of benefits, due process mandates "timely and adequate notice detailing the reasons for a proposed termination." Goldberg v. Kelly , 397 U.S. 254, 267-71, 90 S.Ct. 1011, 25 L.Ed.2d 287 (1970).
Moreover, federal regulations require that when, as here, a participant's voucher is terminated as a result of "the family's act," a PHA is required to give "prompt written notice" that must: "(i) [c]ontain a brief statement of reasons for the decision, (ii) [s]tate that if the family does not agree with the decision, the family may request an informal hearing on the decision, and (iii) [s]tate the deadline for the family to request an informal hearing." 24 C.F.R. § 982.555. The purpose of this...
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... ... impossible.” [R. 9, at p.2]. It is true that “[a] ... loss of housing constitutes an irreparable harm.” ... Watkins v. Greene Metro. Hous. Auth ., 397 F.Supp.3d ... 1103, 1109 (S.D. Ohio 2019); see also White v. U.S. Bank ... N.A. , No ... ...