Watkins v. Paragould Light & Water Comm'n

• Decision Date: 28 September 2016
• Docket Number: No. CV-15-523,CV-15-523
• Citation: 2016 Ark. App. 432,504 S.W.3d 606
• Parties: Connie WATKINS and Richard Watkins, Husband And Wife, Appellants v. PARAGOULD LIGHT & WATER COMMISSION and City of Paragould, Appellees
• Court: Arkansas Court of Appeals

2016 Ark. App. 432

504 S.W.3d 606

Connie WATKINS and Richard Watkins, Husband And Wife, Appellants

v.PARAGOULD LIGHT & WATER COMMISSION and City of Paragould, Appellees

No. CV-15-523

Court of Appeals of Arkansas, Division II.

OPINION DELIVERED: SEPTEMBER 28, 2016

Rehearing Denied November 2, 2016

Richard and Connie Watkins, pro se appellants.

Michael Mosley and Scurlock Law Firm, by: James V. Scurlock II, North Little Rock, for appellees.

ROBERT J. GLADWIN, Chief Judge

Nearly ten years ago, appellee Paragould Light & Water Commission (PLWC) petitioned the Greene County Circuit Court to enjoin appellants Connie and Richard Watkins from interfering with PLWC's efforts to trim trees around its electrical power lines.¹ The lawsuit grew in size and complexity when Mr. and Mrs. Watkins filed a pro se counterclaim that asserted over twenty causes of action ranging from breach of contract to intentional torts to civil-rights violations. The counterclaim was ultimately dismissed by summary judgment, and the circuit court entered an order enjoining Mr. and Mrs. Watkins from interfering with PLWC's tree trimming.

In this pro se appeal, Mr. and Mrs. Watkins argue that several errors occurred over the lengthy history of the case, which saw four separate circuit judges presiding. We find no merit in appellants' arguments and affirm the circuit court's rulings.

I. Factual Background and Procedural History

Because appellants do not directly challenge either the sufficiency of the evidence to support the injunction or the propriety of granting summary judgment on their counterclaim, we set forth only those facts necessary for an understanding of the issues on appeal.

Appellants live on a residential lot which has a number of trees along its northern and southern borders. The trees on the southern border are interspersed along an old fence row between appellants' lot and an open field farther to the south. A major PLWC electrical-distribution line runs east and west along that fence row, and at least one power pole is located along the row, at or near the corner of appellants' lot. The proof below revealed that PLWC's line had been in place since at least 1983 and that PLWC had trimmed the trees around the line for many years.

Beginning in 1999, appellants and PLWC experienced a series of conflicts over PLWC's tree-trimming methods. That year, Mrs. Watkins alleged that the trees in her front yard were trimmed improperly while she was out of town. In 2002, she sued PLWC in small-claims court for damage to her trees but later nonsuited the action. In 2003, Bill Fisher, the CEO and general manager of PLWC, agreed that appellants could trim their own trees. Despite this agreement, appellants requested PLWC's assistance in 2004 to trim the trees in the northern, or front, part of their property. When the crew arrived, Mrs. Watkins objected to the personnel that PLWC had sent to do the job. According to witnesses, she became quite confrontational with the workers and with Bill Fisher. Near this same time, Mr. Watkins attempted to trim a tree himself and caused a limb to fall on a power line. Consequently, PLWC informed appellants that they could trim their own trees if they did so in a manner that met electric-safety codes but that, unless they removed encroaching vegetation by May 1, 2004, PLWC crews would remove it.

In April 2006, Bill Fisher sent appellants a letter reserving PLWC's right to trim trees on the City's rights-of-way or easements. PLWC also commissioned a survey of appellants' property that, unlike previous surveys, located most, if not all, of the southern fence-row trees even farther south, off appellants' property.

With this survey in hand, PLWC attempted to trim the trees near the southern part of appellants' lot in July 2006. However, the trimming crew was met with resistance by Mrs. Watkins and did not accomplish the task. A few months later, on November 9, 2006, PLWC crews arrived at appellants' property to trim the trees on the northern part of the lot. Mrs. Watkins got involved in the process, attempted to direct the tree trimming, and, according to witnesses, insulted and cursed the workers.

Concerned that winter weather was on the horizon, PLWC planned to trim the trees along appellants' southern border on November 28, 2006. Given PLWC's history with appellants, Bill Fisher was concerned about the possibility of a confrontation. He therefore asked the Paragould Police Department to provide officers for a civil standby during the tree trimming. PLWC crews, along with two police officers, arrived in the open field south of appellants' property on the morning of November 28.

Appellants, who had learned of the trimming, appeared at the work site and tried to stop the trimming. Witnesses would later testify that Mrs. Watkins rushed at the crew, yelled and cursed at them, refused to leave the restricted work area, and slapped a police officer's arm when the officer tried to move her away. As a result, Mrs. Watkins was handcuffed at the scene and taken to the police station. She was later convicted of misdemeanor disorderly conduct in connection with the incident. Our court affirmed the conviction in Watkins v. State , 2010 Ark. App. 85, 377 S.W.3d 286, cert. denied , 562 U.S. 892, 131 S.Ct. 275, 178 L.Ed.2d 140 (2010).

A few days after the above-described confrontation, PLWC filed a petition in the circuit court alleging that it owned, or had acquired by prescription, "right of way easements for the erection, maintenance, repair, removal and replacement of its electrical transmission lines ... on, over, across and through [appellants'] property." PLWC asked that appellants be enjoined from interfering with the easement. Appellants counterclaimed that PLWC had engaged in improper tree trimming and had, among other things, engineered Mrs. Watkins's arrest, defamed her, and interfered with her right to complain publicly about the tree-trimming situation.

In March 2009, Judge Victor Hill dismissed several of the counts in appellants' counterclaim by summary judgment. He ordered that the remaining counts be tried separately from PLWC's claim for an injunction. The case was later transferred to Judge David Laser, who conducted a bench trial on the injunction issue over the course of six days in June and September 2011.

Following the trial, Judge Laser granted PLWC's request for an injunction in an order entered May 10, 2012. Judge Laser ruled that PLWC had maintained the power lines over appellants' property for more than thirty years; that appellants had acquiesced in PLWC's line maintenance without incident for many years; and that PLWC was entitled to

a right of way easement by prescription relating to the power lines which cross any portion of [appellants'] property, which easement is a total of twenty feet wide (ten feet on either side of the poles in place) for the purpose of utility construction, erection, installation, operation, inspection, maintenance, repair, renewal, substitution, and removal under, over, across and through its entirety.

The court further ruled that, based on appellants' history of confrontational behavior, they should be enjoined from interfering with PLWC's tree trimming. Appellants filed posttrial motions, which were denied, and a notice of appeal. At their request, Judge Laser recused from all future rulings in the case.

We dismissed appellants' appeal without prejudice in Watkins v. City of Paragould , 2013 Ark. App. 539, 2013 WL 5512831, for lack of a final order.² The case returned to the circuit court, with Judge Pamela Honeycutt presiding. PLWC soon filed a motion for summary judgment, seeking dismissal of all remaining counts of appellants' counterclaim. Judge Honeycutt granted PLWC's motion for summary judgment in a February 20, 2015 order. Thereafter, appellants filed a complaint against Judge Honeycutt with the Administrative Office of the Courts, and she recused on that basis.

The case was then transferred to Judge Melissa Richardson, who denied appellants' posttrial motions. This appeal followed.

II. Statements of Fraud and Conspiracy

At the outset, we must take the unusual measure of striking a significant portion of appellants' initial brief and reply brief due to a violation of Rule 1-5 of the Rules of the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals (2016).

Rule 1-5 provides that no appellate argument, brief, or motion shall contain language showing disrespect for the circuit court. If such language appears in an appellate brief, we may strike the offending language. See Henry v. Eberhard , 309 Ark. 336, 832 S.W.2d 467 (1992).

Throughout appellants' initial brief and reply brief, they assert that one of the circuit judges who presided below purposely interfered with their attempt to perfect an earlier appeal; deceived them with fraudulent advice and promises; deliberately made legal errors; and conspired with PLWC. Appellants also state that two of the other judges who presided on the case adopted and participated in the alleged fraud. These allegations go far beyond a claim of bias and are clearly in violation of Rule 1-5.

Consequently, we strike from appellants' briefs all language accusing the circuit judges in this case of fraud, deceit, conspiracy, and deliberate commission of errors. Further, because these allegations are most egregious in appellants' first two points on appeal, we strike those arguments in their entirety without reaching their merits.

We feel compelled to inform appellants that, by rights, we could strike their entire brief—so pervasive is their offensive language. See McLemore v. Elliot , 272 Ark. 306, 614 S.W.2d 226 (1981). And, had appellants been attorneys rather than pro se litigants, we would not hesitate to refer them to the Committee on Professional Conduct. See generally White v. Priest , 348 Ark. 783, 73 S.W.3d 572 (2002). However, we have exercised our discretion in a manner that we hope will allow appellants, as nonprofessionals, to appreciate the import of Rule 1-5...