Watkins v. Pash
| Decision Date | 26 May 2016 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 4:12-CV-2393 NAB |
| Parties | KENNETH WATKINS, Petitioner, v. RONDA J. PASH, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Missouri |
This matter is before the Court on Petitioner Kenneth Watkins' (Watkins) Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. [Doc. 1.] Respondent Ronda J. Pash filed a response. [Doc. 15.] Watkins filed a Reply Memorandum. [Doc. 27.] The parties have consented to the jurisdiction of the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1). [Doc. 11.] For the reasons set forth below, Watkins' petition for writ of habeas corpus will be denied.
Watkins was convicted of robbery in the first degree and armed criminal action. (Resp't Ex. B at 70-71.) Watkins was tried in this matter twice. The first trial in August 2007 ended in a mistrial. (Resp't Ex. B at 46.) At the second trial in January 2008, a jury found Watkins guilty. (Resp't Ex. B at 70-71.) The evidence presented at the second trial, viewed in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict, was presented as follows1: The victim, LaShonda Phillips sat in her car at a gas station. Watkins then tapped on her window with a gun and demanded money.Watkins then ordered her out the car. When Phillips exited the car, Watkins got in the car and sped away. Ms. Phillips entered the gas station and called the police.
A few days later, Officer Ronald Mueller saw Phillips' car and recognized it as a car listed on the "hotsheet," a list of stolen cars. Officer Mueller pulled the car over, at which point Watkins exited the car and began walking toward Officer Mueller carrying a white plastic bag and a black bag. Officer Mueller ordered him to stop and Watkins began to run. Watkins was taken into custody shortly thereafter. Phillips' car keys were found in Watkins' front pocket, the white bag contained Phillips' car stereo, and the black bag contained a gun.
A few hours after the car was recovered, Phillips went to the police station and identified Watkins in a lineup. Phillips also identified the gun, Watkins' hoodie and baseball cap, and her car stereo. Watkins received a thirty year sentence for first degree robbery, which was run concurrently to his sentence of ten years for the armed criminal action charge. Watkins filed a direct appeal, which was denied by the Missouri Court of Appeals. Watkins then filed a motion to vacate, set aside, and correct sentence. The post-conviction motion court denied Watkins' post-conviction motion and that denial was affirmed by the Missouri Court of Appeals.
Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 91 (2011). "In general, if a convicted state criminal defendant can show a federal habeas court that his conviction rests upon a violation of the Federal Constitution, he may well obtain a writ of habeas corpus that requires a new trial, a new sentence, or release." Trevino v. Thaler, 133 S.Ct. 1911, 1917 (2013). The Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 28 U.S.C.§ 2254 (AEDPA) applies to all petitions for habeas relief filed by state prisoners after this statute's effective date of April 24, 1996. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 326-29 (1997). In conducting habeas review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, a federal court is limited to deciding whether a claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state court proceedings (1) resulted in a decision that is "contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court, or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented at the State court proceedings." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). A determination of a factual issue made by a state court is presumed to be correct unless the petitioner successfully rebuts the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).
For purposes of § 2254(d)(1), the phrase "clearly established federal law refers to the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of Court's decisions as of the time of the relevant state court decision." Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 71-72 (2003). "In other words, clearly established federal law under § 2254(d)(1) is the governing legal principle or principles set forth by the Supreme Court at the time the state court renders its decision." Id. To obtain habeas relief, a habeas petitioner must be able to point to the Supreme Court precedent which he thinks the state courts acted contrary to or unreasonably applied. Buchheit v. Norris, 459 F.3d 849, 853 (8th Cir. 2006).
A state court's decision is "contrary to" clearly established Supreme Court precedent "if the state court either 'applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [Supreme Court] cases' or 'confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the] Court and nevertheless arrives at a result different from [the] precedent.'" Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 792 (2001) (citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-406 (2000)).A state court decision is an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court precedent if it correctly identifies the governing legal rule but applies it unreasonably to the facts of a particular prisoner's case. Id. (citing Williams, 529 U.S. at 407-408). "A federal habeas court making the unreasonable application inquiry should ask whether the state court's application of clearly established federal law was objectively reasonable." Penry, 532 U.S. at 793. "A state court decision involves 'an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceedings,' 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2), only if it is shown that the state court's presumptively correct factual findings do not enjoy support in the record." Evanstad v. Carlson, 470 F.3d 777, 782 (8th Cir. 2006). A "readiness to attribute error is inconsistent with the presumption that state courts know and follow the law." Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002). AEDPA's highly deferential standard demands that state court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt. Id.
Watkins presents eight claims for review. First, Watkins asserts that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence due to an illegal arrest, because he was arrested by City of St. Louis police officers outside of their jurisdiction. Next, Watkins contends that he conviction was procured through perjured testimony from Phillips. Then, Watkins states that the prosecutor suppressed Brady material. Finally, Watkins presents five ineffective assistance of counsel claims. Watkins contends that his trial counsel failed to (1) properly present the issue of St. Louis police officers assaulting him, (2) argue the issue of an unlawful arrest, because the arresting officers were outside of their jurisdiction, (3) impeach Phillips with inconsistent deposition testimony, and (4) impeach Officer Mueller concerning the observations leading to Watkins' arrest. Watkins asserts that appellate post-conviction counsel was ineffective forfailing to raise a strong claim of trial court error that would have likely prevailed on appeal. The Respondent contends that Watkins has procedurally defaulted seven of the eight claims and the petition should be denied.
"The Sixth Amendment recognizes the right to the assistance of counsel because it envisions counsel's playing a role that is critical to the ability of the adversarial system to produce just results." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984). "An accused is entitled to be assisted by an attorney, whether retained or appointed who plays the role necessary to ensure that the trial is fair." Id. To succeed in a claim "that counsel's assistance was so defective as to require reversal of a conviction," a petitioner must establish (1) that the trial counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and (2) that this deficient performance prejudiced the Petitioner's defense. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88.
The "performance" component of Strickland requires a showing that "counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. To satisfy this prong, a petitioner must first identify the specific acts or omissions of counsel that are alleged not to have been the result of reasonable professional judgment. Id. at 690. The court must then examine the totality of the circumstances in order to determine whether "the identified acts or omissions were outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance." Id. In making this determination, the court should recognize that trial counsel is "strongly presumed to have rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment." Id. "Miscues and omissions are inevitable in any caseand there is no such thing as a perfect trial." Medearis v. U.S., 469 F.Supp.779, 785 (D.S.D. 2006).
To satisfy the "prejudice" component of Strickland, a petitioner "must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. Such "reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Id. In determining whether prejudice exists, "a court hearing an ineffectiveness claim must consider the totality of the evidence before the judge or jury." Id. at 695. Further, the court "should presume, absent challenge...
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