Watkins v. State

Decision Date08 February 1945
Docket Number15050.
Citation33 S.E.2d 325,199 Ga. 81
PartiesWATKINS v. STATE.
CourtGeorgia Supreme Court

Rehearing Denied March 7, 1945. [Copyrighted Material Omitted]

Syllabus by the Court.

1. That ground of the motion for new trial which complains that the court erred in overruling the challenge to the array of jurors, is, for the reasons stated in division 6 of this opinion, ruled adversely to the contention of the movant.

2. A confession otherwise admissible is not rendered inadmissible because made to an officer immediately after his saying to the accused that it was always best to tell the truth.

3. On the trial of a person shown to be a principal in the second degree, evidence showing the guilt of the principal in the first degree, including a confession made by the latter is admissible for the purpose of showing the guilt of the principal.

(a) Evidence that is relevant can not be kept from the jury by a waiver of proof on that point, or by an admission of the fact.

4. Defendant's counsel having addressed the trial judge stating that the accused desired to make a statement to the jury and requesting that the court instruct him in his rights, it affords no sufficient cause for the grant of a new trial that the court, in responding to the request so made, informed the prisoner that he could make a statement to the court or to any member of the jury, and that it was 'incumbent' upon the accused to tell them.

5. A new trial will not be granted because of the refusal of the court to declare a mistrial, the motion therefore being based on the fact that the solicitor-general over objection was reading to the jury an alleged confession of the alleged principal in the first degree, which contained certain inflammatory statements. The person on trial was jointly indicted and the proof tended to show him a principal in the second degree.

6. A challenge to the array of jurors was made by a negro about to be tried on a criminal charge, the ground of challenge being, that he was being deprived of substantial rights under the fourteenth amendment to the constitution of the United States and the civil liberties act, for that no member of his race would be put upon him as a juror, there being the names of only 44 negroes out of a total of 2493 names in the jury box, although there are out of a total population in the county of 83,783, negroes to the number of 35,536, a substantial portion of whom are literate, and are upright and intelligent men well qualified to serve as jurors, there being a manifest intention on the part of the officials of the county to prevent members of the negro race from serving on juries.

Held: The trial judge, acting as trior, was authorized to find under the evidence that there had been no deliberate and systematic action by the officials to keep the names of negroes out of the jury box or to keep them from serving on juries, and no denial of any right of the accused under said amendment or said civil liberties act.

7. The evidence fully authorized the verdict.

The plaintiff in error, David Watkins, was jointly indicted with Nathaniel Lamar for the murder of Mrs. Connell. A challenge to the array of jurors was filed as follows:

'This defendant is a negro and has been indicted and is going on trial for the murder of a white woman. This defendant respectfully says that by virtue of the continued, deliberate, and systematic activity of the officials of Bibb County, Georgia, this defendant has been and is being deprived of his rights under the 14th amendment of the constitution of the United States and civil liberties act of the United States as embodied in section [title] 8, paragraph [section] 44 of the U.S. Code Ann., in that by said activity of said officials, (a) no member of his race will be put upon him as a juror; and (b) despite the fact that of the total population of Bibb County, Georgia, which was 83,783, in the year 1940 there were 35,536 negroes, [and] in the jury box of said county from which this array was drawn there were a total of 2493 names, of which only 44 were negroes.

'Defendant says that this is true, despite the fact that a substantial proportion of the negro population of Bibb County, Georgia, is literate and are upright and intelligent men, well qualified to serve as jurors; and that the action of the officials of said county manifests their intention by systematic activity to prevent members of the negro race serving on juries, all of which is in violation of the laws of the United States, and particularly of the 14th amendment to the constitution of the United States, and * * * paragraph [section] 44 of article 8 of the United States Code, and which concerted action deprives this defendant of a substantial right which is guaranteed to him by the constitution and laws of Georgia and of the United States.'

A response was filed thereto as follows:

'1. There has been no continued, deliberate, and systematic acts of the officials of Bibb County, Georgia, to keep negroes out of the jury box of Bibb County or to keep them from serving on juries in Bibb County. On the contrary, the jury commissioners of Bibb County have proceeded under section 59-106 of the Code of 1933 of this State to make up a list of jurors from the tax books of the county and to select these jurors, who will necessarily constitute a small proportion of our population and of our taxpayers, on the basis of uprightness and intelligence. This is the standard which the law raises and this is the standard which has been followed by the jury commissioners of Bibb County.

'2. No official of Bibb County has interfered with this proper and constitutional process in selecting jurors. The solicitor-general has announced that he will not try any case with a mixed jury of negroes and white people in Bibb superior court, if that can be avoided. The only thing the solicitor-general has done, however, about this matter is to exercise his peremptory challenge given him by law under Code, section 59-805 of the Code of 1933. He has not influenced any jury commissioner or any other public official, and he has not sought to do so. These peremptory challenges are subject to exercise by counsel for [either] party in a criminal case without any excuse or justification whatever; however, the solicitor-general has, in public speeches, to both white and colored citizens, endeavored to justify his exercise of the peremptory challenge as to negro jurors by stating that in his judgment we have not reached the point in the social affairs of the State of Georgia, which would make it possible for negro jurors and white jurors to work together and possibly to eat together and sleep together and conserve the ends of justice. It is respectfully submitted that this is a sound observation of our social conditions at the present time.

'Wherefore, it is prayed that all issues of fact under the original challenge to the array of jurors, and all other challenges that may be filed to any additional array, may be submitted to the trial judge for determination, without the intervention of a jury. The State of Georgia also prays that all challenges to the array be overruled and denied.'

At the conclusion of said heading, the trial judge overruled the traverse.

A deputy sheriff, on being called to the scene of the occurrence, and being informed that Nathaniel Lamar and David Watkins knew that Mrs. Connell kept money, and that it would be well to look for them, testified that he and another officer found Lamar and Watkins at a negro juke joint, in a taxicab. With them was Lamar's sister, Emma Lattimore. These officers found on them and in the taxicab something over one thousand dollars. They went to Lamar's home and found enough to make a total of $1938. Deputy sheriff Gibson testified that he questioned the defendant Watkins, and that the latter admitted that he and Lamar planned for thirty days to get the money at the home of Mr. Bush, for whom they had been working at a grill run by Bush. Mrs. Connell was Mr. Bush's aunt and resided with him. Watkins said to Gibson that he did not do anything to Mrs. Connell, but that Lamar did. While Gibson was talking to and questioning the defendant, officer Robertson came to the door and stated that Lamar had confessed. Lamar and Watkins were then brought together. Lamar said that he planned the affair and asked Watkins to go with him. Both boys then told what happened. Lamar said he hit her over the head with a blunt instrument, and that Watkins stood by the road and watched.

Later, both Lamar and Watkins made confessions, and signed them, in the presence of four deputy sheriffs. Lamar confessed that he knocked Mrs. Connell down with a piece of electric fan, and then searched her room and found the money; and that then Watkins came in.

Watkins in his confession stated that he and Lamar went to the home of Mr. Bush, and finding him there, they waited for him to go back to his place of business. After Lamar was in the house for about ten minutes, he came to the door and called Watkins in. Watkins found the woman's body on the floor in the kitchen. He then struck her once with the handle of the pistol, and then Lamar dragged her into her bedroom. Lamar put paper under the bed and Watkins lit the paper. Watkins said that he did not see Lamar hit the woman, and that he used a different instrument from that used by Lamar.

The jury found the defendant guilty. He made a motion for new trial on the general grounds and the following special grounds:

1. Because the overruling of the movant's challenge to the array was contrary to law and without evidence to support it.

2. (a) Because the alleged confessions testified to by the witness Gibson were not freely and voluntarily made. (b) Because all...

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