Watkins v. State
| Citation | 203 S.W. 344,140 Tenn. 1 |
| Parties | WATKINS v. STATE. |
| Decision Date | 06 May 1918 |
| Court | Supreme Court of Tennessee |
Appeal from Circuit Court, Wilson County; John E. Richardson, Judge.
Matt Watkins was convicted of murder in the second degree, and he appeals and assigns error. Reversed and remanded.
John C Sanders and Seth Walker, both of Lebanon, for appellant.
Wm. H Swiggart, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.
The plaintiff in error was convicted of murder of one Tom Leek (in the second degree), and has appealed to this court and assigned errors.
A reversal of the judgment must result because of the failure of the trial judge to hold the argument of the District Attorney General within legitimate bounds. In that argument it was said, by way of prefatory remarks:
"I come before you with but one humble purpose in mind, and that is, to the best of the ability that I have in performing that office that the law requires of me, by a cool, deliberate, and unimpassioned debate and rehearsal of the facts to aid you in arriving at that verdict which truth and justice expects at your hands."
And at other points the Attorney General asseverated his purpose to discuss the issues with deliberation and fairness to the accused. All this, unfortunately, was lost sight of as the argument proceeded, and the Attorney General said:
"Gentlemen, you are expected to be men. Have I got 12 brave men? Have I got 12 men that are sponsors of Wilson county in justice? If there are men upon this jury who were put upon it to hang it, if there are men sitting there, no matter what the truth is, regardless of evidence and of duty, who are going to sit in the jury box and stand in the way of a verdict, for God's sake rise up and let me see who you are that I may quit wasting my sweat, that I may look into his face, and with all the power within me that I may tell it is you, or you; that I may leave the 11, 10, 9, 8, to their conscience, to their God, and that I may plead with you not to miscarry justice at the hands of a Wilson county jury, but that you stand firm for the rights of the people, the protection of the homes and of the widows of this country, that you put your foot down on murder and murderers, and that you make life more secure and safe in this land in which you live. Won't you? I am struggling by argument to touch you. Won't you tell me by some look that you are the man that intends to stand in the way of justice, if you are on this jury? God knows I don't want a man on this jury, when I address it, except he is for right. You know the tale this man tells you--
Mr. Walker (for the defendant): We object to that as improper to the jury.
Mr. Faulkner (district attorney): Just so you don't take my time, it don't bother me to be interrupted.
Mr. Walker: We have the right to except. (Overruled.)
Mr. Faulkner: You have the right to continue to interrupt. Here is what I want, brave men who are not afraid. I stand here as the representative of the law, as the representative of the state; I have no interest, I have no sheckels in my pockets from the man that I represent charged with murder to get him out of it, but I simply stand here in justice before God and under my oath to assist you in a correct and not an incorrect decision that you bring in."
It requires neither specification nor argumentation on our part to demonstrate that there was in this a departure from that orderly administration of justice which should mark all court procedure. The Attorney General, standing as the spokesman of the state, has no right to impute to the trial jurors wrongdoing or perfidy should they be unable to take his view of the facts, or to seek by any sort of intimidation to compel or deflect their verdict. We confess our inability to understand the conception of the Attorney General when he asked of that trier of fact, who dared to dissent, to tell of it by some look--thus to mark that juror, in the esteem of the state's law officer, as one whose intention it was to stand in the way of justice.
A verdict in a criminal case is not to be striven for by him who represents the state as a meed for his forensic or histrionic ability. The vindication of justice, not of advocacy, is the true concern. Still less is a verdict to be sought under conditions which may not untruly be said to take something of the color of jury hectoring.
Where language such as the above is used in addressing a jury in a criminal case, it should be understood, as we now declare, that any verdict so obtained cannot stand. The net result of the Attorney General's effort will be a mistrial of the cause, to the added expense of the state which he represents.
It appears, further, that the District Attorney General in the heat of advocacy addressed to the accused and his counsel at least one-fourth of his entire argument. The counsel of the defendant had asked of a witness who was testifying as to the good reputation of the deceased for peace and quietude whether it was not a part of deceased's reputation that he had made an attack of violence on one Luther Bingham. The Attorney General argued that Bingham ought to have been subp naed and used as a witness. Without any proof on the point the Attorney General...
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...a prosecutor should vigorously prosecute offenders and represent the State “impartially in the interest of justice”); Watkins v. State, 140 Tenn. 1, 203 S.W. 344, 345 (1918) (recognizing that in a criminal case “[t]he vindication of justice, not of advocacy, is the true concern”).Our conclu......
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State v. Pillow, No. M2002-01864-CCA-R3-CD (Tenn. Crim. 2/27/2004)
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