Watkins v. State

Decision Date09 April 2002
Docket NumberNo. 49A02-0103-CR-151.,49A02-0103-CR-151.
PartiesJames WATKINS, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
CourtIndiana Appellate Court

Janice L. Stevens, Marion County Public Defender Agency, Indianapolis, IN, Attorney for Appellant.

Steve Carter, Attorney General of Indiana, Jodi Kathryn Stein, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.

OPINION

BAILEY, Judge.

Case Summary

James Watkins ("Watkins") was charged by Information with Felony Murder,1 Murder,2 and Robbery, as a Class A felony.3 Watkins was tried by jury. The jury returned guilty verdicts on all counts. The trial court entered judgments of conviction on Murder and Robbery as a Class B felony, and imposed aggravated sentences of sixty years for Murder and fifteen years for Robbery, to be served consecutively. We affirm.

Issues

Watkins raises three issues on appeal, which we restate as follows:

I. Whether Watkins' convictions for Murder and Robbery are supported by sufficient evidence;

II. Whether Watkins' convictions for Murder and Robbery violate the double jeopardy clause of the Indiana Constitution; and

III. Whether the prosecutor committed misconduct by shifting the burden of proof to Watkins during closing argument.

Facts and Procedural History

Jimmy Anderson ("Anderson") and Cara Edwards ("Edwards") lived together at the Wingate Village Apartments. Anderson sold marijuana to friends and neighbors that lived in the apartment complex. On the morning of September 15, 1999, Edwards left for work and locked the deadbolt to her apartment with her key, while Anderson remained asleep in bed. At 11:14 that morning Edwards called Anderson and told him that she was going to come home during her lunch hour and smoke a joint. Minutes later, Star Easley ("Easley"), who lived in a neighboring apartment, saw three men leave Anderson and Edwards' apartment building. Phone calls placed to Anderson's apartment between 11:38 a.m. and 11:45 a.m. went unanswered. Edwards and two of her co-workers clocked out of work at 11:45 and drove to her apartment. When they arrived several minutes later at the apartment Edwards unlocked the dead-bolted door and found Anderson dead on the floor. Anderson's gold chain, his wallet with $250.00, his keys, and two ounces of marijuana were gone.

One of the individuals to whom Anderson had previously sold marijuana was Watkins' brother, neighbor Ezra Watkins ("Ezra"). Ezra lived in an apartment building situated perpendicular to that of Anderson and Edwards. Easley identified Ezra and Watkins as two of the three men that she saw leaving Edwards' apartment that day.4

Anderson died as a result of five stab wounds to his neck. The wounds were caused by a knife with a blade length of four to five inches and a width of ¾ of an inch. A knife matching this description was found in Watkins' apartment. The stab wounds to Anderson's neck cut through his carotid artery and into the cartilage of his larynx. No defensive wounds were found on Anderson's body.

Watkins told police that he had never been inside Anderson's apartment, however Watkins' right palm print was discovered on the south foyer wall near Anderson's body. The State charged Watkins with Felony Murder, Murder, and Robbery as an A felony. The jury found Watkins guilty as charged. The trial court, noting double jeopardy concerns, entered a judgment of conviction against Watkins for Murder and Robbery as a class B felony. Watkins appeals his convictions.

Discussion and Decision
I. Sufficiency of the Evidence

Watkins argues that "[n]o evidence was presented to show that [he] was involved, participated or aided anyone else in the commission of the [charged] offense[s]," and as such that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions for Murder and Robbery. Brief of Appellant at 6. We disagree.

Standard of Review

Our standard of review for claims challenging the sufficiency of the evidence is well settled. Whether the evidence is direct or circumstantial, we will not reweigh it or assess the credibility of witnesses. Moore v. State, 652 N.E.2d 53, 55 (Ind.1995). We consider only the evidence most favorable to the verdict and the reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom. Davis v. State, 658 N.E.2d 896, 897 (Ind.1995). A murder conviction may be based entirely on circumstantial evidence. Franklin v. State, 715 N.E.2d 1237, 1241 (Ind.1999). Such circumstantial evidence will be deemed sufficient if inferences may reasonably be drawn that enable the trier of fact to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.

Rules of Law

To convict Watkins of Murder, the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Watkins knowingly or intentionally killed Anderson. See IND.CODE § 35-42-1-1(1). To sustain Watkins' conviction for Robbery, as a Class B felony, the evidence must have shown that Watkins knowingly or intentionally took Anderson's property by using force while armed with a deadly weapon. See IND. CODE § 35-42-5-1.

We must further consider that Watkins' mere presence at the crime scene, with the opportunity to commit these crimes, is not a sufficient basis on which to support a conviction. See Fry v. State, 748 N.E.2d 369, 373 (Ind.2001.)

However, his presence at the scene in connection with other circumstances tending to show participation may be sufficient to sustain a conviction. See id.

Analysis

Here, the jury was presented in part with the following evidence: Easley saw Watkins leaving Anderson's apartment building around the time of Anderson's death; Watkins denied ever being in Anderson's apartment, yet his palm print was found on the foyer wall of Anderson's apartment; a knife matching the physical characteristics of the weapon used to kill Anderson was recovered from Watkins' apartment; and, cash, jewelry, keys and marijuana were missing from Anderson's apartment. From this evidence an inference may reasonably be drawn which supports the finding that Watkins knowingly or intentionally killed and robbed Anderson.

II. Double Jeopardy

Watkins also contends that his convictions for Murder and Robbery as a Class B felony violate the double jeopardy clause of the Indiana Constitution. Specifically, Watkins argues that his robbery conviction should be reduced to a Class C felony. We disagree.

Rule of Law

Where a criminal statute provides for the elevation of a charge to a more serious crime based upon an additional element, the Richardson double jeopardy analysis applies. Walker v. State, 758 N.E.2d 563, 565 (Ind.Ct.App. 2001). Richardson v. State, 717 N.E.2d 32 (Ind.1999), describes two components, the statutory elements test and the actual evidence test. Id. at 49. Two offenses are the same offense in violation of Article I, section 14 of the Indiana Constitution if, "with respect to either the statutory elements of the challenged crimes or the actual evidence used to convict, the essential elements of one challenged offense also establish the essential elements of another challenged offense." Id. Watkins argues that his convictions, for Murder and Robbery as a Class B felony, violate the actual evidence test. To show that two challenged offenses constitute the same offense under the actual evidence test, "a defendant must demonstrate a reasonable possibility that the evidentiary facts used by the fact-finder to establish the essential elements of one offense may also have been used to establish the essential elements of a second challenged offense." Id. at 53.

Analysis

In the instant case, the State's Murder and Robbery charges read as follows:

COUNT II

EZRA I. WATKINS and JAMES D. WATKINS, on or about SEPTEMBER 15, 1999, did knowingly kill another human being, namely: JAMES ANDERSON, by STABBING with a deadly weapon, that is: A KNIFE, at and against the person of JAMES ANDERSON, thereby inflicting mortal injuries upon JAMES ANDERSON, causing JAMES ANDERSON to die;

COUNT III
EZRA I. WATKINS and JAMES D. WATKINS, on or about SEPTEMBER 15, 1999, did knowingly, while armed with a deadly weapon, that is: A KNIFE, take from the person or presence of JAMES ANDERSON property, that is: a wallet and contents, jewelry, marijuana, and keys, by putting JAMES ANDERSON in fear or by using or threatening the use of force on JAMES ANDERSON, which resulted in serious bodily injury, that is: STAB WOUNDS OF THE NECK AND BACK, RESULTING IN DEATH, to JAMES ANDERSON;

(App. 40-41.) The jury returned guilty verdicts on both of the above counts and the Felony Murder charge, but when the trial court entered judgment it reduced Count III from a Class A felony to a Class B felony, ruling as follows:

The Court will enter judgment of conviction in each case ... on Counts II and III. And with respect with Count I, which is the Felony Murder, you need to put a "P" [for proven] in the code. As to Count III, the serious bodily injury is also an elevator, or enhancement, is precluded because it is the same as the death. So as to Count III, the Court will find the Defendants guilty of a lesser, that is: Robbery as a Class B felony.

(Tr. 900-01.) In doing so, the trial court avoided the double jeopardy implications of the jury's verdict.

In Chapman v. State, 719 N.E.2d 1232 (Ind.1999), the jury convicted the defendant of Murder and Robbery as a Class A felony. In that case, Chapman pointed a gun at a group of four individuals with whom he had been playing poker and told them to put their money on the floor, when one of the individuals refused, Chapman grabbed him, put a gun to his head, and asked, "Do you want to catch a bullet?" Id. at 1233. Chapman then fired a single shot to the individual's head. At trial, the foregoing account of events was given by all three of the other poker players. However, determining that Chapman's robbery conviction could not be elevated by the same serious bodily injury that formed the basis of his murder conviction, our supreme court remanded the case to the trial...

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