Watkins v. U.S. Dist. Court for the Cent. Dist. of Ill.

• Decision Date: 16 June 2022
• Docket Number: 18-2967
• Parties: Shane T. WATKINS, Petitioner-Appellant, v. UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS, Respondent-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

37 F.4th 453

Shane T. WATKINS, Petitioner-Appellant,

v.UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS, Respondent-Appellee.^*

No. 18-2967

United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.

Argued April 14, 2022

Decided June 16, 2022

Caroline Cook Lindsay, Attorney, Jones Day, Washington, DC, for Petitioner-Appellant.

Jeffrey Kienstra, Attorney, Office of the United States Attorney, Peoria, IL, for Respondent-Appellee.

Before Sykes, Chief Judge, and Hamilton and Scudder, Circuit Judges.

Hamilton, Circuit Judge.

This appeal presents several challenging issues related to the "categorical approach" to federal recidivist sentencing enhancements and the availability of collateral relief from criminal convictions and sentences under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. As it turns out, however, we need not resolve these difficult questions because the case is moot.

Back in 2004, petitioner Shane T. Watkins was convicted under federal law of possessing crack cocaine with intent to distribute. He received a mandatory life sentence based on three prior convictions for "felony drug offenses." After multiple unsuccessful collateral attacks, Watkins filed this § 2241 petition. Invoking the Supreme Court's decision in Mathis v. United States , 579 U.S. 500, 136 S.Ct. 2243, 195 L.Ed.2d 604 (2016), he argues that two of his prior convictions do not qualify as predicate felony drug offenses under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A), so his enhanced sentence was unlawful. Without contesting the merits of that argument, the government asserts, among other things, that Watkins has abused the writ of habeas corpus and that he does not meet the requirements to seek the habeas remedy provided in § 2241.

The problem for this appeal stems from good news for Watkins. Following enactment of the First Step Act of 2018, he applied for relief under that statute. He was resentenced to time served and released from prison. He is currently serving a reduced term of supervised release. Watkins says that a favorable decision on the merits here could lead to a further reduction in his supervised release term, but any help we might provide in that effort is too speculative to keep the case alive. We therefore vacate the judgment and remand with instructions to dismiss the petition as moot. See United States v. Munsingwear, Inc. , 340 U.S. 36, 39, 71 S.Ct. 104, 95 L.Ed. 36 (1950).

I. Factual and Procedural Background

A. Initial Sentence and Appeal

In 2004, a jury convicted Watkins under federal law for possessing more than fifty grams of crack cocaine with intent to distribute. Before trial, the government had filed a notice of intent under 21 U.S.C. § 851 to seek an enhanced sentence based in part on three prior drug convictions. One of those convictions was for possession of cocaine in violation of federal law. The other two were for possession of cocaine and delivery of cocaine in violation of the Illinois Controlled Substances Act, 720 ILCS 570/401(d) (1999). When Watkins was convicted in 2004, § 841(b) called for a mandatory life sentence for a defendant with two or more prior convictions for felony drug offenses. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) (2004) ; see also § 802(44) ("The term ‘felony drug offense’ means an offense that is punishable by imprisonment for more than one year under any law of the United States or of a State ... that prohibits or restricts conduct relating to narcotic drugs, marihuana, anabolic steroids, or depressant or stimulant substances.").

At sentencing, Watkins did not dispute that he had two such prior convictions.

Judge McDade, who had presided at Watkins' trial, said that a life sentence for the offense was "horrific" and described the case as "a perfect example of one of the evils of mandatory minimums." As required by statute, however, the judge imposed the mandatory sentence of life in prison, as well as the mandatory minimum ten-year term of supervised release. Watkins appealed. He challenged the partial denial of a pre-trial motion to suppress but did not challenge his sentence. This court affirmed. United States v. Watkins , 175 F. App'x 53, 58 (7th Cir. 2006).

B. Collateral Relief Proceedings

In 2007, Watkins filed a motion for relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. In an amended motion, he argued that he had received ineffective assistance of counsel and that one of his prior convictions should have been classified as a misdemeanor rather than as a felony drug offense. Judge McDade denied his motion in 2009.

Seven years later, the Supreme Court decided Mathis v. United States , 579 U.S. 500, 136 S.Ct. 2243, 195 L.Ed.2d 604 (2016). As we have said, Mathis provided guidance on the "categorical approach for classifying prior convictions for purposes of recidivist sentencing enhancements." Guenther v. Marske , 997 F.3d 735, 739 (7th Cir. 2021). The categorical approach matters to defendants who have received enhanced sentences based on prior convictions because it is used to "determine whether [a] state conviction can serve as a predicate offense by comparing the elements of the state statute of conviction to the elements of the federal recidivism statute." United States v. Elder , 900 F.3d 491, 501 (7th Cir. 2018).

A few months after Mathis was decided, Watkins filed his first petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Relying on Mathis , he argued that his prior drug convictions did not qualify as controlled substance offenses under the Sentencing Guidelines, so the enhanced sentence he received was unlawful. Judge Shadid denied Watkins' petition. The judge first noted that Watkins' designation as a career offender under the Guidelines was "irrelevant" because "his sentence was based on the statutory minimum sentence rather than the career offender guideline." In any event, the judge concluded, Watkins' three prior drug convictions all qualified as felony drug offenses, even after Mathis .

Watkins then filed this second § 2241 petition. This time, he asserted that his sentence was unlawful because the statutory enhancement was erroneous. Again citing Mathis , Watkins argued that his Illinois convictions did not qualify as felony drug offenses under the categorical approach because the Illinois drug statute under which he was convicted swept more broadly than federal law. He also asserted that a § 2241 petition was the proper vehicle for relief. A convicted petitioner seeking relief under § 2241 must show that

(1) the claim relies on a statutory interpretation case, not a constitutional case, and thus could not have been invoked by a successive § 2255 motion; (2) the petitioner could not have invoked the decision in his first § 2255 motion and the decision applies retroactively; and (3) the error is grave enough to be deemed a miscarriage of justice.

Franklin v. Keyes , 30 F.4th 634, 643 (7th Cir. 2022), quoting Chazen v. Marske , 938 F.3d 851, 856 (7th Cir. 2019). Watkins argued that these conditions were satisfied because Mathis —a statutory interpretation case—had not been decided at the time he filed his § 2255 motion and because he had received an improper life sentence.

Judge McDade dismissed this second § 2241 petition. The judge invoked the abuse-of-the-writ doctrine, concluding that "any claim based on Mathis was available to Watkins when he filed his first § 2241 petition in late 2016." And regardless, Judge McDade said, Watkins could not raise an independent Mathis claim in a § 2241 petition because Mathis did not create a new rule.

Watkins appealed. While his appeal was pending, Congress passed the First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194. As relevant here, section 404 of the Act allows defendants convicted of certain crack cocaine offenses to move for reduced sentences. See United States v. Shaw , 957 F.3d 734, 739–40 (7th Cir. 2020). Watkins filed such a motion in January 2019, almost fifteen years into his life sentence. Judge McDade resentenced him to time served and imposed a reduced eight-year term of supervised release.

In this appeal from the denial of his second § 2241 petition, Watkins argues that he was erroneously subjected to a mandatory life sentence and that the conditions for proceeding under § 2241 are satisfied. The government offers several reasons to reject the petition, arguing that the case is moot, that Watkins abused the writ, and that Watkins cannot pursue relief under § 2241. Because we agree that Watkins' case is moot, we do not decide the other issues.

II. Mootness

Article III of the Constitution limits the judicial power to "resolving live ‘Cases’ and ‘Controversies,’ rather than issuing advisory opinions." E.F.L. v. Prim , 986 F.3d 959, 962 (7th Cir. 2021), quoting U.S. Const. art. III, § 2. To invoke federal jurisdiction, therefore, a plaintiff must have "a ‘personal stake’ in the outcome of the action." United States v. Sanchez-Gomez , ––– U.S. ––––, 138 S. Ct. 1532, 1537, 200 L.Ed.2d 792 (2018), quoting Genesis Healthcare Corp. v. Symczyk , 569 U.S. 66, 71, 133 S.Ct. 1523, 185 L.Ed.2d 636 (2013). That requirement extends to all stages of the litigation, "not merely ... the time the complaint is filed." Id. , quoting Preiser v. Newkirk , 422 U.S. 395, 401, 95 S.Ct. 2330, 45 L.Ed.2d 272 (1975). If intervening circumstances deprive the plaintiff of a personal stake in the outcome, "the action can no longer proceed and must be dismissed as moot." Genesis Healthcare , 569 U.S. at 72, 133 S.Ct. 1523. Courts have a " ‘constitutional obligation to resolve the question of mootness’ and address it sua sponte if needed." E.F.L. , 986 F.3d at 962–63, quoting United States v. Fischer , 833 F.2d 647, 648 n.2 (7th Cir. 1987).

A case is moot "only when it is impossible for a court to grant any effectual relief whatever to the prevailing party." Chafin v. Chafin , 568 U.S. 165, 172, 133 S.Ct. 1017, 185 L.Ed.2d 1 (2013), quoting Knox v. Service Employees International Union, Local 1000 , 567 U.S. 298, 307, 132 S.Ct. 2277, 183 L.Ed.2d 281 (2012). Where the parties "have a concrete...