Watkins v. W. Va. State Police
| Decision Date | 01 September 2016 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO.: 3:15-CV-136 |
| Parties | ELVIN CLIFFORD WATKINS, Plaintiff, v. WEST VIRGINIA STATE POLICE, and CPL. J. E. WHISNER, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of West Virginia |
(GROH)
This matter is before the Court for consideration of a Report and Recommendation ("R&R") issued by United States Magistrate Judge Robert W. Trumble. ECF No. 11. Pursuant to this Court's Local Rules, the above-styled action was referred to Magistrate Judge Trumble for submission of an R&R. On March 9, 2016, Magistrate Judge Trumble issued his R&R recommending that this Court dismiss without prejudice the Plaintiff's complaint [ECF No. 1] and deny as moot the Plaintiff's Application to Proceed Without Prepayment of Fees and Affidavit [ECF No. 10]. For the following reasons, the Court ADOPTS IN PART the R&R.
On March 3, 1987, pursuant to a plea agreement, the Plaintiff was convicted in the Court of Common Pleas for the County of Franklin, Ohio, of rape of an individual betweenthe age of twelve and sixteen years. As a result, the Plaintiff was sentenced to not less than six nor more than twenty-five years of incarceration in the Ohio State Reformatory followed by two years of supervised release. On December 21, 1997, the Plaintiff concluded his period of incarceration and began his period of supervised release. More than nine years thereafter, in August of 2007, the Plaintiff was charged with possession of marijuana in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma, for which he was sentenced to fifty-seven months of imprisonment followed by thirty-six months of supervised release. Judgment and Commitment, United States v. Watkins, 6:07-cr-54-RAW (E.D. Okla. Feb. 4, 2008), ECF No. 49. While on supervised release for his 2007 offense, the Plaintiff was ordered to register as a sex offender under the federal Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act ("SORNA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 16901-16962 and 18 U.S.C. § 2250. Request for Modifying Conditions, United States v. Watkins, 6:07-cr-54-RAW (E.D. Okla. Oct. 5, 2011), ECF No. 116. On August 22, 2013, pursuant to a recommendation from his supervising probation officer, the Plaintiff received approval for the early termination of his supervised release. Order Terminating Supervision, United States v. Watkins, 1:13-cr-352-RDB (D. Md. Aug. 22, 2013), ECF No. 3.
In his complaint, the Plaintiff argues that requiring him to register as a sex offender is unconstitutional because registration was not a condition of his plea agreement in relation to his 1987 rape conviction. Additionally, he argues that once he was released from supervision on August 22, 2013, for his 2007 offense, the government no longer had the authority to require him to register under SORNA. Finally, the Plaintiff argues that requiring him to register as a sex offender is in violation of the Ex Post Facto and Double Jeopardy Clauses.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C), this Court is required to make a de novo review of those portions of the magistrate judge's findings to which objection is made. However, this Court is not required to review, under a de novo or any other standard, the factual or legal conclusions of the magistrate judge to which no objections are made. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 150 (1985). Failure to file objections in a timely manner constitutes a waiver of de novo review and a plaintiff's right to appeal this Court's Order. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); Snyder v. Ridenour, 889 F.2d 1363, 1366 (4th Cir. 1989); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91, 94 (4th Cir. 1984).
In this case, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C) and Rule 72(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, objections to Magistrate Judge Trumble's R&R were due within fourteen plus three days after being served with a copy of the R&R. The Plaintiff was served with the R&R on March 14, 2016. ECF No. 12. On March 21, 2016, he filed his objections. ECF No. 13. Accordingly, the Court is required to review de novo those portions of the R&R to which the Plaintiff objects and the remainder of the R&R for clear error.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), a court shall dismiss a cause of action proceeding in forma pauperis if such cause of action "(i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). If a complaint fails to allege "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face," Bell Atl. Corp. v.Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007), or fails to "show" that the plaintiff is entitled to relief, Francis v. Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 193 (4th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted), then it will be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
SORNA was enacted by Congress on July 27, 2006, "to protect the public from sex offenders and offenders against children." 42 U.S.C. § 16901. In § 16913(d), Congress gave the Attorney General of the United States "the authority to specify the applicability" of registration requirements to sex offenders convicted prior to SORNA's enactment. On February 28, 2007, the Attorney General made SORNA's registration requirements retroactively applicable "to all sex offenders." 28 C.F.R. § 72.3; see also United States v. Kebodeaux, 133 S. Ct. 2496, 2500 (2013). SORNA provides, in relevant part:
The R&R recommends dismissing without prejudice the Plaintiff's § 1983 complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and denying as moot the Plaintiff's application to proceed without prepayment of fees. Specifically, the R&R recommends dismissing the complaint because it (1) is devoid of any facts establishing the West Virginia State Police's or Corporal Whisner's personal involvement in the deprivation of his federal rights, (2) fails to allege any policy or custom that would satisfy an official capacity claim and (3) fails to allege facts necessary to establish Corporal Whisner's supervisory liability. Upon review, the Court finds that the majority of the Plaintiff's arguments in response to the R&R are not objections, but rather reiterations of arguments previously presented through the complaint. The Court discerns only one objection to the R&R: the Plaintiff's statement that the claims against Corporal Whisner are brought against him not in his official capacity but in his individual capacity. Notwithstanding the Plaintiff's objection regarding official capacity, upon consideration, the Court finds that the entirety of the Plaintiff's complaint lacks merit. Specifically, contrary to the Plaintiff's assertions, SORNA's registration requirements are constitutional, have no relation to the Plaintiff's supervised release status and do not violate the Ex Post Facto or DoubleJeopardy Clauses. Therefore, because the Plaintiff's complaint is legally frivolous2 and fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, it must be dismissed.
The Plaintiff argues that because there was no registration requirement incorporated into his 1987 plea agreement, he cannot now be compelled to register in accordance with SORNA. However, the parameters of the Plaintiff's plea agreement has no relation his obligation to register under SORNA. Indeed, SORNA did not come into existence until more than twenty years after the Plaintiff's 1987 rape conviction. Nevertheless, on February 28, 2007, pursuant to the authority delegated to him by Congress, the Attorney General made SORNA's registration requirements applicable to "all sex offenders, including sex offenders convicted of the offense for which registration is required prior to the enactment of [SORNA]." 28 C.F.R. § 72.3. And SORNA's applicability to "pre-Act" offenders has been upheld time and time again. See, e.g., United States v. Brewer, 766 F.3d 884, 886 (8th Cir. 2014); United States v. Lott, 750 F.3d 214, 216-20 (2d Cir. 2014); United States v. Elk Shoulder, 738 F.3d 948, 951-52 (9th Cir. 2013); United States v. Stock, 685 F.3d 621, 625 (6th Cir. 2012); United States v. Davis, 352 F. App'x 270, at *2 (10th Cir. 2009). Therefore, because SORNA's registration requirements are unaffected by the Plaintiff's 1987 plea agreement, this argument lacks merit.
In addition, the Plaintiff argues that upon the conclusion of his supervised release for his 2007 offense, he was no longer required to register under SORNA. However,SORNA's registration requirements may extend beyond an individual's term of supervised release. For example, § 16915(a) requires a tier one sex offender to register for fifteen years, a tier two sex offender to register for twenty-five years and a tier three sex offender to register for life. 42 U.S.C. § 16915(a). These periods...
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