Watkins v. Wabash R. Co.

• Decision Date: 19 November 1907
• Citation: 113 N.W. 924,137 Iowa 441
• Parties: WATKINS ET AL. v. WABASH R. CO.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

137 Iowa 441

113 N.W. 924

WATKINS ET AL.

v.WABASH R. CO.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Nov. 19, 1907.

Appeal from District Court, Marion County; J. H. Applegate, Judge.

The opinion states the case. Reversed.N. E. Kendall and Crozier & Welch, for appellants.

Kinkead & Mentzer and Read & Read, for appellee.

WEAVER, C. J.

Ad quad damnum proceedings having been instituted for the condemnation of land for the use of the defendant railway, the sheriff's jury assessed the plaintiff's damages at $325. From this finding the defendant appealed to the district court, where, upon trial to a jury, the damages were assessed at $223.95, and plaintiff appeals.

The principal question presented for our review involves the ruling of the trial court in admitting the testimony of one Leopold Liike, a witness on behalf of the defendant, as to the price at which he had sold his own land, and in giving to the jury an instruction relating to the weight to be given to this and other similar testimony. The witness above mentioned, having first testified that he was and had been the owner of land in the vicinity of plaintiff's farm and was familiar with land values in that neighborhood, estimated the fair market value of plaintiff's farm at $60 per acre. He then proceeded to say that at the date of the condemnation proceedings he owned a tract of land within about one-quarter of a mile from Watkins' land; that both were on the same creek, had about the same proportion of bottom land, and were quite similar in quality, except that Watkins' land was under better cultivation. He further stated that shortly before the trial he had sold the tract he had previously mentioned. The condemnation proceedings were had in May, 1903, and the trial at which the witness testified took place in October, 1904. He was then asked by defendant's counsel: “Q. What change has there been in market values of land in that locality since May, 1900, and at time you sold your place? (Objected to by plaintiff as incompetent, irrelevant, and immaterial. Overruled. Plaintiff excepts.) A. None that I know of. Q. At what price did you sell your land? (Objected to as incompetent and immaterial, and because witness says his land was inferior to the Watkins land. Overruled. Plaintiff excepts.) A. $60 per acre.” It is to be conceded that under some circumstances testimony of this kind is admissible to show the knowledge of the witness and his competency to speak as an expert upon the subject concerning which he is being examined. This is especially true where the witness has assumed to express an opinion, and is being cross-examined for the purpose of testing the weight and value of his testimony. King v. Railroad Co., 34 Iowa, 458;Winkelmans v. Railroad Co., 62 Iowa, 11, 17 N. W. 82;Cummins v. Railroad Co., 63 Iowa, 397, 19 N. W. 268;Hollingsworth v. Railroad Co., 63 Iowa, 443, 19 N. W. 325. But the practically universal rule is to the effect that such testimony is not admissible as substantive evidence of the value of the property which is the subject of the controversy. That the offer of the testimony in the present case was not intended simply to show the qualification of the witness to give an opinion of the value of plaintiff's land can hardly be disputed from the record before us. The witness had already shown his qualification by testifying to his ownership of land in that vicinity, and to his familiarity with land values in the neighborhood. Having thus shown his qualification, he had been allowed to give his testimony without objection. Thereafter, and apparently for no other reason than to corroborate his estimate and give it additional strength and influence with the jury, he was allowed to state that nearly a year and a half after the condemnation proceedings were instituted and the sheriff's jury had made its assessment of damages he had sold his own land at $60 per acre. In this we think there was prejudicial error. See Railroad Co. v. Huster, 40 Pa. 53;Railroad Co. v. Bunnell, 81 Pa. 414; Railroad Co. v. Benson, 36 N. J. Law, 557; Railroad Co. v. Pearson, 35 Cal. 247; Railroad Co. v. Keith, 53 Ga. 178. The reasoning upon which the doctrine of these cases is based is usually stated as follows: “The value of the property in controversy may be shown by the testimony of competent witnesses, and on cross-examination, for the purpose of testing their knowledge respecting the market value of land in that vicinity, they may be asked to name such sales of property and prices therefor as have come to their attention. But a party may not establish the value of his land by showing what was paid for another parcel similarly situated because it appears to give to the agreement of the grantor and grantee the effect of evidence by them that the consideration for the conveyance was the market value, without giving to the opposite party the benefit of cross-examination to show that one or both were mistaken. If such fact is to be admitted as some evidence of value, then prima facie a case could be made out so far as the question of damages is concerned by proving a single sale, and thus the agreement of the parties to such sale which may have been the result of necessity or caprice would be evidence of the market value of land similarly situated, and become a standard by which to measure the value of the land in controversy. This would lead to an attempt by the opposing party, first, to show the dissimilarity of the two parcels of land;...