Watkins v. Wattle
Decision Date | 05 August 1977 |
Docket Number | No. 10504,10504 |
Citation | 558 S.W.2d 705 |
Parties | Lennie S. WATKINS, Sr., Respondent, v. John L. WATTLE, Appellant. |
Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
Wendell W. Crow, Ford, Ford, Crow & Reynolds, Kennett, for appellant.
James E. Reeves, Byron D. Luber, Ward & Reeves, Caruthersville, for respondent.
Before BILLINGS, C. J., and HOGAN and FLANIGAN, JJ.
This is an action for the unlawful detainer (Chapter 534 V.A.M.S.) of 17.68 acres of agricultural land located in the city of Caruthersville. Plaintiff is the owner of the land. Defendant, who was in actual possession of the land at the time of the institution of the action on April 18, 1972, initially went into possession as a tenant under a written lease with the prior owner Wilks. The action, which originated in magistrate court, was tried in the circuit court without a jury. Although the trial involved additional issues, also resolved in plaintiff's favor, only that portion of the judgment which awarded plaintiff possession is under attack on this appeal by defendant.
Prior to 1971 Wilks and defendant entered into two written leases. Lease 1 was for a term beginning January 1, 1964, and ending December 31, 1974. Lease 2 was for a term beginning January 1, 1975, and "continuing for and during the natural life of lessee (defendant)."
On August 17, 1971, 1 defendant executed and delivered to Wilks a quitclaim deed in which the grantee was Wilks. The deed recited that it was made "for the purpose of releasing all interests of (defendant) under (lease 1) and (lease 2)."
On August 16, 1971, Wilks executed and delivered to plaintiff a general warranty deed in which plaintiff was grantee. This deed was not recorded until August 17, 1971, approximately two hours after the quitclaim deed had been recorded. The land described in both deeds was the same land covered by the two leases.
Five days prior to the institution of this action the plaintiff served upon defendant a written demand for delivery of possession.
Defendant's sole "point relied on" is that the trial court erred in refusing, on the basis of § 441.120, para. 1, V.A.M.S., to receive certain evidence offered by defendant. Plaintiff had objected to the proffered evidence on the basis of the statute. The court, in sustaining the objection, stated that it did so "in view of the statute."
The rejected evidence was to the general effect that plaintiff had a conversation with defendant, prior to the execution of the quitclaim deed, in which plaintiff told defendant that if defendant would sign the quitclaim deed "you can still farm the land as long as I own it." The terms of the oral letting were to be "the same as (defendant) had with Wilks prior to that time." Under lease 1 and lease 2, defendant had agreed to pay Wilks, as lessor, "crop rent in the amount of 1/4 of all cotton grown" on the land and "1/3 of all other crops." The rent was to be paid at the time the crops were marketed.
The only witness for plaintiff was plaintiff himself. He testified that the land was wholly within the city limits of Caruthersville. He also testified that the defendant was in possession and had refused the demand to vacate. On cross-examination plaintiff admitted that the land had always been used for agricultural purposes. He also admitted that, in the fall of 1971, he received "the crop rental." This rental was from the cotton crop which defendant, who had remained in possession, harvested and marketed in November 1971.
The testimony concerning plaintiff's receipt of the crop rental in November 1971 was received in evidence without objection and plaintiff's (respondent's) brief in this court understandably concedes its truthfulness.
The scope of appellate review of this action is governed by Rule 73.01 V.A.M.R. as construed in Murphy v. Carron, 536 S.W.2d 30 (Mo. banc 1976). This court holds that under the admitted facts here, § 441.120, para. 1, could not be invoked by plaintiff and that the trial court's reliance upon it constituted an erroneous application of the law. Murphy, supra, 536 S.W.2d at 32(1).
Section 441.120 reads:
Defendant argues that the trial court erred in invoking, at plaintiff's instance, § 441.120, para. 1. Defendant asserts that the statute was inapplicable for three independent reasons. The reasons are: (a) Under the facts here there was no holding over by defendant "after the termination of the time for which the premises were let or leased"; (b) The statute applies only to oral agreements subsequently entered into by the same persons who were parties to the original written agreement; and (c) The statute may not be invoked by plaintiff because the petition had alleged that the wrongful possession commenced on January 1, 1972, (rather than on the date of the delivery of the quitclaim deed) and plaintiff had accepted rent consisting of his share of the cotton crop which defendant harvested in November 1971.
Reason (a), advanced by defendant without citation of authority, is unsound and no bar to the invocation of § 441.120, para. 1. In his argument in support of reason (a) defendant says:
Defendant's argument, under reason (a) is, then, that there was no holding over by defendant "after the termination of the time for which said premises were let or leased under written contract." This is so, says defendant, because, at the time of the institution of the action (April 18, 1972) the time for which the premises were leased under lease 1 (until December 31, 1974) had not terminated and the time for which the premises were successfully leased under lease 2 (defendant's lifetime) had not terminated.
The same argument, in a somewhat different factual situation, was unsuccessfully made in Walther v. Anderson, 52 Tex.Civ.App. 360, 114 S.W. 414 (1908). There a Texas statute read in material part: "If any person shall willfully and without force hold over any land, tenements, or other real property after the termination of the time for which such lands, tenements or other real property was let to him . . . such person shall be guilty of forcible entry and detainer."
The lessee, against whom an action for forcible entry and detainer had been brought, argued that the statute was limited to cases where the lease had expired by efflux of time and did not apply to a case where a lease had been terminated by the lessor for lessee's violation of a covenant in the lease, which the lease itself authorized.
In rejecting this argument the court said, at pp. 417-418:
The case at bar does not involve a termination of the lease by reason of lessee's violation of a covenant...
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