Watson Const. Co. Inc. v. City of Gainesville
| Decision Date | 23 May 2006 |
| Docket Number | No. 1:05-CV-094-SPM.,1:05-CV-094-SPM. |
| Citation | 433 F.Supp.2d 1269 |
| Parties | WATSON CONSTRUCTION COMPANY INC., a Florida corporation, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF GAINESVILLE, a political subdivision, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Florida |
S. Scott Walker, Esq. of Folds & Walker, LLC, Patrice Boyes, Esq. of Patrice Boyes, PA., Gainesville, FL, In this case, Plaintiff, Watson Construction Company, Inc.
Timothy J. McDermott and Sarah G. Maroon of Alterman Senterfitt, Jacksonville, FL, along with Marion J. Radson, City Attorney for the City of Gainesville, Elizabeth A. Waratuke, Esq., Litigation, Gainesville, FL, for Defendant, City of Gainesville.
ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT FOR DEFENDANT
THIS CAUSE comes before the Court upon the City's countermotion for summary judgment (doc. 103) and memorandum in support thereof (doc. 104), and Plaintiff's memorandum in opposition (doc. 114). For the reasons set forth below, the Court finds the motion must be denied.
The complicated factual history of this case is set out at length in Defendant's countermotion for summary judgment (doc. 103). In brief, Yelvington Industries, owned by Conrad and Gary Yelvington, purchased a 49-acre tract of land in north Gainesville off of State Road 441. Plaintiff, Watson Construction Company, approached Yelvington about possibly buying a portion of the property. Watson and Yelvington entered into a contract for sale of 22.37 acres on the eastern side of the 49-acre tract, contingent upon Watson receiving approval from Defendant, the City of Gainesville, to site an asphalt and/or concrete plant on the property. During a "first-step" meeting1 with City planning staff, concern was expressed about the number of asphalt plants already in the area, and the idea of instituting a moratorium on this type of development was raised. The City indicated to Watson representatives that it would not seek a moratorium, but that private citizens would still be free to initiate such proceedings.
On January 18, 2001, Watson attended a "concept review" held by the City's Plan Board, at which a number of citizens appeared and expressed concern about the impact of the proposed asphalt plant. On February 12, 2001, during a City Commission meeting, more citizens voiced comments about the plant and asked the City to impose a moratorium in order to study the allowable uses in that particular zoning district. The City agreed and referred the matter to the Community Development Committee to "investigate the feasibility and language of a temporary moratorium with respect to 1-2 zoning." See doc. 94, Tsp.App. 1 at 12:9-12.2 A motion was passed to refer the issue to the Development Committee "for a special meeting to look into this and try to come up with a moratorium." See doc. 94, Tsp.App. 1 at 15:10-11. Three days later, on February 15, Watson filed an application for preliminary site plan approval for an asphalt and concrete batch plant.
Additional meetings were held, research was conducted, and studies were performed. Finally, upon second reading on May 14, 2001, a six-month moratorium was adopted and imposed, during which time the City would study 48 industrial uses and their impact on the surrounding areas.3 A "zoning-in-progress" date of February 12, 2001 was established after which no applications would be accepted.
Watson and Yelvington then filed complaints and motions for injunctive relief in state court. Upon hearing, the judge granted Watson's motion and enjoined the City from enforcing the moratorium as to Watson. The City took an interlocutory appeal to the First District Court of Appeal of Florida, which affirmed on the merits but remanded the case to enable the trial court to require Watson to post a bond.
Watson now sues the City of Gainesville seeking monetary damages under a number of theories, including due process and equal protection violations, as well as takings claims. The City has moved for summary judgment, and each ground is examined in turn.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) provides that summary judgment shall be granted "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." The moving party bears the initial burden, under Rule 56, of showing the court that there are no genuine issues of material fact to be decided at trial. Jeffery v. Sarasota White Sox, Inc., 64 F.3d 590, 593 (11th Cir.1995); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). If a moving party discharges its burden by pointing out an absence of evidence to support a necessary part of a claim, "the non-moving party must then `go beyond the pleadings' and by its own affidavits, or by `depositions, answers, to interrogatories, and admissions on file,' designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Id. at 594, 106 S.Ct. 2548 (quoting Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548).
The court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movant, resolving all reasonable doubt in that party's favor. Id. Thus, if a reasonable fact finder could draw more than one inference to support a genuine issue of material fact, the court should not grant summary judgment. Id. An issue of material fact is genuine if the "evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for a nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). "[A]ll that is required is that sufficient evidence supporting the claimed factual dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties' differing versions of the truth at trial." Id. (quoting First National Bank of Arizona v. Cities Service Co., 391 U.S. 253, 288-289, 88 S.Ct. 1575, 20 L.Ed2d 569 (1968)).
LEGAL ANALYSIS:
Standing and Property Interest
A crucial element of Watson's claims — due process, equal protection, and takings — requires that the plaintiff have some type of protectable property interest that has been infringed upon or abridged in some fashion. Without a finding that Watson had a property interest at stake, standing does not exist, and the case must be dismissed.
The elements of standing laid out by the United States Supreme Court in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992) were summarized by the Eleventh Circuit as follows:
To satisfy the constitutional requirements of standing, a plaintiff must make three showings: First, the plaintiff must have suffered an "injury in fact" — an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) "actual or iniminent, not `conjectural' or `hypothetical.'" Second, there must be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of — the injury has to be "fairly ... trace[able] to the challenged action of the defendant, and not ... th[e] result [of] the independent action of some third party not before the court." Third, it must be "likely," as opposed to merely "speculative," that the injury will be "redressed by a favorable decision."
Dillard v. Baldwin County Comm'rs, 225 F.3d 1271, 1275 (11th Cir.2000)(alterations in original). Standing is unavailable to a plaintiff "unless the right invaded is a legal right — one of property, one arising out of a contract, one protected against tortious invasion, or one founded on a statute which confers a privilege." Tennessee Elec. Power Co. v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 306 U.S. 118, 137-38, 59 S.Ct. 366, 83 L.Ed. 543 (1939).
The City argues that the contract for sale between Yelvington and Watson was specifically for the eastern 22.37 acres of the 49-acre tract owned by Yelvington. The site plan submitted to the City by Watson showed the proposed plant sitting on 5 acres west of the 22.37 subject acres. Because Watson submitted plans on land it did not own, the City claims that Watson has no cognizable property right to protect.
In response, Watson cites to a letter from Yelvington authorizing Watson "to do and perform any act whatsoever requisite and necessary to obtain those development approvals for the property as described by ... Exhibit A." See doc. 96 App. Exh. 180. Exhibit A contains a legal description of the entire 49 acres which, Watson argues, demonstrates that it was not limited to the 22.37 acres described in the contract. To the contrary, Watson claims that the decision was deliberately made to use the entire 49-acre parcel's legal description as the site plan location. As Gary Yelvington noted in his affidavit, this would prevent delay in the event Watson's engineers had to shift the site's layout to accommodate regulations or unforeseen City requests. See doc. 121, att. 14 at 2, ¶ 9. Accordingly, Watson was given authorization to build anywhere on the 49 acres, with the expectation that the final closing documents would use an amended description of the land actually utilized. See doc. 121, att. 14 at 2, ¶ 9. Watson submitted multiple site plans to the City, some of which utilized property outside of the 22.37 acres. See doc. 121, att. 14 at 2, ¶ 10. Each plan was submitted with Yelvington's full knowledge and consent. See doc. 121, att. 14 at 2, ¶ 10. Additionally, Yelvington testified that he specifically bought the 49 acres with the expectation of selling or leasing part of it in order to offset the costs of purchase. See doc. 93, att. 26 at 13:9-19; 20:1-6; doc. 121, att. 14 at 6, ¶ 7.
Watson had been planning since the inception of the contract to build an asphalt and concrete plant on the Yelvington site; in fact, it was because of this contract that Yelvington closed on the purchase of the entire 49 acres from Nekoosa, the original owner of the parcel. See doc. 121, att. 14 at 6, ¶ 6....
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