Watson v. Banks

• Citation: 243 S.W. 844,154 Ark. 396
• Decision Date: 03 July 1922
• Docket Number: 100
• Parties: WATSON v. BANKS
• Court: Supreme Court of Arkansas

243 S.W. 844

154 Ark. 396

WATSON v. BANKS

No. 100

Supreme Court of Arkansas

July 3, 1922

Appeal from Desha Circuit Court; W. B. Sorrels, Judge; affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.

Poe Gannaway & Poe, for appellant.

Appellant was legally declared an insane person under 9403-9405, C. & M. Digest. Such adjudication is not required by statute to be recorded at all, and the fact that it was recorded in the county court records does not invalidate same.

After lawful adjudication, appellant is presumed to remain insane until his disability is removed by competent authority. One dealing with a supposed insane person must show that he had mental capacity to enter into the contract. 136 Ark. 72; 139 Ark. 223; 14 R. C. L. 622.

It was the province of the jury to find whether or not appellant was insane, and the court erred in taking away this question from them by the instructions given.

Danaher & Danaher, and Moore & Hester, for appellee.

The adjudication of insanity was made by the county court, and not the judge thereof, and was done under authority of secs 5826-5829, C. & M. Digest. The probate court made no finding whatever. The sections of the Digest relied on by appellant had no reference to the regulation of the business affairs of appellant, but refer only to the manner of gaining admission to the State hospital.

A valid adjudication of insanity is prima facie evidence but the burden of proof is upon the one asserting insanity. 304 Mass. 173; 22 C. J. 79; 119 Ark. 179. Appellant failed to request the court to give an instruction to the effect that the adjudication of the county court was prima facie evidence of continuing insanity at the time the contract was made, and he cannot now complain.

OPINION

MCCULLOCH, C. J.

Appellee is a merchant doing business in Desha County, and he instituted this action in the circuit court of that county against appellant to recover on account for merchandise sold and delivered to one Harvill, upon written orders given by appellant.

In the answer filed in the case, appellant denied the allegations of the complaint with respect to the giving of the orders for the sale of merchandise, and the answer also contained a plea that appellant was insane at the time of the alleged sale of the merchandise, and on that account incapable of executing a contract.

There was a trial of the issues before a jury, which resulted in a verdict in favor of appellee.

It is conceded that the evidence was sufficient to support the finding of the jury in favor of appellee upon the issues whether or not appellant gave the written orders and whether or not the account of appellee was correct. It is also conceded that these issues were properly submitted to the jury, and there is no assignment of error in regard to that feature of the case.

The only assignments of error relate to rulings of the court with respect to the issue as to appellant's mental capacity at the time the contract is alleged to have been entered into.

The transactions occurred during the year 1920. Appellant was residing in Desha County, and was the owner of a farm. Harvill was his tenant. Appellant gave orders to appellee to make advances to Harvill.

The testimony tends to show that during the month of February, 1920, appellant suffered a nervous breakdown, and on March 21, 1920, he was taken to the State Hospital for Nervous Diseases, at Little Rock. He remained in that institution until April 1, 1920, when he was discharged, and returned home.

One of the orders given by appellant for a small amount was given prior to the time he went to the hospital, and all of the others were given after his return.

There is a conflict in the testimony as to the mental condition of appellant before and after he went to the hospital. There was sufficient evidence to support a verdict either way on that issue.

Appellant offered to introduce in evidence a certified copy of a written order, or judgment, signed by the county and probate judge of the county and entered upon the records of the county court, on March 21, 1920, declaring that appellant was insane and committing him to the State Hospital. The county clerk was introduced as a witness by appellant, and testified that the probate court was not in session on that date and had not been in session since March 10, 1920, but that the county court was in session, and that he placed this order on the records of the county court pursuant to the custom in that regard which had theretofore prevailed in that county. The court admitted the record in evidence as a circumstance tending to show that appellant was insane, and instructed the jury to that effect. The court...