Watson v. Beckel
Decision Date | 19 March 2001 |
Docket Number | No. 99-2290,99-2290 |
Citation | 242 F.3d 1237 |
Parties | (10th Cir. 2001) DANIEL WATSON, as a minor by his next friends, JIM and SANDRA WATSON, Plaintiff - Appellant, v. ROBERT D. BECKEL, Superintendent, New Mexico Military Institute, SETH R. ORELL, Commandant of Cadets, New Mexico Military Institute, ANTONIO PINO, CHRISTOPHER CORTEZ, Employees of the New Mexico Military Institute, all in their individual capacities, Defendants - Appellees |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit |
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of New Mexico. (D.C. No. CIV-98-551-JC/LFG)
Warren F. Frost, Tucumcari, New Mexico, for the appellant.
Richard E. Olson (Rebecca N. Johnson with him on the brief), of Hinkle, Hensley, Shanor & Martin, L.L.P, Roswell, New Mexico, for the appellees.
Before TACHA and LUCERO, Circuit Judges, and LUNGSTRUM, District Judge.*
After Daniel Watson was expelled from the New Mexico Military Institute, he sued officials at the Institute under 42 U.S.C. 1983 alleging that he was denied due process. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants on the due process claim and denied Mr. Watson's motion for leave to amend the complaint to add an equal protection claim. Mr. Watson appeals. We exercise jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1332 and affirm the district court's order.
Daniel Watson enrolled as a ninth grade cadet at the New Mexico Military Institute on January 3, 1998. In February 1998, Mr. Watson's roommate at the Institute complained to Lieutenant Antonio Pino, an official at the Institute, that Mr. Watson and several other cadets had assaulted him. Mr. Watson was required to change rooms and an investigation into the allegation was initiated. Mr. Watson's mother called Lieutenant Pino about the room change and was told that her son had assaulted his roommate and that the assault was motivated by racism. Major Christopher Cortez led the investigation and interviewed numerous cadets, including Mr. Watson. Major Cortez told Mr. Watson that the alleged assault was the subject of the investigation and Major Cortez asked Mr. Watson questions about the assault and its motive.
Major Cortez prepared a written report and, on the basis of the report, the Commandant of Cadets, Seth Orell, decided to convene a Major Disciplinary Board to hear the allegations against Mr. Watson and two other cadets allegedly involved in the assault. The Commandant appointed Lieutenant Pino as president of the board and Major Cortez as the recorder. Henry Borom, a Troop Leadership Advisor at the Institute, informed Mr. Watson of the decision. Mr. Borom told Mr. Watson that the investigating officer had recommended that he go before a Major Disciplinary Board for the alleged assault. The same day, Mr. Borom called Mr. Watson's mother and told her that her son was to appear before a disciplinary board for the assault. On March 4, 1998, Lieutenant Pino presented Mr. Watson with a Major Disciplinary Notice informing him of the time and date of the hearing and that he was "permitted to have an Advisor/Assistant from the staff, faculty, or Corp. of Cadets, to call witnesses on my behalf, to testify or remain silent without prejudice to be drawn therefrom." The notice did not specify the charges against Mr. Watson.
Mr. Watson arrived at the hearing without an "Advisor/Assistant." Major Cortez presented the evidence against Mr. Watson to the board, including five witnesses and numerous exhibits. Mr. Watson spoke to the board, but did not call witnesses on his behalf or introduce other evidence. Mr. Watson admitted to the board that he assaulted his roommate and that he was motivated by the fact that his roommate was Hispanic and Catholic. The board voted unanimously to expel Mr. Watson.
Commandant Orell met with Mr. Watson to inform him of the board's decision. Mr. Orell told Mr. Watson of his right to appeal the board's decision and Mr. Watson requested an appeal to the Superintendent. Robert Beckel, the Institute Superintendent, reviewed the evidence and upheld the board's decision to expel Mr. Watson.
On May 8, 1998, Mr. Watson filed this lawsuit against officials at the Institute under 42 U.S.C. 1983 alleging that he was denied due process. The district court subsequently granted summary judgment for the defendants on the due process claim and denied Mr. Watson's motion for leave to amend the complaint to add an equal protection claim on the ground that the amendment would be futile.
We review a district court's grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the same legal standard used by the district court. See Byers v. City of Albuquerque, 150 F.3d 1271, 1274 (10th Cir. 1998). Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). When applying this standard, we review the evidence and draw inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Byers, 150 F.3d at 1274.
This court reviews de novo a district court's refusal to grant leave to amend a complaint based on the court's conclusion that the amendment would be futile. See Jefferson County School Dist. No. R-1 v. Moody's Investor's Services, Inc., 175 F.3d 848, 858-59 (10th Cir.1999). A proposed amendment is futile if the complaint, as amended, would be subject to dismissal for any reason, including that the amendment would not survive a motion for summary judgment. Id; Bauchman v. West High School, 132 F.3d 542, 561 (10th Cir. 1997).
Mr. Watson argues that he was denied due process because he received inadequate notice.1 Notice was inadequate, according to Mr. Watson, because the written notice he received did not specify the charges against him. Mr. Watson also alleges that the board based its decision, in part, on the finding that Mr. Watson was a racist and argues that notice was inadequate because he was not told that he was charged with racism.
The Supreme Court decision in Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975), sets the standard for procedural due process owed to students facing short-term school suspensions:
Due process requires, in connection with a suspension of 10 days or less, that the student be given oral or written notice of the charges against him and, if he denies them, an explanation of the evidence the authorities have and an opportunity to present his side of the story.
Goss, 491 U.S. at 581. The Goss court explained that "[l]onger suspensions or expulsions for the remainder of the school term, or permanently, may require more formal procedures." Id. at 584. Mr. Watson, therefore, was entitled to at least the amount of due process described by the Goss court.
The Supreme Court has not answered the question of what, if any, additional process is required for a long-term suspension or expulsion. The Goss decision, however, provides some guidance. The Court explained that "the timing and content of the notice and the nature of the hearing will depend on appropriate accommodation of the competing interests involved. Id. at 579. The students' interest in "unfair or mistaken exclusion from the educational process" must be balanced against the school's interest in "discipline and order." Id. The Court emphasized that "the risk of error should be guarded against if that may be done without prohibitive costs or interference with the educational process." Id. at 580.
Other circuits that have considered the requirements of due process in cases of long-term suspension or expulsion have applied the balancing test of Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), to determine if additional process was required. See Palmer v. Merluzzi, 868 F.2d 90, 95 (3d Cir. 1989); Newsome v. Batavia Local School Dist., 842 F.2d 920, 923-34 (6th Cir. 1988); Gorman v. University of Rhode Island, 837 F.2d 7, 14 (1st Cir. 1988); Nash v. Auburn University, 812 F.2d 655, 660 (11th Cir. 1987). Under Mathews, a court must balance three factors: (1) the private interest that will be affected by the official action, (2) the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards, and (3) the government's interest, including the fiscal and administrative burden, that the additional or substitute procedural requirements would entail. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334-35. The three-factor test from the Mathews decision, decided one year after Goss, is appropriate for determining when additional procedure is due because the test crystallizes the balancing of student interests against school interests suggested in the Goss decision.
Mr. Watson's argument that he received insufficient notice because the written notice provided to him failed to list the specific charges fails under the Mathews balancing test. The Goss decision specifies that a student may be provided with either oral or written notice of the charges against him. It is uncontroverted that Mr Borom told Mr. Watson that he was to appear before the board for a hearing on the alleged assault, that Mr. Watson knew the subject of the investigation and that Mr. Watson understood that the hearing was about the assault. In addition, Mrs. Watson was told by Lieutenant Pino that her son was being investigated for the assault of his roommate and that the assault was racially motivated. Mr. Watson received adequate oral notice of the charges against him as well as what the district court termed "constructive notice"-- knowing the allegations that were the subject of the investigation and understanding that the hearing was about those allegations. The issue, therefore, is whether there would have been any additional value in listing the charges in the written notice and comparing that value to the burden that would be placed upon the Institute in...
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