Watson v. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway Company

• Decision Date: 11 June 1891
• Citation: 48 N.W. 1129,46 Minn. 321
• Parties: Frederic E. Watson, Administrator, v. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway Company
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

48 N.W. 1129

46 Minn. 321

Frederic E. Watson, Administrator, v. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway Company

Supreme Court of Minnesota

June 11, 1891

Plaintiff, as administrator of Clark W. Thompson, who died in 1885, brought this action in the district court for Faribault county, to recover possession of a strip of land in the village of Wells, 30 feet in width, and being the northerly part of a tract 130 feet wide occupied by defendant, the strip in question having a side track upon it. A jury was waived and the action tried by Severance, J., who found these facts: In 1869 Thompson, being owner of about 9,000 acres of land in Faribault county, and being president and general promoter of and a stockholder in the Southern Minnesota Railroad Co., and having in contemplation the laying-out and platting of a village on his land and establishing there a station and other conveniences for the railroad of his company, determined to donate and convey to the company a strip of land through all his lands in the county, including the village, sufficient for the right of way, structures and appliances of the railroad; and he then and there orally promised the company that he would do so upon the construction of the railroad through his lands. But it does not appear that the company constructed its railroad on the premises in question because of or relying on such promise. Afterwards and in the same year, 1869, the company, under Thompson's direction and controlled by him, located its railroad through his lands, and, among them, through a quarter-section which, in the same year, he laid out and platted as the village of Wells, the plat being duly acknowledged and filed for record. In making the plat he left a strip 130 feet wide, and marked as of that width on the plat, running from east to west through the village, open and unplatted into lots, blocks, streets, or alleys, upon which strip the line of the company, which had already been located, was plainly marked, the strip being 50 feet wide on the south side of such line and 80 feet wide on the north side. In platting the village Thompson reserved this strip for the purpose of right of way for the railroad, and for depots, side tracks, and other necessary appliances, and placed upon the strip the following: "Reserved for right of way, Line of S. M. R. R." In 1869 and 1870, the company, under Thompson's personal supervision and direction as president and chief promoter, built its railroad through the village so platted and upon the line fixed and marked on the plat on the reserved strip, and built stations etc. On the north 30 feet of the strip (being the premises in question) a side track only was constructed. Long before Thompson's death private warehouses were built in the village along the north side of the 130-foot strip and adjacent to the side track on the north 30 feet thereof, to be accommodated by such side track -- all with Thompson's knowledge, consent and acquiescence from the time of their erection to the time of his death. The company took full possession of the 130-foot strip in 1869, and it and its successors have held such possession thereof ever since operating the railroad thereon, and all this by the procurement and with the consent of Thompson, to the time of his death.

In March, 1876, Thompson and his wife, to carry out his original determination and promise to give the company so much land as it should need for its right of way and structures through all his lands, conveyed to the Southern Minnesota Railroad Co. the south 100 feet of the 130-foot strip. The conveyance was prepared by the general attorney of the company, and at the time of its execution he and Thompson supposed it embraced all of the strip in the village occupied by the company, and by their mistake and inadvertence the north 30 feet of the strip were omitted from the deed.

The convenience of the railroad and the public require for the purposes of the railroad the whole of the 130-foot strip. The defendant has succeeded to all the rights of the Southern Minnesota Railroad Co.

Upon these facts the court held that Thompson was owner in fee of the premises in question at the time of his death, and ordered judgment for plaintiff, which was entered, and the defendant appealed.

Judgment affirmed.

Andrew C. Dunn, for appellant.

Eller & How, for respondent.

OPINION

Gilfillan, C. J.

There are two principal questions in the case -- First. Was there a statutory donation or grant of the land in controversy to the defendant by Clark W. Thompson, by means of the plat of the town of Wells? Second. May a railroad corporation acquire an easement in lands by a common-law dedication of it to public use for railroad purposes? For, if the second question be answered in the affirmative, there can be no doubt of the defendant's title, as the facts found are sufficient to establish a dedication.

The first of these questions is really covered by the decision in County of Hennepin v. Dayton, 17 Minn. 237, (260.) The statute (Gen. St. 1878, c. 29, § 5) provides that, "when the plat is made out, certified, acknowledged, and recorded as required by this chapter, every donation or grant to the public, or any individual, religious society, or to any corporation or body politic, marked or noted as such on said plat, shall be deemed, in law and equity, a sufficient conveyance to vest the fee-simple of all such parcels of land as are therein expressed," etc. Such a donation or grant must be evidenced wholly by the plat. It cannot rest partly upon the plat and partly in parol, any more than can a conveyance by deed. The intent to donate or grant must appear from the plat itself. In the case referred to, there was, upon the plat of the town of Minneapolis, a block not divided into lots, on and across which were placed the words "County Block." The court held the intent to donate to the county not to be sufficiently indicated, and said of those words: "They might furnish ground for a conjecture that the proprietors had either given or granted the block to Hennepin county, or that they had reserved it with the design of giving it or selling it to the county at some future time. But there must be more than a ground for any conjecture, even if it were not in the alternative. The donation or grant must be marked or noted as a donation or grant. There must be some marking or note upon the plat, clearly expressing, in some way, that a designated piece of land is given or granted to a designated owner or grantee." So in this case the words marked on the strip of which the land in controversy is a part, "Reserved for right of way, Line of S. M. R. R.," might furnish ground for conjecture that the owner had given, or intended in the future to give, the strip to the railroad company; but they do not clearly express that the land is thereby and then donated or granted to the company. If we are to suppose that the owner used words in their legal sense, then the word "reserved" would express an intent on the part of the owner to hold the land to himself, rather than, at present, to part with it. If he intended to withhold the land, it is immaterial, so far as a statutory donation or grant is concerned, what purpose he intended eventually to make of it.

It is remarkable that there are so few decisions touching in any way the capacity of a railroad company to receive a common-law dedication of land for the purpose of a railway. The appellant refers us to 1 Rorer Railroads, 322, where the author assumes that such dedication may be made, and to Daniels v. Chicago & N.W. R. Co., 35 Iowa 129; Texas & New Orleans Ry. Co. v. Sutor, 56 Tex. 496, (11 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 506;) and Morgan v. Railroad Co., 96 U.S. 716, 24 L.Ed. 743, -- in which the same thing seems to have been assumed, though in none of them is there anything to indicate that the question was raised. In Todd v. Pittsburg, etc., R. Co., 19 Ohio St. 514, referred to by the respondent, the court held directly that a railroad company cannot acquire title to land by dedication.

The appellant argues that, whenever the right of eminent domain may be exercised to appropriate private property to public use, the property, or an easement in it, may pass by common-law dedication; and therefore, as lands for...