Watson v. District Court In and For Fourth Judicial Dist., 79SA111
| Decision Date | 07 January 1980 |
| Docket Number | No. 79SA111,79SA111 |
| Citation | 604 P.2d 1165,199 Colo. 76 |
| Parties | Arthur Jerome WATSON, Petitioner, v. DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR the FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT and the Honorable William Calvert, District Court Judge, Respondents. |
| Court | Colorado Supreme Court |
J. Gregory Walta, Colorado State Public Defender, Denver, Michael Wood, Deputy State Public Defender, Colorado Springs, for petitioner.
Robert L. Russel, Dist. Atty., Fourth Judicial Dist., Charles Yett, Deputy Dist. Atty., Colorado Springs, for respondents.
This is an original proceeding which is buttressed by only a skeleton record. The petitioner, Arthur Jerome Watson, seeks a writ of prohibition to prevent the respondent district court from forcing him to go to trial immediately after a scheduled hearing on his counsel's motion to withdraw. Petitioner also seeks a writ of mandamus requiring the trial court to allow his counsel to withdraw because of a conflict of interest. As a result of our rule to show cause, the continuance sought by petitioner has in effect been granted. We now discharge the rule.
On March 21, 1978, the petitioner was charged with counts of aggravated robbery, section 18-4-302, C.R.S.1973 (now in 1978 Repl.Vol. 8), and crime of violence, section 16-11-309, C.R.S.1973 (now in 1978 Repl.Vol. 8). The public defender was appointed to represent him on September 11, 1978, and trial was set for February 20, 1979. In February, the petitioner moved for a continuance and the trial was continued to March 12, 1979. The petitioner was told that no further continuances would be granted.
Prior to the scheduled trial date, a lawyer not connected with the public defender's office, contacted the respondent district court and indicated his intention to enter an appearance on behalf of the petitioner if the court would grant a continuance. The respondent court advised the lawyer of its earlier order regarding additional continuances, and said that March 12, 1979 was a firm trial date. Thereafter, on March 8, 1979, the petitioner requested that the public defender arrange for a meeting with the prosecutor so that the petitioner could offer information and assistance to the police in exchange for favorable disposition of his case. When the petitioner outlined the information to the public defender, it was apparent that the evidence could be used in the prosecution of other defendants represented by the public defender. The public defender immediately terminated the interview and told the petitioner that he had a conflict of interest and could not assist the petitioner in his efforts to obtain concessions from the prosecutor in the form of a plea bargain. The public defender then informed the respondent court of the conflict of interest and filed a motion for withdrawal from petitioner's case. Because of a heavy docket, the respondent court was unable to hear the motion until the morning of trial. The public defender filed a petition in this Court for a writ of prohibition.
The allegations in the petition prompted us to issue a rule to show cause. Denials and assertions made by the respondent court in the answer, coupled with counter assertions by the petitioner in the reply, create factual issues. It would be folly under the circumstances for us to grant relief in an original proceeding.
The petitioner asserts that scheduling of the hearing on the public defender's motion to withdraw on the day of trial deprived him of the effective assistance of counsel. With a more complete record the matter of effective assistance of counsel might be completely determined on the basis of constitutional standards. Certain principles, however, are so fundamental that they should be set forth so that the trial court can properly determine the issues after we discharge our rule to show cause.
It is a fundamental tenet of the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution that the right to the assistance of counsel be "untrammeled and unimpaired by a court order requiring that one lawyer shall simultaneously represent conflicting interests." Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 62 S.Ct. 457, 86 L.Ed. 680 (1942); White v. United States, 396 F.2d 822 (5th Cir. 1968); People v. Romero, 189 Colo. 526, 543 P.2d 56 (1975). In Allen v. District Court, 184 Colo. 202, 519 P.2d 351 (1974), we said:
"The need for defense counsel to be completely free from a conflict of interest is of great importance and has a direct bearing on the quality of our criminal justice system."
184 Colo. at 205, 519 P.2d at 352-53. In short, an attorney must not be placed in any circumstances where the loyalty owed to his client "(may) be diminished, fettered, or threatened in any manner by his loyalty to another client." Id.
The Code of Professional Responsibility, C.R.C.P. Canon 2, DR 2-110, provides general guidelines on withdrawal from employment, and Canon 5, DR 5-105(B) provides strictures on counsel appearing for defendants who have conflicting interests "A lawyer shall not continue multiple employment if the exercise of his independent professional judgment in behalf of a client will be or is likely to be adversely affected by his representation of another client, or if it would be likely to involve him in representing different interests."
When the conflict involves clients who are not being tried jointly, DR 5-105(B) is amplified by EC 5-14, which provides:
See also American Bar Association Standards for Criminal Justice Relating to the Defense Function, § 4-3.5.
Further guidance is given by the American Bar Association Standards for Criminal Justice. 1 The American Bar Association Standards for Criminal Justice Relating to the Defense Function define the role of defense counsel in these terms:
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Rodriguez v. State
...171, 472 P.2d 39. (Emphasis added.) Accord, State v. Kruchten, 101 Ariz. 186, 199, 417 P.2d 510 (1966); Watson v. District Court in and for Fourth Jud., Colo., 604 P.2d 1165, 1168 (1980). Even though the Disciplinary Rules do not require Foreman to move to withdraw, other considerations may......
-
People v. Demarest, 89CA0447
...discretion of the court. Riley v. District Court, 181 Colo. 90, 507 P.2d 464 (Colo.1973); C.A.R. 5; and see also Watson v. District Court, 199 Colo. 76, 604 P.2d 1165 (1980). We further recognize the general rule that counsel who undertakes to conduct an action impliedly stipulates that he ......
-
The Conflicted Attorney
..._____________________ Footnotes: 1. People v. Belfor,___Colo.___, 591 P.2d 585 (1979). 2592 2. See, Watson v. District Court,___Colo.___, 604 P.2d 1165 (1980); See also, Sands, "Prior Representation: The Specter of Disqualification of Trial Counsel," 11 The Colorado Lawyer 1214 (May 1982). ......
-
Justice Delayed Is Justice Denied
...basis of compelling circumstances. 27. C.R.C.P. Rule 121. See also, DR 2--101. 28. EC 2--32 and EC 7--39. 29. Watson v. District Court, 604 P.2d 1165 (Colo. 1980). 30. ABA Standard 4--3.9. 31. Sobol v. District Court, 19 P.2d 675, 677 (Colo. 1980). 32. ABA Standard 4--1.2(A)(D). 33. ABA Sta......
-
Tcl - Ethical Concerns When Dealing With the Elder Client - October 2005
...the client to be more candid and, perhaps, reveal conflicts of interest. 10. Watson v. District Court in and for Fourth Judicial Dist., 604 P2d 1165 (Colo. 1980). 11. Colo.RPC 1.7(b). 12. For sample fee agreements, see http://www.cobar.org/group/index.cfm?category=260&EntityID=dplpm. 13. Pe......
-
A Practical Approach to Conflicts of Interest
...bring upon others. Trial of Queen Caroline 8 (1821). 6. People v. Belfor, 591 P.2d 585, 587 (Colo. 1979). 7. Watson v. District Court, 604 P.2d 1165, 1166 1980). 8. Confidentiality has been recognized as "the cornerstone of the adversary system and effective assistance of counsel." Morris v......