Watson v. Industrial Commission

• Decision Date: 12 May 1966
• Docket Number: No. 8628--PR,8628--PR
• Citation: 414 P.2d 144,100 Ariz. 327
• Parties: Carl WATSON, Petitioner, v. The INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION of Arizona and State of Arizona-State Auditor(Arizona State Prison), Respondents.
• Court: Arizona Supreme Court

Page 144

414 P.2d 144

100 Ariz. 327

Carl WATSON, Petitioner, v. The INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION of Arizona and State of Arizona-State Auditor(Arizona State Prison), Respondents.

No. 8628--PR.

Supreme Court of Arizona, In Banc.

May 12, 1966.

Donald J. Morgan, Phoenix, for petitioner.

Robert K. Park, Chief, Counsel, by DeeDee Samet, Phoenix, for Industrial Commission and others, respondents.

UDALL, Justice.

This matter is before us by a petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals reported in 3 Ariz.App. 32, 411 P.2d 455. We have jurisdiction to review this case pursuant to Rule 47(b), Rules of the Supreme Court, 17 A.R.S. and A.R.S. § 12--120.24. The Court of Appeals, Division I, set aside an award of the Arizona Industrial Commission, and held that an inmate of the state prison who was injured while working as a prisoner could recover for injuries sustained pursuant to the Workmen's Compensation Act of this state.

The facts of this case, as reflected by the evidence, are simple and undisputed: Carl Watson, hereinafter referred to as petitioner, on July 7, 1963 was an inmate of the Arizona State Prison serving a sentence for a term of years less than life. On the above date petitioner, while performing work related to the prison farm, came into contact with an electrical wire and received serious electrical shock and burns which have resulted in permanent disfigurement to parts of his body.

At the time of the injury petitioner was an outside trusty having his living quarters, mess facilities, and assigned work outside the walls of the prison. The work of the prison farm is usually performed without supervision of an armed guard or member of the prison staff. Petitioner was not under direct supervision on the day he was injured, and was a member of a hay crew whose assigned task was to go to the fields, load bales of hay on a truck and unload the hay from the truck at the prison barn. The hay was used to feed livestock of the prison which livestock was, in turn, used to feed the inmates. The products of the prison farm are not sold to the public but no doubt de help reduce the cost of maintaining the prison.

While returning from the field, petitioner was riding on the top of the loaded truck and came in contact with a low-hanging active power transmission line, sustaining injuries. There was testimony that the status of an outside trusty at the prison is sought by the inmates.

The statutes of this state require that all persons sentenced to Arizona State Prison must work unless they are being disciplined. After an initial sixty-day orientation period, those prisoners whose behavior and work record are acceptable, are assigned work duties and receive two days credit on their sentence for every day they work, whether the work is performed within or outside prison walls, or whether under supervision or as a trusty. Prisoners in this state do not receive remuneration for work performed but their reward is a shorter sentence if their conduct otherwise is proper. The only advantage of an outside trusty at the prison is the relative freedom incident thereto plus the psychological benefit derived from lack of strict confinement.

The Industrial Commission found that petitioner at the time of injury was not in the employment of the State of Arizona and that the employer-employee relationship did not exist. As a consequence of this finding, the Commission determined that petitioner's injury was noncompensable. Petitioner complied with appropriate procedural steps and brought the matter before the Court of Appeals by a writ of certiorari to review the action of the Commission.

Both parties agree that the record presents but one question: Was petitioner an employee of the State of Arizona within the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Law? To be entitled to compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act it is necessary for petitioner to show that he comes within the provisions of Chapter 6, Title 23 of the Arizona Statutes. It is the basic requirements of this section which determines persons included thereunder as employees.

An examination of the constitution and statutes of the State of Arizona reveal no explicit provision stating that one who is serving time at the Arizona State Prison is or is not covered by the Workmen's Compensation Act. Therefore, we must consider the purpose and requisites of the Workmen's Compensation Act together with applicable statutes pertaining to prisoners incarcerated in the Arizona State Prison.

The right to compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act is delineated by the terms of Art. 18, § 8, Constitution of Arizona, A.R.S., which states, in part:

'The Legislature shall enact a Workmen's Compensation Law applicable to workmen engaged in manual or mechanical labor in all public employment whether of the State, or any political subdivision or municipality thereof * * * and in such private employments as the Legislature may prescribe * * *.'

The legislature, in defining the term 'employee', specifically states, A.R.S. § 23--901, that it means:

'4. * * *

(a) Every person in the service of the state, a county, city, town, municipal corporation or school district, including regular members of lawfully constituted police and fire departments of cities and towns, Whether by election, appointment or contract of hire.' (Emphasis supplied)

Petitioner was not elected or appointed as required by the above statute; therefore, there must be a contract of hire in order to come within the scope of the Workmen's Compensation Law. If the employment relationship arises from any of three methods established by the statute, 'some form of duty to serve and remuneration therefor must exist before one may be considered an employee of the state.' Ferrell v. Industrial Commission, 79 Ariz. 278, 288 P.2d 492 (1955).

A number of other states have considered the same question and announced the general rule that a prisoner does not come within the scope of workmen's compensation acts absent special legislation extending benefits of the workmen's compensation act to prisoners. Lawson v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 37 Ga.App. 85, 139 S.E. 96 (1927); Shain v. Idaho State Penitentiary, 77 Idaho 292, 291 P.2d 870 (1955); Miller v. City of Boise, 70 Idaho 137, 212 P.2d 654 (1949); Schraner v. State of Indiana, Dep't of Correction, 135 Ind.App. 504, 189 N.E.2d 119 (1963); Greene's Case, 280 Mass. 506, 182 N.E. 857 (1932); Jones v. Houston Fire and Casualty Insurance Co., 134 So.2d 377 (La.App.1961); Brown v. Jamesburg State Home for Boys, 60 N.J.Super. 123, 158 A.2d 445 (1960); Goff v. Union County, 26 N.J.Misc. 135, 57 A.2d 480 (1948); Scott v. City of Hobbs, 69 N.M. 330, 366 P.2d 854 (1961); In re Kroth, 408 P.2d 335 (Okl.1965). But see, California Highway Com'n, etc. v. Industrial Accident Com'n, 200 Cal. 44, 251 P. 808, 49 A.L.R. 1377 (1926).

Some state legislatures have enacted special provisions providing compensation for effects of injuries received arising out of prison work. See, Gen.Stat. of N.C., § 97--13, Annotated Code of Md., Art. 101, § 35; W.S.A. 56.21, as amended.

'Convicts and prisoners have usually been denied compensation for injuries sustained in connection with work done within the prison, even when some kind of reward attended their exertions. The reason given is that such a convict cannot and does not make a true contract of hire with the authorities by whom he is confined. The inducements which might be held out to him, in the form of extra food or even money, are in no sense consideration for an enforceable contract of hire.' 1 Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law, 1952 ed., § 47.31, p. 692.

Petitioner contends that he was performing a service for the state of a definite value at the time of his injury. He claims that his status of a Class A prisoner working outside the walls, for which he volunteered and received special treatment is sufficient to imply a 'contract of hire.' We cannot follow such reasoning.

Certain requirements have been established by our legislature as to individuals sentenced to our state prison. A.R.S. § 31--251, concerning labor required of prisoners, in part states:

'A. The superintendent of the state prison shall require of each able-bodied prisoner as many hours of labor each day during his term of imprisonment as prescribed by the rules of the prison.

'B. Every prisoner faithfully performing such labor and conforming in all respects to the rules, or if unable to work, but complying in all respects to the rules, shall be allowed, if a first offender, from the minimum term of his sentence, or, if a second offender or more, from the maximum term of his sentence, a deduction of two months in each of the first two years, four months in each of the next two years, and five months in each of the remaining years of the term.

* * *'

Subsection A of A.R.S. § 31--252, reads as follows:

'A. A prisoner in the state prison, while working on the public highways or the prison farms as a trusty outside the prison walls and without requiring armed guards, or...