Watson v. Owen

• Decision Date: 19 April 1926
• Docket Number: 25606
• Citation: 142 Miss. 676,107 So. 865
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
• Parties: WATSON et al. v. OWEN. [*]

107 So. 865

142 Miss. 676

WATSON et al. v. OWEN. ^[*]

No. 25606

Supreme Court of Mississippi

April 19, 1926

Division B

1. REFORMATION OF INSTRUMENTS. Agreement of children to divide money coming to father's estate would not be reformed as for mutual mistake to include sum received by one party in settlement of claim against deceased relative's estate by virtue of father's relationship, where evidence showed agreement included only cotton claims of father's estate against government. Agreement between children to divide equally any money that might come to father's estate would not be reformed as for mutual mistake to include sum received by one of parties in settlement of claim against estate of deceased relative, by virtue of father's relationship, where the evidence showed that agreement was intended only as to money expected to come to father's estate from certain cotton claims against United States government.

2. APPEAL AND ERROR.

Decree of chancellor refusing to reform written instrument will not be disturbed on appeal, where appellants failed to meet burden of proof required by law.

3. REFORMATION OF INSTRUMENTS.

The party who seeks to reform a written instrument has burden of proving mutual mistake beyond reasonable doubt.

4. REFORMATION OF INSTRUMENTS.

Burden of proof required to reform written instrument grows heavier on complainant by lapse of time before seeking reformation.

5. DESCENT AND DISTRIBUTION. Written agreement of children to share money coming to father's estate did, not entitle heirs of deceased parties to agreement to share of money received by one party from her aunt's estate, though acquired as descendent of father; father having died before aunt.

Written agreement of children to divide equally any money that should come to father's estate held not to entitle heirs of deceased parties to agreement to division of money received by one of parties as settlement of claim against her aunt's estate, though money was acquired as descendant of father; father having died before aunt.

HON. T P. GUYTON, Chancellor.

APPEAL from chancery court of Lowndes county, HON. T. P. GUYTON Chancellor.

Suit by T. C. Watson and others against Mrs. Tennessee Watson Owen. From a decree denying relief, and dismissing the bill, complainants appeal. Affirmed.

Decree affirmed.

Paine & Paine, for appellants.

I. Appellants are entitled to a decree compelling appellee to disgorge the shares of this one hundred twenty-six thousand six hundred thirty-three dollars and seventy-five cents, equitably and justly due appellants, and this is true for the reason that Exhibit E, even without reformation, entitles appellants to their share of this money received by appellee as a descendant of Asa Watson. It clearly says that appellee and the forbears of appellants agreed to share equally any money that might come to the estate of their father, Asa Watson. Appellee contends that this was meant to apply only to money received from the United States Government on a cotton claim, but this construction contended for by appellee contradicts the very plain wording of the instrument. We submit that this instrument is not to be so construed, but it is not necessarily ambiguous, and the court in construing it, need only look to the four corners of it. Appellants ask only that to which they are entitled in equity and good conscience.

What was the intention of appellee and H. D. and Wheeler Watson and Mrs. Julia Manning when they executed Exhibit E? Exhibit E, used the expression "divide equally among ourselves any money that may come to the estate of our father, Asa Watson." It could only mean, and was meant and understood by all of the signers thereto, that they would divide any money which would come to them or any of them as descendants of Asa Watson and due to their relationship to Asa Watson.

It is a policy of the law and our courts to look with favor upon family agreements and settlements, and our courts have always been prone to uphold such family settlements. But we submit that the chancellor disregarded and overlooked the equities of appellants and, therefore, erred in dismissing the bill.

II. Looking at the case from another angle, the court will see from the sworn answer of appellee and from her testimony that she contends that Exhibit E, referred only to money to be received from cotton claims against the United States Government, but Exhibit E, does not mention cotton claims; and to that extent, under the testimony and contention of appellee, Exhibit E, would be ambiguous and, therefore, parol evidence would be competent to show what was actually intended. See 22 C. J., "Evidence," secs. 1715-1720; also secs. 1571-1573 and secs. 1586-1590; Shackleford v. Hooker, 54 Miss. 716.

III. As to the right of appellants to a reformation of Exhibit E: One of the fundamental grounds of equity jurisdiction is to grant relief and reformation of written instruments on account of mutual mistake of facts, whether the contract is executed or executory. See Dunbar v. Newman, 46 Miss. 235; Mills v. Mills, 84 Miss. 624-637-640; Ingram-Day Lumber Co. v. Robertson, 129 Miss. 385; Pomeroy's Equity Jurisdiction (Student's Ed.), sec. 845, p. 418; Snell v. Remington Paper Co., 198 N.Y. 922; Williams v. Hamilton, notes, 65 A. S. R. 482, 483, 487, 488, 489, and 492; Brimm v. McGee, 119 Miss. 52.

And parol evidence is admissible to reform a voluntarily adopted written instrument upon the ground of mutual mistake. See Pomeroy's Equity Jurisdiction (Student's Ed.), pp. 430 and 431; Williams v. Hamilton, notes, 65 A. S. R. 521.

Especially is this true with reference to a family settlement. In which event, there is no necessity for a valuable consideration, and a voluntary settlement without such valuable consideration may be reformed. See Spencer v. Spencer, 115 Miss. 71.

The assignments of expectancies by family settlements are valid. 5 C. J., p. 862, especially p. 868, sec. 25 (3); Hunt v. Smith, notes, 17 A. L. R. 601; Spencer v. Spencer, 115 Miss. 71; Field v. Camp, 201 F. 682; 125 A. (N. J.) 582.

The appellants, descendants of H. D. and Wheeler Watson and Mrs. Julia Watson Manning, are entitled to reformation against appellee as they are in privity with their father and their aunt, Mrs. Manning. See 23 R. C. L. 339, sec. 33; Williams v. Hamilton, 65 A. S. R., notes, 504; Dunbar v. Newman, 46 Miss. 231.

Counsel for appellee cite a number of authorities to the effect that before a court will order a reformation the rule requires that the evidence be "clear, convincing, and satisfactory." But in answer to this part of their brief we reply that this rule does not necessarily preclude relief because the evidence is conflicting. Hutchinson v. Ainsworth, 2 A. S. R. 823; Williams v. Hamilton, notes, 65 A. S. R. 495.

Counsel for appellee also contend that appellants are barred of any rights in this case by laches and by their negligence. We submit that laches, short of the statute of limitations, does not bar their right. 23 R. C. L. 352; Williams v. Hamilton, notes, 65 A. S. R. 504. Negligence is no bar to reformation. Brimm v. McGee, 119 Miss. 52.

Owen & Garnett, for appellee.

I. We submit that a court will not reform a written instrument for mistake unless the mistake was mutual, and that it was mutual must be shown without a doubt. Chief Justice SHARKEY, in Harrington v. Harrington, 2 How. 701, 718; Justice CLAYTON in Lauderdale v. Hallock, 7 S. & M. 629; Justice TRULY in Jones v. Jones, 41 So. 373; Justice COOK in St. P. F. & M. Ins. Co. v. McQuaid, 75 So. 255.

II. We submit that a court will weigh parol evidence to reform a writing for mutual mistake "with great caution and distrust" when, in the language of Justice STORY, "circumstances have occurred in the intermediate time which give an intense importance to the asserted mistake," or in the language of Justice THAYER in Travelers' Ins. Co. v. Henderson, 69 F. 765 (C. C. A.), "an event has also occurred which renders a change in the terms of the contract of vital importance to the person who is seeking to reform the instrument."

III. We submit that a direct conflict in the evidence is conclusive against the reformation of an instrument for alleged mistake. Litteral V. Bevins, 217 S.W. 369; Little v. Webster, 1 N.Y.S. 315; Mifflin County Nat'l Bank v. Thompson, 22 A. 714; Pope v. Hoopes, 90 F. (C. C. A.) 451; Desmoines Co. Agr. So. v. Tubbessing, 54 N.W. 68; Coleman v. Ill. Life Ins. Co., 82 S.W. 616; Heffron v. Fogel, 82 P. 1003; Bobb v. Bobb, 4 S.W. (Mo.) 514; Fitschen v. Thomas, 22 P. 453; Stein v. Phillips, 84 P. 793 (Ore.) ; Webb v. Mose, 49 S.W. 1081; Wells v. Ogden, 30 Wisc. 637.

IV. We submit that the alleged intention to which a complainant desires an instrument to be made to conform must be shown to have "continued concurrently in the minds of all parties down to the time of its execution." Roberts v. Derby, 23 N.Y.S. 34; Dawson v. Graham, 41 Upper Canada Q. B. 532; citing Kerr on Frauds, 350; Stockbridge Iron Co. v. Hudson Iron Co., 107 Mass. 290, 317; Nebraska Loan & T. Co. v. Ignowski, 74 N.W. 852; Ramsey v. Smith, 32 N.J.Eq. 28; So. F. & W. Co. v. Ozment, 44 S.E. 681; Hearne v. M. Life Ins. Co., 20 Wall (U.S.) 483.

V. We submit that a lapse of thirty-six years between the date of the execution of the instrument and the date of the attack on it, accompanied by the death of all parties to it but one, is fatal to a prayer for reformation, especially where the deceased parties to it lived many years after its execution had copies of the writing in their possession, and made no complaints as to its terms. Keedy v. Hally, 63 Md. 311; Stiles v. Willis, 8 A. (Md.) 353; Bobb v. Bobb, 4 S.W. (Mo.) 511; Davidson v. Mayhew, 68 S.W. 1031; Fitschen v. Thomas 22 P. 450; ...