Watson v. People
| Decision Date | 10 August 1964 |
| Docket Number | No. 20640,20640 |
| Parties | Arthur J. WATSON, Plaintiff in Error, v. The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Defendant in Error. |
| Court | Colorado Supreme Court |
Jim R. Carrigan, Boulder, for plaintiff in error.
Duke W. Dunbar, Atty. Gen., Frank E. Hickey, Deputy Atty. Gen., John E. Bush, John P. Moore, Asst. Attys. Gen., Denver, for defendant in error.
We will refer to plaintiff in error as defendant or by name. This action is here on writ of error directed to a judgment which imposed a sentence of life imprisonment on the defendant following a trial in which a verdict of guilty on a charge of first degree murder was entered. This is the second time that the facts involved in this case have been before this court. In Kostal and Watson v. People, 144 Colo. 505, 357 P.2d 70, a new trial was ordered. For a statement of facts forming the basis of the murder charge we refer to that case.
Watson now seeks reversal of the judgment entered following his second trial and as grounds therefor contends:
1. That the trial judge was shown to have an interest in the case and should have sustained defendant's motion to disqualify himself.
2. That defendant requested the production of certain statements made by eyewitnesses to the alleged crime, and that the trial judge erred in failing to order immediate production thereof for defendant to use in the cross-examination of those witnesses.
3. That testimony of an unrelated crime was admitted and considered by the jury over objection of defendant.
4. That the trial court erred in admitting in evidence the circumstances surrounding the arrest of defendant in Detroit, Michigan.
5. That the trial court ered in admitting into evidence two 45-caliber cartridge casings in connection with testimony given by ballistics experts.
6. That the trial judge erred in denying defendant's request for the appointment of psychiatrists, investigators, and ballistics experts in equal numbers to those used by the state.
7. That, taken as a whole, the state's evidence relating to firearms identification and ballistics is in such a state of conflict and confusion that it should have been taken from the jury.
8. That the failure of the trial judge to grant defendant's motion for a directed verdict of acquittal was error.
9. That the state failed to sustain its burden of proof.
In connection with the above mentioned first ground urged for reversal, two motions were filed seeking to disqualify Judge Christian D. Stoner from presiding at the trial. One supporting affidavit was signed by Watson and another was a joint statement by Watson and his co-defendant Kostal. The only statement contained in these affidavits warranting mention in this opinion was the assertion that an action was pending in the district court of the United States in which Watson as plaintiff sought damages against Judge Stoner as defendant. The claim was based on the allegation made by Watson that Judge Stoner and the district attorney, in the performance of their official duties connected with the first trial, conspired to deprive defendant of a fair trial, pursuant to which conspiracy Watson alleged that Judge Stoner participated in the subordination of perjured testimony, the suppression of evidence vital to his defens, and the admission of evidence of other offenses committed by him.
In disposing of this ground for reversal we think it sufficient to say that an adverse interest sufficient to disqualify a trial judge from presiding at the trial of a criminal case must be based on a more substantial foundation than appears from the record in this case. The action instituted against Judge Stoner by defendant was filed in the Federal District Court of Colorado. It was dismissed, and Watson appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit where the action of the Federal District Court was affirmed. See Kostal and Watson v. Stoner, et al., 10 Cir., 292 F.2d 492. The contention of Watson is that Judge Stoner, who presided at the first trial, is answerable to him in damages for errors committed in that trial which resulted in a reversal, and that the pendency of the action for damages created an adverse interest which should have prevented Judge Stoner from hearing the second trial.
We are thoroughly familiar with the record in the first trial, and although error was committed which required a...
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