Watson v. Richmond & D.R. Co.

• Decision Date: 09 November 1892
• Citation: 18 S.E. 306,91 Ga. 222
• Parties: WATSON v. RICHMOND & D. R. CO.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

18 S.E. 306

91 Ga. 222

WATSON v. RICHMOND & D. R. CO.

Supreme Court of Georgia

November 9, 1892

Syllabus by the Court.

1. It is competent for the general assembly to make the residence of a lessee corporation for the purposes of suit the same as that which the lessor corporation had when the relation of lessor and lessee originated. By section 3407 of the Code the lessee or person or corporation having possession of a railroad is liable to suit in the same court or jurisdiction as was the lessor or owner before the lease. A declaration which names the defendant corporation as lessee of a specified railroad, and which indicates that the defendant is in possession and operating the road, is to be construed as seeking to charge the defendant in its character as lessee though no lease be set out or expressly alleged.

2. As the statute virtually makes the county of the principal office or place of business of the lessor before the lease the county of the principal office or place of business of the lessee, a declaration against the lessee, alleging that its principal office within this state is in the county where the suit is brought, shows jurisdiction over the person of the lessee, though the latter be a foreign corporation.

3. The lessee of a line of railroad partly within this state and partly within the state of Alabama is subject to suit here by an employe for a personal injury sustained in Alabama while engaged in his duties as an employe upon the line.

Error from city court of Atlanta; T. P. Westmoreland, Judge.

Action for personal injuries by Gabe Watson against the Richmond & Danville Railroad Company. Plaintiff was injured in the state of Alabama, while in the performance of his duties as brakeman on defendant's road. From a judgment dismissing the action for want of jurisdiction, plaintiff brings error. Reversed.

Reid & Stewart, for plaintiff in error.

Jackson & Jackson, for defendant in error.

BLECKLEY C.J.

1. By the constitution, the county in which a defendant is subject to be sued is ordinarily that in which he resides, and no other. Code, § 5172. But a person may be a resident of two or more counties at the same time. Code, § 1691. Where a railroad is not confined to one county, but extends from one to others, so as to be partly in several, the owner may relatively to causes of action arising out of or connected with operating it, be treated by the legislature as residing in each of the several counties in which the road is located. This has been done to a limited extent by certain provisions of the Code. Sections 712, 3406. Where the owner is a domestic corporation, the general rule of law that it resides also where its principal office or place of business is situated still prevails. The corporation has this common-law residence for general purposes, in conjunction with the superadded statutory residences for special purposes which the Code ascribes to it. By making it a resident of each and every county in which the road is located, for the purpose of certain specified suits brought against it, the Code does not make it cease to be a resident of the county in which its principal office or place of business is located, for all purposes whatsoever, including the same classes of suits which, by reason of the special enactment may be brought against it elsewhere. The qualified residences do not absorb or obliterate the unqualified one, either wholly or partially. They merely supplement, without otherwise affecting it. In this state there is certainly legislative competency to establish this composite system of residence for all railroad corporation which the general assembly has chartered. It follows, obviously, that there is like competency to make the residence of a lessee corporation, for the purposes of suit, the same as that which the lessor corporation had when the relation of lessor and lessee originated. This has been done by the act of April 17, 1863, (Acts 1862-63, p. 161, Code, § 3407,) which declares that "the lessees of any railroad, or the person, or persons, or company having possession of the same, shall be liable to suit of any kind in the same court of jurisdiction as the lessors or owners of the railroad were before the lease." We are now to inquire, first, whether the declaration in the present case shows on its face that the suit is against a lessee corporation. No lease is set out or expressly alleged, but the defendant...