Watson v. Shanley
| Decision Date | 07 April 2021 |
| Docket Number | No. 9:19-cv-00275-JKS,9:19-cv-00275-JKS |
| Parties | TYRONE R. WATSON, Petitioner, v. RAYMOND SHANLEY, Superintendent, Coxsackie Correctional Facility, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of New York |
Tyrone R. Watson, a New York state prisoner proceeding pro se, filed a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus with this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Watson is in the custody of the New York State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision ("DOCCS") and incarcerated at Coxsackie Correctional Facility. Respondent has answered the Petition, and Watson has replied.
On December 18, 2012, Watson was charged with five counts of third-degree criminal sale of a controlled substance, six counts of third-degree criminal possession of a controlled substance, and criminally using drug paraphernalia after an undercover police officer, having been introduced to Watson by a confidential informant ("CI"), purchased cocaine from Watson during five separate controlled buys. After Watson was arrested and a search warrant executed, drug paraphernalia was discovered in Watson's residence.
Watson denied the charges and proceeded to a jury trial. At the close of the People's case-in-chief, Watson moved to dismiss the indictment on the ground that the People had failed to locate and produce the CI for trial. County court denied the motion, and the matter was submitted to the jury. The jury found Watson guilty as charged. The court sentenced Watson to an aggregate determinate term of 18 years' imprisonment, to be followed by three years of post-release supervision.
Through counsel, Watson appealed his conviction, arguing that: 1) the trial court erred in failing to dismiss the indictment based on the CI's unavailability for trial; 2) the trial court erred in granting the People's Molineux1 application seeking to introduce evidence of Watson's prior bad acts; 3) the trial court erred in granting the People's Sandoval2 application seeking permission to cross-examine Watson about six prior convictions in the event he testified; and 3) the imposed sentence was unduly harsh and excessive, and should be reduced in the interests of justice. The Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court unanimously affirmed the judgment against Watson in a reasoned opinion issued on May 11, 2017. People v. Watson, 55 N.Y.S.3d 460, 465 (N.Y. App. Div. 2017).
Proceeding pro se, Watson then moved to vacate the judgment pursuant to New York Criminal Procedure Law ("CPL") § 440.10 on the grounds that: 1) the prosecutor committed misconduct by a) misrepresenting the evidence, b) falsely informing Watson as to his indictment date, and c) making improper and prejudicial references on summation; 2) trial counsel renderedineffective assistance by failing to a) object to the prosecution's misrepresentation of the evidence and b) investigate the location of the CI; and 3) Watson is actually innocent of the crimes for which he was convicted. The county court denied the motion in a reasoned, unpublished opinion issued on September 11, 2018. The Appellate Division denied leave to appeal without comment on January 16, 2019.
Watson then timely filed the instant pro se Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus in this Court on February 22, 2019. Docket No. 1; see 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A).
In his pro se Petition before this Court, Watson argues that: 1) the trial court erred in not dismissing the charges based on the People's failure to produce their CI at trial; 2) the trial court erred in admitting evidence of Watson's "possession of a vastly larger amount of cocaine 10 years prior to the events alleged in the current charges and under markedly different circumstances;" 3) the court erred in its Sandoval ruling by failing to properly consider the circumstances of the instant case to the prior bad acts; and 4) the sentence imposed is harsh and excessive.
Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), this Court cannot grant relief unless the decision of the state court was "contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States," § 2254(d)(1), or "was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding," § 2254(d)(2). A state-court decision is contrary to federal law if the state court applies a rule thatcontradicts controlling Supreme Court authority or "if the state court confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision" of the Supreme Court, but nevertheless arrives at a different result. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 406 (2000). The term unreasonable is a common term in the legal world. The Supreme Court has cautioned, however, that the range of reasonable judgments may depend in part on the nature of the relevant rule argued to be clearly established federal law. Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004) ( ).
To the extent that the Petition raises issues of the proper application of state law, they are beyond the purview of this Court in a federal habeas proceeding. See Swarthout v. Cooke, 131 S. Ct. 859, 863 (2011) (per curiam) (). It is a fundamental precept of dual federalism that the states possess primary authority for defining and enforcing the criminal law. See, e.g., Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991) (); Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 653 (1990) (), overruled on other grounds by Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
In applying these standards on habeas review, this Court reviews the "last reasoned decision" by the state court. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 804 (1991); Jones v. Stinson, 229 F.3d 112, 118 (2d Cir. 2000). Where there is no reasoned decision of the state court addressing the ground or grounds raised on the merits and no independent state grounds exist fornot addressing those grounds, this Court must decide the issues de novo on the record before it. See Dolphy v. Mantello, 552 F.3d 236, 239-40 (2d Cir. 2009) (citing Spears v. Greiner, 459 F.3d 200, 203 (2d Cir. 2006)); cf. Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 530-31 (2003) (). In so doing, the Court presumes that the state court decided the claim on the merits and the decision rested on federal grounds. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 740 (1991); Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 263 (1989); see also Jimenez v. Walker, 458 F.3d 130, 140 (2d Cir. 2006) ( the Harris-Coleman interplay); Fama v. Comm'r of Corr. Servs., 235 F.3d 804, 810-11 (2d Cir. 2000) (same). This Court gives the presumed decision of the state court the same AEDPA deference that it would give a reasoned decision of the state court. Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 784-85 (2011) (); Jimenez, 458 F.3d at 145-46. Under the AEDPA, the state court's findings of fact are presumed to be correct unless the petitioner rebuts this presumption by clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003).
Watson first argues that the trial court erred in refusing to dismissal the charges against him when the People failed to produce the CI. The Appellate Division rejected this claim on direct appeal, reasoning that the People made sufficient steps to locate the CI, and Watson failed to meet his burden of establishing that the proposed testimony of the CI would be exculpatory or create a reasonable doubt as to the reliability of the People's case. Watson, 55 N.Y.S.3d at 1385. The appellate court further concluded that dismissal was not warranted because the trial courtgave Watson a missing witness charge as to the CI even though he was not entitled to it. Id. at 1386.
Watson fails to show that the Appellate Division's determination was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly-established Supreme Court authority. To the extent that Watson claims that the decision was erroneous under the New York law requiring a duty of production, or dismissal of the prosecution's case, where the People "have intentionally procured the disappearance of the [CI] . . . or have exerted inadequate efforts to locate" her, People v. Jenkins, 360 N.E.2d 1288, 1291 (N.Y. 1977), declined to follow on other grounds by People v. Scarborough, 402 N.E.2d 1127 (N.Y. 1980), such claim fails because it does not allege an error of constitutional dimension.
Moreover, federal law does not require mandatory production. See United States v. Super, 492 F.2d 319, 321 (2d Cir. 1974). Rather, in response to a timely request, the Government "must accord reasonable cooperation in securing the [CI's] appearance where his testimony might substantiate a claim of the defense." United States v. Dixon, 112 F.3d 506 (2d Cir. 1996) (citing United States v. Tuck, 380 F.2d 857, 859 (2d Cir.1967)). Here, the record fully supports that the People made good faith efforts to locate the CI once it became apparent that Watson might want to call the CI as a witness in support of his agency defense. As the Appellate Division explained, ...
To continue reading
Request your trial