Watson v. State

• Citation: 5 Mo. 497
• Parties: WATSON v. THE STATE.
• Decision Date: 30 September 1838
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Missouri

5 Mo. 497

WATSON

v.THE STATE.

Supreme Court of Missouri.

September Term, 1838.

P. COLE, for Appellant. Upon an indictment for murder, at common law, it is conceded, the accused could be convicted of manslaughter; but under the statute of this State, with regard to crimes and punishments, it is respectfully submitted this cannot be done. Murder, under the statute, consists of two degrees (Digest 176). The first degree is punishable with death; the second with not less than ten years' imprisonment in the penitentiary. Manslaughter, by the same statute, consists of four degrees, the first whereof is punishable with five years' imprisonment in the penitentiary, and the other degrees for a less period of time (Digest, 170). The Legislature appears to have contemplated distinct crimes in the graduation of these offenses, and makes use of the terms murder and manslaughter as generic, and the several degrees as species of the offense. 4 Bl. Com.; Digest, 214, § 14.

J. S. BRICKEY, Circuit Attorney, for the State. This case seems to present but one question for the consideration of this court. On a trial for murder, can a jury find the defendant guilty of manslaughter, and the court render judgment on that finding? It certainly will not be denied that at common law, the jury could acquit the defendant of murder, and find him guilty of manslaughter. I will not trouble this court with authorities to prove this position, because it is too well established to require the production of authorities. The question, then arises, has the statute altered the common law in this particular? It seems not; for notwithstanding the statute has graded murder from the first to the second degree, and apportioned the punishment accordingly, I have not found the common law rule, as above laid down, changed. Digest, 167, §§ 1, 2; do. 168, §§ 5, 6, 7, 8; do. 170, §§ 21, 22; do. 214, §§ 14, 15.

MCGIRK, J.

At the November term of the Circuit Court for the county of St. Francois, for 1837, Watson was indicted for the murder of I atrick Castello. The jury found the defendant not guilty of the murder, but guilty of manslaughter in the first degree, and sentenced the prisoner to the penitentiary for five years. The defendant moved the court for a new trial; because the indictment is for murder, and the finding of the jury is for manslaughter, an offense for which the defendant was not indicted. This motion was overruled. The defendant moved, also, in arrest of judgment, which was also overruled. The counsel for Watson now relies on the same matter to reverse the judgment of the Circuit Court.

I understand the point now made to be this, to-wit: Can the jury, on an indictment for murder, find the defendant guilty of manslaughter, only? Mr. Cole, the counsel, admits that, at common law, this might be done; but he insists that, by the Revised Code of 1835, the law is otherwise. By the 1st section of the 3rd article of the statute respecting crimes (Rev. Code, 167), it is declared that certain murders shall constitute the first degree; the 2nd section declares certain other murders shall stand in the second degree; the 3rd section declares the punishment. The 7th section declares certain forms of murder at common law shall be manslaughter; it also places this manslaughter in the first degree. The statute then proceeds to make, in all, four degrees of manslaughter, up to the 20th section, inclusive. The 3rd article of the statute proceeds to define and classify arson. The 1st section declares the first degree, which consists in burning a dwelling house, &c., in the nighttime. Four degrees of arson are created by this article; the last instance of which, in the fourth degree, is the burning of stacks of grain, standing grass in a field, a fence, or toll bridge, in the day-time. The statute then proceeds to classify and lay off, in degrees, burglary and forgery, &c. In the 14th section of the 9th article of the statute (Rev. Code, 214), it is declared that, “upon an indictment for any offense consisting of different degrees, as prescribed by this act, the jury may find the accused not guilty of the offense charged in the indictment, and may find him guilty of any degree of such offense inferior to that charged in the indictment, or of an attempt to commit such offense.”

The argument of Mr. Cole, of counsel for Watson, is that under this indictment, and by the law, the jury could only have found the defendant...