Watson v. State, 1975

• Decision Date: 17 November 1961
• Docket Number: No. 1975,1975
• Citation: 134 So.2d 805
• Parties: Ronald WATSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

Page 805

134 So.2d 805

Ronald WATSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 1975.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

Nov. 17, 1961.

Rehearing Denied Dec. 7, 1961.

Frank Ragano, Tampa, for appellant.

Richard W. Ervin, Atty. Gen., and George R. Georgieff, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

KANNER, Acting Chief Judge.

Appealing from judgment of conviction and sentence rendered after jury trial below, defendant directs his attack to certain intratrial occurrences as to which he asserts error on the part of the trial judge. The offense under which defendant was charged and convicted was larceny of a semi-trailer and 435 boxes of oranges.

Since the case must be reversed upon the basis of defendant's first appeal point, we find it necessary to consider only the question which that point raises. Under this, the problem which arises relates to the propriety of the action of the trial judge in sustaining the state's objection to certain questions posed during cross examination of a state's witness by defendant's counsel. That objection halted a line of inquiry purporting to elicit from the witness testimony that defendant had been acquitted of two separate offenses to which that witness had testified.

It appears that the state's witness, in response to a question by the prosecutor, replied that he and defendant upon an earlier occasion had stolen a truck; then on cross, he was asked what truck he was referring to. The witness's answer was, 'Well, we stole both of them. Me and him.' Counsel for defendant then asked the witness if that was the truck involved when he had testified as a state's witness against defendant in another criminal trial. At that point the state interposed its objection, essentially upon the ground that the question was incompetent, immaterial, and irrelevant to the cause and that it referred to cases either pending or tried in other jurisdictions, with no bearing on the offense then being tried. The court, sustaining the objection of the prosecutor, said, 'I don't think you can show it this way * * *. You are entitled to cross examine the witness, but not to prove your defense by this witness on cross examination.' Proffer was submitted by defendant showing that there were two prior criminal trials involving theft of a trailer with boxes of oranges and a truck, respectively, with the witness for the state in the present case testifying in each of the other causes as a State's witness and with defendant being acquitted by the jury in both instances. ¹

The state asserts that evidence of defendant's alleged acquittal of the separate offenses testified to was not admissible. Conceding that there were several times when the witness made reference to commission of the independent offenses in which he and the defendant were involved, the state reasons that this did not constitute testimony relative to any convictions therefor; that had the witness testified defendant had been convicted of the offenses, the evidence might well have been admissible, but that he simply said when questioned that he and defendant had stolen the objects involved on those separate occasions. Under arguendo concession that such evidence was admissible, the state submits that defendant was free to produce certified judgments and sentences and certification by the clerk of the court as to results of trials relative to the offenses testified to, that he could have taken the...