Watson v. State, 79139
Decision Date | 03 November 1994 |
Docket Number | No. 79139,79139 |
Citation | 651 So.2d 1159 |
Parties | 19 Fla. L. Weekly S564 Kenneth WATSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee. |
Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Kenneth Watson appeals his conviction for murder and the ensuing sentence of death. We have jurisdiction. Art. V, Sec. 3(b)(1), Fla. Const.
On October 31, 1988, Mrs. Ella Hickman entered her home and found a stranger within. The stranger, using a long slender sharp object, stabbed Mrs. Hickman six times about the head and neck; a stab to the carotid artery was fatal. Watson was charged with and the jury found him guilty of first-degree murder, armed burglary with an assault, and armed robbery of Mrs. Hickman. The judge imposed a sentence of death, 1 and Watson now appeals his murder conviction and death sentence. 2
Watson's first issue asserts that the trial court erred in denying his challenges for cause against prospective jurors Webster, Benton, and Vento. 3 We disagree. During voir dire, the trial judge instructed the panel as follows:
Now, the other principle that I want to address with you and it's a very important constitutional right that the defendant has, is that he does not have to prove anything.... [T]hat burden is entirely on the State.... [T]he defendant has the absolute right to remain silent and if he exercises that right you cannot use that against him in any way.
....
... [T]he attorneys don't have to do anything either, they could sit there and do cross word puzzles and if the State doesn't meet the burden of proof, proving the defendant guilty beyond and to the exclusion of every reasonable doubt, the fact that the attorneys didn't do anything cannot play a part, cannot say well, they didn't do anything so he must be guilty.
After this instruction was given, the judge turned to topics unrelated to the burden of proof. Later in the proceedings, the state and defense attorneys were allowed to ask questions of the panel. The questioning relevant to our decision is as follows:
MR. SMITH [defense counsel]: Okay. What if we didn't do anything? I'm not saying that's going to happen, but I just want to know if that was the situation. The law says, the rule is that we don't have to do anything, we don't have to prove anything, we don't have to prove to, we have no responsibility, they do?
....
MR. SMITH: Right. Who feels the same way as Ms. Mena, that it would concern them if we didn't prove anything by bringing witnesses or bringing evidence?
Ms. Webster, that would concern you?
It's a hard question.
The questioning of Webster was terminated at this point and the relevant examination of venireman Vento was as follows:
MR. SMITH: Okay. What about the second row, does anybody here feel that it would make them think Mr. Watson's guilty if we didn't prove anything, we didn't present witnesses, didn't present evidence?
....
Mr. Vento, how about that?
The questioning of Vento was terminated after this answer. Neither the court nor the state attempted to rehabilitate Webster or Vento or to determine whether in light of previous answers they possessed a state of mind that would enable them to render impartial verdicts based solely on the evidence presented and the instructions given by the judge. 4 Watson's attempt to have the two venirepersons removed for cause was denied and he was forced to remove them by using peremptory challenges. Watson exhausted his peremptory challenges, requested three additional challenges, and identified the jurors he would strike. The court granted one additional challenge. Watson asserts that the trial court erred in denying his challenges for cause and that the denial of these challenges forced him to exhaust his peremptories, thus resulting in a trial by objectionable jurors. At the outset, it is well to remember the standard by which we review this issue. In Mills v. State, 462 So.2d 1075, 1079 (Fla.), cert. denied, 473 U.S. 911, 105 S.Ct. 3538, 87 L.Ed.2d 661 (1985), this Court stated:
The competency of a juror challenged for cause presents a mixed question of law and fact to be determined by the trial court. Manifest error must be shown to overturn the trial court's finding.
A fair reading of juror Webster's colloquy indicates that her main concern was that if Watson's lawyers did not call any witnesses, he would not be getting fair representation. She did not indicate that she would find him guilty if he presented no evidence. To the extent that her later answers could be characterized as ambiguous, the trial judge was clearly within his discretion to deny the motion to excuse for cause. Because of counsel's obscure questions and the short venire on the subject, it is difficult to discern what caused juror Vento to say that if Watson put on no evidence he did not know whether he could follow the law. However, this was not the reason Vento was challenged. The motion to excuse Vento for cause was premised on the fact that he had said that he had a burglary the previous night. Thus, Watson's attorneys waived any objection they might have had to Vento. Since the trial judge gave Watson one additional peremptory challenge, he is not entitled to reversal unless both jurors were improperly excused. Clearly, he has failed to demonstrate error with respect to both of the jurors.
Watson's second issue asserts that juror Abernott's phone call was evidence of her partiality, thereby depriving him of his right to an impartial jury. We disagree. Before the commencement of opening statements, the trial judge instructed the jury "not [to] form any definite or fixed opinion on the merits of the case until you've heard all the evidence." During a phone conversation with her employer, and before the presentation of evidence, Abernott opined that the case was "open and shut." Upon learning of the phone conversation, the trial judge questioned Ms. Abernott and concluded that her statement referred to the length of the trial and was not a comment upon Watson's guilt or innocence. The judge declined to excuse the juror for cause. Our review of the transcript, including the trial judge's inquiry into the matter, convinces us that the record supports the judge's determination that Abernott had not formed an opinion relative to Watson's guilt before hearing the evidence. This issue is decided against Watson. We also find that prospective juror Moss' voir dire comment did not violate Watson's right to an impartial jury. 5 When faced with a similar circumstance in Randolph v. State, 562 So.2d 331, 337 (Fla.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 992, 111 S.Ct. 538, 112 L.Ed.2d 548 (1990), we held that the venire was not tainted when a prospective juror was excused after stating that the victim had been "brutally murdered." In so finding, we held that the statement "did not relate to Randolph's culpability but merely briefly described the nature of the crime." Id. at 337. Based on Randolph, we find that the trial court properly refused Watson's request to strike the venire. There is also no merit to Watson's claim that the trial court violated his right to an impartial jury when it allowed the jurors to submit questions to the witnesses. 6 As both Watson and the State concede, this practice has been condoned as permissible trial procedure. See Shoultz v. State, 106 So.2d 424 (Fla.1958); Ferrara v. State, 101 So.2d 797 (Fla.1958). We decline to revisit this issue.
We find no merit in issues five and eight, which in essence assert that the state's opening statement improperly appealed to the sympathy of the jury and was an improper use of victim impact evidence. 7 It is within the trial judge's discretion to determine when an attorney's argument is improper, and such a determination will not be upset absent an abuse of discretion by the lower court judge....
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