Watson v. State

• Decision Date: 02 June 1971
• Docket Number: No. 26531,26531
• Citation: 182 S.E.2d 446,227 Ga. 698
• Parties: James WATSON v. The STATE.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

Page 446

182 S.E.2d 446

227 Ga. 698

James WATSON v. The STATE.

No. 26531.

Supreme Court of Georgia.

June 2, 1971.

Syllabus by the Court

1. Absent a proper objection and any evidence that the defendant's in-custody statement was involuntary, the admission of such statement in evidence without a hearing as to its voluntariness was not error. Where the defendant was advised of his constitutional rights prior to his first in-custody statement, further warning was not required prior to the taking of a second in-custody statement some 7 hours later, which constituted merely continued interrogation.

2. The trial court did not err in failing to charge the jury as to the weight of certain evidence, this being purely a matter for the jury.

3. The evidence authorized the verdict.

The defendant was convicted of rape and sentenced to life imprisonment. He filed pro se a motion for a new trial. The court then appointed for him counsel, who filed an amended motion for a new trial, which was overruled. The appeal is from the judgment of conviction.

Edwin Maxwell Saginar, Atlanta, for appellant.

Lewis R. Slaton, Dist. Atty., Tony H. Hight, Joel M. Feldman, Carter Goode, Arthur K. Bolton, Atty. Gen., Harold N. Hill, Jr., Executive Asst. Atty. Gen., Courtney Wilder Stanton, Mathew Robins, Asst. Attys. Gen., Atlanta, for appellee.

FELTON, Justice.

1. Enumerated error 1 is as follows: 'The court erred in admitting over objection the statement alleged to be the defendant's second statement, without a hearing as to its voluntariness. The court merely assumed the continuing applicability of Staet's Exhibit #1, which was a written waiver taken before any statement was taken from the defendant. By not conducting a special determination of the admissibility of the second statement the court decided a question which was raised by timely objection, without hearing evidence on that issue alone.' (Emphasis supplied.)

'Where the voluntariness of a confession is questioned on the trial of a criminal case it is necessary under the decision in Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 84 S.Ct. 1774, 12 L.Ed.2d 908, 1 A.L.R.3d 1205, to have a separate hearing as to its voluntariness before it is finally presented to the jury for consideration as to its voluntariness.' (Emphasis supplied.) Strickland v. State, 226 Ga. 750, 177 S.E.2d 238. In the absence of a proper objection, however, there is no requirement for such a hearing. See Evans v. United States, 377 F.2d 535 (5th Cir., 1967); United States v. Taylor, 374 F.2d 753 (7th Cir., 1967). The sole objection made to the introduction of the second statement was as follows: 'I'll object. It was taken from eight or nine hours subsequent to the arrest. He was not apprised of any of his constitutional rights. This objection was on the ground of the alleged failure to apprise the defendant of his constitutional rights prior to taking his statement and did not reach the issue of its voluntariness. Hence, the first enumerated error attempts to raise for the first time a question which was not raised in the trial court and therefore presents nothing for decision. See Turner v. Smith, 226 Ga. 448(2), 175 S.E.2d 653 and cit.; House v. State, 227 Ga. 257(1), 181 S.E.2d 31 and cit.

Even if the objection made raised the issue of voluntariness, moreover, no harmful error is shown in the admission of the statement. The record shows that testimony as to the contents of such statement had already been admitted in evidence during the trial without objection to its voluntariness or on any other grounds and that thereafter defendant's counsel had openly referred to the statement in his cross examination of the State's witness. By stipulation, both counsel waived a hearing as to the voluntariness of defendant's first statement, signed some 7 hours earlier. There was no evidence that the second statement was given involuntarily; on the other hand, the State produced affirmative evidence that the defendant read the second statement, then freely and voluntarily signed it. The state courts of New York, out of which Jackson v. Denno, supra, arose, later recognized that the Jackson requirement for a hearing on the issue of voluntariness applies only 'if the evidence presents a fair question as to its voluntariness,' which it does not in the present case. See annotation, 1 A.L.R.3d 1252.

Furthermore, even if the enumerated error be construed as an attempt to raise the issue made by the objection on the trial, it is without merit. It is not disputed that defendant was apprised of his constitutional rights prior to his making the first statement some 7 hours prior to the making of the second in-custody statement. Although this is apparently a question of first impression in Georgia, the general rule in other jurisdictions, which we hold to be applicable in the present case, is to the effect that a further warning is not necessary under these circumstances of continued interrogation. See Maguire v. United States, 396 F.2d 327(10) (9th Cir., 1968); Miller v. United States, 396 F.2d 492(3) (8th Cir., 1968); United States v. Mansfield, 381 F.2d 961(1) (7th Cir., 1967); State v. Rowe, 468 P.2d 1000(7) (Wash., 1970); People v. Hill, 39 Ill.2d 125(13), 233 N.E.2d 367; People v. Hill, 66 Cal.2d 536, 58 Cal.Rptr. 340, 426 P.2d 908; Sossamon v. State, 245 Ark. 306, 432 S.W.2d 469(1).

Accordingly, the first enumerated error is without merit.

2. Enumerated error 2 is as follows: 'The court erred in failing to charge on the weight to be given to the outcry made by the prosecutrix regarding the time when such statment was made and the circumstances surrounding such...