Watson v. Watson

Decision Date24 August 2005
Citation196 S.W.3d 695
PartiesStephanie Todd WATSON v. Timothy James WATSON.
CourtTennessee Court of Appeals

Harold F. Johnson, Jackson, for defendant/appellant Timothy James Watson.

Betty Stafford Scott, Jackson, and Mary Jo Middlebrooks, Jackson, for plaintiff/appellee Stephanie Todd Watson.

OPINION

HOLLY M. KIRBY, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which W. FRANK CRAWFORD, P.J., W.S., and ALAN E. HIGHERS, J., joined.

This case is about parental relocation and child custody. The parents of a minor child divorced in 2001. Both parents lived in Lexington, Tennessee, and, at the time of the divorce, agreed to joint custody. The child alternated daily between the parents' homes. In 2002, the mother remarried and moved to Murfreesboro, Tennessee. The mother petitioned the court to designate her as primary residential parent and allow her to move the child with her to Murfreesboro. The father opposed the petition and asked the court to designate him as the primary residential parent. The trial court found that it was in the child's best interest to move to Murfreesboro with the mother, and designated her as primary residential parent. The father appealed. We affirm, finding that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court's decision to designate mother as primary residential parent and permit the child to move with her.

Plaintiff/Appellee Stephanie Todd Watson ("Mother") and Defendant/Appellant Timothy James Watson ("Father") had a son, Christian, born July 7, 1997. They were married on June 18, 1998, and lived in Lexington, Tennessee.

On August 30, 2001, Mother and Father were granted a divorce on the grounds of irreconcilable differences. At the time of the divorce, Mother and Father agreed to a permanent parenting plan ("Plan"). The Plan, incorporated into the marital dissolution agreement, granted Mother and Father joint custody of Christian, and stated that Mother and Father would alternate physical custody of Christian on a daily basis, that neither party would pay child support to the other, and that major decisions regarding the child would be made jointly. Disagreements about joint decisions or modifications of the Plan were to be handled through mediation.

In June 2002, Mother remarried. Thereafter, in April 2003, Mother filed a petition in the Henderson County Chancery Court, indicating that she planned to relocate to Murfreesboro, Tennessee, and wanted Christian to move with her. Father did not agree to permit Christian to move. Mother and Father attempted to resolve their issues through mediation, as required by the Plan, but were unsuccessful in resolving the issues of a change in custody and the parenting schedule for the non-custodial parent. The petition asked the trial court to enter an order on an interim parenting plan.

The revised parenting plan submitted by Mother provided that the child would reside with Mother during the week and with Father on every weekend while the child was playing T-ball1 and every other weekend after T-ball season ended. Mother's proposed revised parenting plan designated Mother as the primary residential parent and granted Mother the sole authority to make major decisions regarding the child.

In June 2003, Mother petitioned the court to adopt her proposed Revised Plan as the permanent parenting plan and appoint her as the primary residential parent. The petition stated that Mother was relocating to Murfreesboro in order to take a significantly better employment position, and, as a result of the move, the parties' original parenting schedule of rotating physical custody every other day would no longer be feasible. Mother and Father agreed to an interim parenting schedule until a hearing could be held on the matter.

Also in June 2003, Father proposed to the trial court his own revised parenting plan, which designated him as the primary residential parent. Father's proposed plan provided that the child would reside with him during the school year with Mother having residential parenting time on alternative weekends, excluding T-ball season. Father's petition asked the trial court to require that Mother pay Father child support based on her income and requested that major decisions regarding the child be made jointly. Like Mother's petition, Father's proposed petition noted that the original parenting plan would no longer be feasible due to Mother's relocation to Murfreesboro. A hearing on the matter was held on July 3, 2003 in the Chancery Court for Henderson County.

At the hearing, Mother testified that she had searched for a job in the Lexington, Tennessee area for about a year before accepting the job in Murfreesboro. Mother said that she accepted the Murfreesboro job because it was in her field, the salary was higher, and it had a flexible schedule, which would allow her take care of Christian when the need arose. Mother testified that she chose the specific neighborhood in Murfreesboro based on her internet search for good schools in the area. The report from the internet was entered into evidence at the hearing, over Father's objection.

Mother acknowledged that her current husband, John "J. P." Patterson, was from middle Tennessee, had extended family in middle Tennessee, including a child, and was living and working in middle Tennessee when they met. She maintained that these facts had no bearing on her choice to accept a job in Murfreesboro and move there. Mother also conceded that, in Lexington, Father lived in the home in which the parties lived when Christian was born, attended the church in which Christian was baptized, and that both Mother and Father had extended family in the Lexington area. Mother noted that one of her sisters had moved to Murfreesboro.

Mother testified that, since Christian was born, she had been his primary caregiver, and that she was the parent who took him to doctor's appointments, took off work to be with him during two surgeries, and taught him to swim and ride a bike. She attended Christian's school functions and Christian was close to her parents and grandparents.

During the marriage, Mother testified, Father physically abused her and she was afraid of him. Mother conceded that she did not confide in anyone about the alleged abuse until close to the time of the divorce.

During the hearing, Mother was asked why she had agreed to the original shared parenting plan, which provided for joint custody. Mother explained:

At the time my concern was protecting me and Christian. I felt like because of [Father's] history as far as the violent behavior toward me—Honestly I was very scared of him. I felt like if I could reach an agreement with him that would not set him off, that that would be in the best interest of all of us to just—for me—to suck it up and do it so that Christian and I could move on.

In her testimony, Mother described an incident that occurred after the divorce. On one occasion, the parties were arguing while Mother was putting Christian in the car. Father kicked the car door, closing it on Mother's legs and injuring her shins. Mother called the sheriff and, as a result, Father was arrested. Mother subsequently dropped the charges, but nevertheless obtained a restraining order against Father.

Mother also testified about Father's care for Christian. Mother said that, after the divorce, Father took Christian to daycare at times when he had fever, and that Father would often call Mother to pick up Christian, even though it was his turn to do so. Mother said that, when Christian was with Father, Christian, rather than Father, would decide whether or not Christian would take a bath that day. Mother observed that Father and Christian usually ate hamburgers or pizza.

Mother was asked about why she wanted to change the parenting plan. Mother stated:

. . .[A]fter the first of the year, after the first of this year, I had decided that with school approaching that Christian needed a more regular schedule than this every other day. And in light of everything else, I believed myself to be the primary caregiver and the person that should be responsible for him. I was going to seek out full custody. It just so happens the timing thing moved—bumped everything up a little bit.

Father testified at the hearing as well. During his testimony, Father denied physically abusing Mother. Father acknowledged, however, being arrested for slamming the car door on Mother after the divorce. He admitted that, as a result of the incident, an order of protection was issued against him, which was later extended for a period of one year. Still, Father maintained that he never intended to harm Mother.

Father denied that he often asked Mother or others to pick up Christian from day care when it was his turn to do so. He also denied that he had taken Christian to day care when he was running a fever. Father testified that Christian ate healthy food when he was with him.

Father stated that Christian had become closer to his extended family since Mother and Father divorced. He said that, if he were designated the primary residential parent, his mother, brother, and sister-in-law would be available to help him care for Christian. Father testified that Christian often expressed his desire to live with Father in Lexington.

After hearing all of the testimony, the judge made the following findings:

It appears that the parties divorced in August of 2001 and had a marital dissolution agreement at that time, and a permanent parenting plan that provided for basically split time, alternating the days and then also alternating the weekends. It's worked well up until now. The mother has remarried. She has moved to Murfreesboro. This change of circumstances makes this plan that they had agreed on unworkable. The child also starting school pretty soon also...

To continue reading

Request your trial
176 cases
  • In re Conservatorship Turner
    • United States
    • Tennessee Court of Appeals
    • May 9, 2014
    ...against a trial court's finding of fact, it must support another finding of fact with greater convincing effect. Watson v. Watson, 196 S.W.3d 695, 701 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005) (citing Walker v. Sidney Gilreath & Assocs., 40 S.W.3d 66, 71 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000); The Realty Shop, Inc. v. RR Westm......
  • Mid–south Indus. Inc. v. Martin Mach. & Tool Inc.
    • United States
    • Tennessee Court of Appeals
    • March 19, 2010
    ...against a trial court's finding of fact, it must support another finding of fact with greater convincing effect. Watson v. Watson, 196 S.W.3d 695, 701 (Tenn.Ct.App.2005) (citing Walker v. Sidney Gilreath & Assocs., 40 S.W.3d 66, 71 (Tenn.Ct.App.2000); The Realty Shop, Inc. v. RR Westminster......
  • Kim v. State
    • United States
    • Tennessee Court of Appeals
    • October 30, 2020
    ...against a [ ] finding of fact, it must support another finding of fact with greater convincing effect." Watson v. Watson , 196 S.W.3d 695, 701 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005) (citing Walker v. Sidney Gilreath & Assocs. , 40 S.W.3d 66, 71 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000) ; The Realty Shop, Inc. v. R.R. Westminst......
  • Purifoy v. Mafa
    • United States
    • Tennessee Court of Appeals
    • September 28, 2017
    ...against a trial court's finding of fact, it must support another finding of fact with greater convincing effect." Watson v. Watson , 196 S.W.3d 695, 701 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005) (citation omitted). Appellate courts afford trial courts considerable deference when reviewing issues that hinge on ......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
1 books & journal articles
  • § 13.02 Division of Property at Divorce
    • United States
    • Full Court Press Divorce, Separation and the Distribution of Property Title CHAPTER 13 The Divorce Action
    • Invalid date
    ...v. McNair, 987 N.W.2d 4 (Mo. App. 1998). South Carolina: Noll v. Noll, 374 S.E.2d 338 (S.C. App. 1988). Tennessee: Watson v. Watson, 196 S.W.3d 695 (Tenn. App. 2005). [281] Fickle v. Fickle, 287 S.W.3d 723 (Tenn. App. 2008).[282] See: Connecticut: Grimm v. Grimm, 82 Conn. App. 41, 844 A.2d ......

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT