Watts v. Archer

• Decision Date: 08 February 1961
• Docket Number: No. 50181,50181
• Citation: 107 N.W.2d 549,252 Iowa 592
• Parties: William L. WATTS, Appellant, v. V. L. ARCHER, a/k/a Lucille Archer, Appellee.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Page 549

107 N.W.2d 549

252 Iowa 592

William L. WATTS, Appellant, v. V. L. ARCHER, a/k/a Lucille Archer, Appellee.

No. 50181.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Feb. 8, 1961.

Kindig, Beebe & McCluhan, Sioux City, for appellant.

McQueen & Forker, Sioux City, for appellee V. L. Archer.

GARFIELD, Chief Justice.

This is an action in equity by plaintiff William L. Watts against defendant Mrs. V. L. Archer for partition of a residence property in Sioux City. Each is the record owner of an undivided half interest therein. Following trial to the court relief was denied and plaintiff appeals.

The pleadings are short. The petition alleges plaintiff and defendant each own an undivided half interest subject to a mortgage, the owners are unable to agree on a division of the property, it should be sold and the proceeds divided. The answer denies plaintiff owns a half interest in the property and alleges defendant has complete interest therein except for the mortgage. The answer also states plaintiff and one Anderson are friends and conspired to defraud defendant out of her home, plaintiff is not an innocent purchaser for value and did not act in good faith, plaintiff has gained no interest in the property by any purported assignment from Anderson. Plaintiff's reply denies these statements in the answer.

On June 10, 1957, defendant owned the property subject to a mortgage. (There is no dispute about the mortgage.) On said date defendant executed a deed, subject to the mortgage, to herself 'and M. J. Anderson a single man, as joint tenants with right of survivorship and not as tenants in common.' The deed was filed for record in Woodbury county in which Sioux City lies, evidently by Anderson, and recorded January 15, 1958. On June 2, 1958, Anderson and his wife made a warranty deed to plaintiff of an undivided half interest in the property for a stated consideration of $625 'and other valuable considerations.' On June 3 plaintiff gave Anderson his check for the $625.

Plaintiff testified he had seen the house on the outside several times, but never on the inside, before his purchase; he and Anderson checked the records in the courthouse to make sure there were no other liens against the property; he didn't have an abstractor check the property; he had no opinion as to the nature of the title; he didn't talk to defendant, who was living in the house, about it but did talk to a tenant who evidently lived in part of it; Jack Anderson is a truck operator who has been doing business five years under that name; he has known Anderson about three years; he (witness) is in the same business; he didn't know 'where Anderson is today.'

Defendant testified Anderson's true name is Marvin John Williams; he is married and she has known his wife since April 1955; she (defendant) formerly worked for Anderson; just before she made the deed to him he came to her house about 2 a. m. and said if she wanted to live and see her children again she should deed this to him; he also made other serious threats against her; knowing Anderson, she knew he would carry out his threats; she was afraid of him and had suffered permanent injuries from him; he last hurt her in late August, 1957; he last threatened her in January, 1958, just before he recorded the deed; she had the deed to herself and Anderson prepared and signed it at the savings and loan office which held the mortgage on the place; Anderson was not there at the time; he had told her how the deed should be made out if she wanted to live; she put the deed in the glove compartment of her car and never gave it to anyone; Anderson came to the house that same day and wanted the deed; she refused to give it to him; he went to the garage and got into the car to which he had a key; Mrs. Anderson called her, evidently the same day, and said he had the deed to the house; she told Mrs. Anderson she didn't give him the deed--he got it.

Defendant also testified that before Mrs. Anderson told her Jack had sold to plaintiff she had a conversation with plaintiff in the basement of the home in which she told him the house wasn't for sale, it was her home; Anderson was present at the conversation; just before June, 1957, when defendant bought the house, she had dinner with plaintiff at Magnolia, Minnesota; Anderson was present in the dining room; in December, 1957, she made some improvements on the home and financed them by a home improvement loan on which she had been making payments; she has two lawsuits pending against Anderson for assault and battery and personal injury; she doesn't know where Anderson is.

The above is a fairly complete statement of the evidence. Aside from the deputy county recorder who identified the record of the deed defendant made, plaintiff and defendant were the only witnesses. The trial court held defendant owned the property subject to the mortgage and, as stated, denied relief to plaintiff. The court found plaintiff knew defendant was in possession of at least part of the premises and made certain claims in regard thereto; defendant never delivered the deed executed by her and it was taken from her without her knowledge and consent; plaintiff has failed to show he was a bona fide purchaser for value without notice of any defects in the title claimed by Anderson.

As a conclusion of law the trial court held a purchaser of realty is bound to take notice of claims of parties in possession and if he does not do so he is not a bona fide purchaser for value as to such claims and takes title subject thereto. Plaintiff assails this conclusion and defendant seeks to uphold it. Plaintiff recognizes, however, that the defense is apparently predicated on the fact defendant did not deliver the deed to Anderson. And defendant argues the decree should be upheld upon this ground.

Although our review is de novo we are justified in giving weight to the trial court's findings, especially so far as they relate to credibility of witnesses, in view of his better position to determine the real truth. Rasmussen v. Rasmussen, 251 Iowa ----, 107 N.W.2d 114, and citations at page 117; Knigge v. Dencker, 246 Iowa 1387, 1395, 72 N.W.2d 494, 498, and citations.

Of course delivery is essential to the validity of a deed. Title does not pass through an undelivered conveyance. Brandt v. Schucha, 250 Iowa 679, 687, 96 N.W.2d 179, 184, and citations. 'An undelivered deed is no deed, and no title, either defeasible or indefeasible, passes under (it) * * *.' Gibson v. Gibson, 205 Iowa 1285, 1290, 217 N.W. 852, 855.

Where, as here, a deed is signed, acknowledged and recorded there is a rebuttable presumption it was delivered and the burden is on the one claiming nondelivery to prove the fact by clear and satisfactory evidence. Some of our decisions say the evidence must be clear, satisfactory and convincing. Wagner v. Wagner, 249 Iowa 1310, 1316, 90 N.W.2d 758, 762, and citations; Jeppesen v. Jeppesen, 249 Iowa 702, 708-709, 88 N.W.2d 633, 637, and citations; Gibson v. Gibson, supra, 205 Iowa 1285, 1290-1291, 217 N.W. 852, and citations; 26A C.J.S. Deeds §§ 187, 204g.

When the trial court's findings are given weight, we think defendant has shown nondelivery of the deed made by her to (herself and) Anderson by the requisite proof. Her testimony as to nondelivery is uncontradicted. It is not unreasonable or improbable. The only other person with knowledge of the matter is Anderson. He could not be expected to admit, at a time when defendant had two lawsuits pending against him, he surreptitiously extracted the deed from the glove compartment of her car. He would be much more apt to deny doing so. Yet Anderson was not produced as a witness. The only explanation of this is plaintiff's statement he did not know where Anderson was the day of the trial. The explanation is hardly sufficient. This circumstance seems to militate against plaintiff on the question of delivery of the deed. See in this connection In re Burrell's Estate, 251 Iowa 185, 100 N.W.2d 177, 184, and citations; Knigge v. Dencker, supra, 246 Iowa 1387, 1397, 72 N.W.2d 494, 499, and citations.

It is clear Anderson acquired no interest in the property by virtue of the undelivered deed. This leaves for decision the question whether plaintiff is in better position than his grantor Anderson. We hold under this record he is not.

16 Am.Jur., Deeds, section 112, states: 'Unless the grantor has ratified the deed by his acts since the grantee obtained the custody of it or is estopped from asserting that the deed was never delivered, an undelivered deed is inoperative even in favor of an innocent purchaser or of one who had no notice that a deed in his chain of title had never...