Watts v. Bruce

• Decision Date: 30 January 1903
• Citation: 72 S.W. 258
• Parties: WATTS et al. v. BRUCE et al.<SMALL><SUP>*</SUP></SMALL>
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

Page 258

72 S.W. 258

WATTS et al. v. BRUCE et al.^*

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas.

January 30, 1903.

Appeal from district court, Hardin county; L. B. Hightower, Judge.

Action by Mrs. M. Watts and others against Charles G. Bruce and others. From a judgment in favor of defendants, plaintiffs appeal. Affirmed.

Oliver S. Kennedy, for appellants. Greer & Minor, for appellees.

GILL, J.

On the ____ day of ____, 1901, Mrs. M. Watts, P. S. Watts, Mrs. Lina Richardson, joined by her husband, Mrs. Isabella Mitchell, joined by her husband, Oliver S. Kennedy, and W. A. Richardson, as administrator of the estate of P. S. Watts, deceased, brought an action in trespass to try title against Charles G. Bruce for the recovery of the Mary E. Hopkins 1,280 survey of land situated in Hardin county, Tex. This suit was numbered 788 on the docket of the district court of said county, and was settled by an agreement of compromise by which plaintiffs should receive 70 acres of the land and the defendant was to have the remainder. On October 3, 1901, in pursuance of this agreement, a judgment was entered according to its terms without hearing proof. Mrs. M. Taylor and Mrs. Lou Sessler, not being included in the compromise, took a nonsuit. On the 7th day of December, 1902, the same plaintiffs and Lea A. Work, one of the heirs at law of P. S. Watts, deceased, brought this suit against Charles G. Bruce, J. B. Hooks, C. M. Votaw, John H. Kirby, and H. A. Hooks. By supplemental petition John T. Smith, W. F. Cotton, Mrs. Lou Sessler and husband, and Mrs. M. Taylor and husband were made parties defendant. The purpose of this suit was to set aside the compromise judgment on the ground of fraudulent representations on the part of Bruce as to his title to the land and the quantity contained in the survey. The parties to the last suit who were not parties to the first were joined in order to determine the questions of title and extent of interest as to all claimants, whether their interests were acquired prior to or subsequent to the compromise judgment. A trial before the court without a jury resulted in a judgment for defendants, from which the plaintiffs have appealed. The court filed no conclusions of fact and law. The decree indicates that the court refused to annul the judgment rendered in cause No. 788, and allowed the interests of the various parties to remain as fixed by the judgment. As between the defendants, Mrs. Sessler and Mrs. Taylor were decreed specific portions of the land, and they are not complaining.

We find from the record the following facts: J. F. Cotton became the owner of the land in controversy in 1881. Thereafter certain judgments were obtained against him, and under executions issued on these judgments and levied on the land same was sold by the sheriff and bought in by P. S. Watts, deceased, to whom the land was deeded by the sheriff in 1884. Between the date of the judgments and the levy and sale J. F. Cotton deeded the land to his wife. It is not claimed that the judgments against Cotton were abstracted and placed of record in the county in which the land was situated. Plaintiffs and Mrs. Sessler and Mrs. Taylor are the heirs of P. S. Watts, deceased, and claim the land under the sheriff's sale and deed. The defendants (except the two last above named and one W. F. Cotton) claim the land under deeds from the children of Mrs. J. F. Cotton, wife of J. F. Cotton, which were adduced in evidence. They also resisted the claim of plaintiffs on the ground that the compromise judgment (which was shown to have been rendered as above stated) estopped them, and that neither under the allegation nor the proof were plaintiffs entitled to have reopened the questions therein adjudicated. In this suit a judgment by default was rendered against defendant John T. Smith, who had acquired an interest in the land under Bruce subsequent to the compromise judgment. Subsequently, and during the term of the court, a motion to set aside the default judgment was sustained by the court. Of this appellant complains by several assignments of error. We shall not discuss them in detail or at length. Such matters rest largely, if not entirely, in the discretion of the court, and appellate courts rarely, if ever, review the action of a trial court where such a judgment is set aside. The assignments are without merit.

The question presented which controls the case as to all the appellants except Lea Work is whether the court erred in refusing to set aside the judgment rendered in cause No. 788. The evidence adduced by appellants in support of their prayer for this relief was that C. G. Bruce represented that he was the owner of the land; that his lawyer had advised that he could recover it; that it was then being held adversely to appellants, but that he preferred to surrender a small part of it, rather than continue the litigation; that he offered to let appellants have 70 acres; that they accepted the offer on the faith of these representations, and a judgment was entered accordingly leaving out Mrs. Taylor and Mrs. Sessler; that they did not discover the falsity of these representations until the term of the court expired. They sought to prove that they had the best title, and, further, that Bruce had not acquired the entire title of the heirs of Mrs. J. F. Cotton, but had acquired the title of only eight of the eleven heirs. As a matter of fact Bruce asserted no more in these representations than he asserted in his pleadings in the case. Appellants had sued for the land, and, in the nature of things, should have known of the truth or falsity of the representations. As to the fact that Bruce had not acquired title from all the heirs of Mrs. Cotton it was immaterial to appellants, for, if the Cotton title was better than theirs, they could not recover in any event. We think the court correctly refused to set aside the compromise judgment.

Lea Work, a grandson of P. S. Watts, was not affected by the compromise judgment, and as to him the cause must have been determined, and must here be determined, upon the merits of the case. Appellants contend that the judgment should be reversed as to him, because his rights were in no way disposed of by this judgment. A complete answer to this rests in the fact that all the lands were adjudged to defendants except the 70 acres given to appellants in cause No. 788, and that plaintiffs take nothing otherwise.

Work further complains that the court erred in not rendering judgment in his favor because he is an heir of P. S. Watts, deceased, and the evidence shows that P. S. Watts had title to the land both by limitation and by purchase under the...