Watts v. Chittenden
| Decision Date | 29 July 2011 |
| Docket Number | SC18474 Dissent |
| Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
| Parties | JOHN D. WATTS v. HEATHER CHITTENDEN—DISSENT |
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McLACHLAN, J., with whom ZARELLA, J., joins, dissenting. I disagree with the majority's conclusion that the continuing course of conduct doctrine applies generally to all claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Because the continuing course of conduct doctrine is an exception to the general rule that the statute of limitations begins to run at the time that a tortfeasor commits a single, wrongful act, to date we have narrowly applied the doctrine to a limited category of negligence actions. What the majority proposes to do today—broadly extending the continuing course of conduct doctrine to claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress without imposing any limitations or restraints—represents a departure from that well established practice, which is both, in my view, significant and unnecessary. Because sweeping changes in the law unnecessarily risk unanticipated and unintended effects, I believe that, when we extend the scope of an existing rule, we must tailor such changes narrowly, to the facts presented. Accordingly, before extending the doctrine to claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress, it is necessary to engage in a thorough consideration of the relevant, competing public policies. Such consideration enables us to examine whether the doctrine should be applied to claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress, and, if so, what rules should guide that application. Moreover, even if it were prudent to extend the continuing course of conduct doctrine to claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress in some instances, the application of the doctrine to the present case would be inappropriate. Therefore, I dissent.
I begin with a preliminary observation. Although our certified question states that the issue on appeal is whether the existence of an original duty is a prerequisite for the application of the continuing course of conduct doctrine to a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress; Watts v. Chittenden, 293 Conn. 932, 981 A.2d 1077 (2009); the real question before us is whether we should extend our application of that doctrine to claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Because intentional infliction claims never require a demonstration of a duty, the question of whether an original duty must exist before a court may apply the continuing course of conduct doctrine to a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress obscures the actual question presented in this appeal. Therefore, I would frame the question presented as whether we should extend the continuing course of conduct doctrine to claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress.
Although I reframe it, I believe that the certified ques-tion—whether the doctrine applies to claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress absent the existence of an original, and, I would add, continuing duty—highlights one of the analytical difficulties presented in this appeal and also provides a helpful guide in delineating the appropriate rule. The difficulty is that in determining whether the doctrine applies to negligence actions we have relied on a concept that has little utility in the realm of intentional torts—continuing duty. Although that concept is not helpful in determining whether to apply the doctrine in the intentional tort context, it is nonetheless instructive to review our application of the doctrine in the negligence context, with particular focus on how we have determined whether a continuing duty existed. We have looked to subsequent wrongful acts related to the original wrong, or, in the alternative, examined whether a special relationship existed that gave rise to a continuing duty. See, e.g., Witt v. St. Vincent's Medical Center, 252 Conn. 363, 371, 746 A.2d 753 (2000); Fichera v. Mine Hill Corp., 207 Conn. 204, 210, 541 A.2d 472 (1988). The first of these two inquiries appears to me to focus on the question of when the cause of action accrued, implicitly suggesting that, at least under certain circumstances, accrual does not occur until the repeated wrongful actions cease. The second inquiry focuses on the nature of the relationship between the parties, inferring the existence of a duty therefrom. I propose a similar approach to the application of the doctrine to claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Specifically, I would conclude that the continuing course of conduct doctrine applies to claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress in either of the two factual scenarios: (1) the extreme and outrageous nature of the defendant's misconduct, as well as the severity of the plaintiff's distress, does not arise from a single instance of that misconduct, but only from repeated instances, which are continuous and unbroken; or (2) the misconduct arises in the context of a spousal or spouse-like abusive relationship.1 In either circumstance, I would conclude that the limitations period begins to run upon the completion of the final wrongful action. To explain why I believe this approach is the appropriate one, I begin by examining the public policy principles that underlie the application of the continuing course of conduct doctrine, starting with the public policy principles underlying the statute of limitations.
The statute of limitations is grounded in principles of both efficiency and fairness. Its purpose is ''to promote finality in the litigation process . . . and give a defendant the peace of mind that comes with knowing that its potential liability has been extinguished.'' (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Cweklinsky v. Mobil Chemical Co., 267 Conn. 210, 224, 837 A.2d 759 (2004). We additionally have explained that, ' (Internal quotation marks omitted.) St. Paul Travelers Cos. v. Kuehl, 299 Conn. 800, 809-10, 12 A.3d 852 (2011).
In some instances, strict application of the statute of limitations may yield inequitable, and even inefficient results. For that reason, we have recognized limited exceptions to the ordinary rule that the limitations period begins to run upon the commission of the alleged tort. One of those exceptions, the continuing course of conduct doctrine, aggregates a series of actions by a tortfeasor for purposes of the limitations period, viewing the series of acts as an indivisible whole for that limited purpose. The practical effect is that ''[w]hen the wrong sued upon consists of a continuing course of conduct, the statute does not begin to run until that course of conduct is completed.'' (Emphasis added.) Handler v. Remington Arms Co., 144 Conn. 316, 321, 130 A.2d 793 (1957); see also Beckenstein v. Potter & Carrier, Inc., 191 Conn. 150, 161, 464 A.2d 18 (1983); Giglio v. Connecticut Light & Power Co., 180 Conn. 230, 241, 429 A.2d 486 (1980). Put another way, the continuing course of conduct doctrine redefines the point in time at which the cause of action accrues. See K. Graham, ''The Continuing Violations Doctrine,'' 43 Gonz. L. Rev. 271, 279-80 (2007/2008) (comparing continuing course of conduct doctrine with other exceptions to statute of limitations and noting that continuing course of conduct doctrine takes ''more drastic step of redefining the very claim or claims as to which the limitations period or periods apply'').
Understanding the effect of the doctrine is only part of our task. It is also essential to understand why in some instances, it is appropriate to understand a cause of action to accrue only upon the completion of a series of wrongful acts, as compared to other instances, in which those actions are understood as a series of discrete actions, each giving rise to a separate cause of action. We have explained that the application of the continuing course of conduct doctrine...
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