Watts v. Commonwealth

• Decision Date: 06 May 2014
• Docket Number: SJC–11613.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
• Parties: Ronald WATTS & another v. COMMONWEALTH.

468 Mass. 49

8 N.E.3d 717

Ronald WATTS & another ¹

v.COMMONWEALTH.

SJC–11613.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts,

Suffolk.

Submitted March 6, 2014.

Decided May 6, 2014.

Barbara Kaban, Committee for Public Counsel Services (Benjamin H. Keehn, Committee for Public Counsel Services, with her) for the petitioners.

Robert J. Bender & Varsha Kukafka, Assistant District Attorneys (Nathanael Burris, Assistant District Attorney, with them) for the Commonwealth.

John E. Roberts, of New York, Scott Harshbarger, Michael R. Hackett, & Jamie Crystal–Lowry, Boston, for Citizens for Juvenile Justice & others, amici curiae, submitted a brief.

Joseph D. Early, Jr., District Attorney for the Worcester District, & Jane A. Sullivan, Assistant District Attorney, for the District Attorney for the Worcester District, amicus curiae, submitted a brief.

Present: IRELAND, C.J., SPINA, CORDY, BOTSFORD, GANTS, DUFFLY, & LENK, JJ.

IRELAND, C.J.

This case requires us to decide whether St. 2013, c. 84(act), which extended the Juvenile Court's jurisdiction to persons who are seventeen years of age at the time of committing an offense, applies retroactively to persons who were seventeen years of age when they committed an offense and against whom criminal proceedings had begun and were pending on September 18, 2013, the effective date of the act. We conclude that the act is not retroactive to criminal cases begun and pending before September 18, 2013, against personswho were seventeen years of age at the time of the alleged offense.

1. Background. On March 4, 2013, a complaint issued in the Quincy Division of the District Court Department charging Ronald Watts with unarmed robbery, ² assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon, assault and battery, and malicious destruction of property.³ At the time of the alleged offenses, Watts was seventeen years of age.

On August 13, 2013, a complaint issued in the Framingham Division of the District Court Department charging Kevin Aguirre with attempt to commit a crime, malicious destruction of property, disorderly conduct, and accessory before the fact.⁴ At the time of the alleged offenses, Aguirre was seventeen years of age.

On September 18, 2013, the Governor signed the act, which states that it “shall take effect upon its passage.” St. 2013, c. 84, § 34. As relevant here, the act amended the upper limit of the operative ages in the definitions of a “[d]elinquent child” and “youthful offender” under G.L. c. 119, § 52, from seventeen years of age to eighteen. See St. 2013, c. 84, § 7.⁵ Similarly, under the act, G.L. c. 119, § 54, was amended to expand the jurisdiction of the Juvenile Court to complaints alleged against delinquent children and indictments issued against youthful offenders to include those under eighteen years of age. St. 2013, c. 84, § 8. Further, the act amends G.L. c. 119, § 74, to state that no criminal proceeding shall be begun against any person who prior to his eighteenth birthday commits an offense against the laws of the Commonwealth without first proceeding against him as a delinquent child. St. 2013, c. 84, §§ 25, 26. The general effect of the act is to treat children accused of violating criminal statutes who are seventeen years of age at the time as delinquent children or youthful offenders, and no longer as adult criminals, and to have their cases (with certain exceptions) ⁶ adjudicated in the appropriate Juvenile Court rather than in sessions of the Superior or District Courts.

Citing the act, the petitioners moved to dismiss the previously identified District Court charges against them, claiming that the District Courts no longer had jurisdiction over them because they were seventeen years of age, and not eighteen years of age, at the time the alleged offenses occurred and when the criminal proceedings had begun. Essentially, the petitioners claimed that the act should be applied retroactively to their pending District Court cases. Their motions were denied. The petitioners then together filed a petition for relief pursuant to G.L. c. 211, § 3, seeking that the orders denying their motions to dismiss be vacated. A single justice of this court reserved and reported the case without decision. On March 7, 2014, we issued the following order:

“Because the petitioners' District Court criminal cases [had] begun before, and were pending on, September 18, 2013, the effective date of St. 2013, c. 84, ‘An Act Expanding Juvenile Jurisdiction,’ it is hereby ORDERED that a judgment is to enter in the county court (SJ–2013–0462) denying the petition for relief pursuant to G.L. c. 211, [§] 3, of Ronald Watts and Kevin Aguirre. Opinion or opinions to follow.”

This opinion states the reasons for that order.

2. Discussion. We reject the petitioners' contention that, by its “plain terms,” the act applies retroactively to their pending cases. ⁷ The act states that it “shall take effect upon its passage,” St. 2013, c. 84, § 34, which occurred on September 18, 2013. It also provides that “no criminal proceeding shall be begun against any person who prior to his eighteenth birthday commits an offense against the laws of the commonwealth ... without first proceeding against him as a delinquent child.” G.L. c. 119, § 74, as amended through St. 2013, c. 84, §§ 25, 26. When these provisions are read together, as relevant here, the act provides that, on and after its effective date, September 18, 2013, criminal proceedings (save those referred to in note 6, supra ) may not be begun in the Superior Court or in the District Court against juveniles who were seventeen years of age at the time of the alleged offense. Thus, the act expressly protects a juvenile who is seventeen years of age and who is charged with committing a crime on or after September 18, 2013. It also protects a juvenile who was seventeen years of age at the time of an alleged offense committed before September 18, 2013, but who had not been charged until on or after September 18, 2013. Nothing in the act, however, speaks to whether its provisions should be applied retroactively to cases involving juveniles who were seventeen years of age at the time of the alleged offense and whose criminal cases in the Superior or District Court were begun prior to, and were pending on, September 18, 2013.⁸ Contrast Boston Edison Co. v.Massachusetts Water Resources Auth., 459 Mass. 724, 743, 947 N.E.2d 544 (2011) (calculation of interest in eminent domain proceedings pursuant to G.L. c. 79, § 37, as amended through St. 2004, c. 352, § 178, provided that statute “shall apply to those pending cases in which no final judgment has entered as of the effective date of this act”).

When determining whether a defendant is entitled to the benefit of a statutory amendment, we have been guided by G.L. c. 4, § 6, which sets forth rules for the construction of “strictly penal” statutes. See Commonwealth v. Dotson, 462 Mass. 96, 99, 966 N.E.2d 811 (2012), citing Nassar v. Commonwealth, 341 Mass. 584, 588, 171 N.E.2d 157 (1961). The petitioners argue that G.L. c. 4, § 6, does not apply because the act's provisions only expanded the Juvenile Court's jurisdiction and did not alter the punishment for any offense. Thus, the petitioners maintain, the act is not “penal” in nature and its provisions therefore should be given retroactive effect. See Nassar v. Commonwealth, supra at 589, 171 N.E.2d 157, citing Berkwitz, petitioner, 323 Mass. 41, 46–47, 80 N.E.2d 45 (1948). We disagree.

The act does not merely make procedural changes to the Juvenile Court's jurisdiction. It changes both the nature of the proceedings against, ⁹ and dispositional options for,¹⁰ juveniles who are seventeen years of age at the time of the alleged offense. The distinction between “child and adult adjudication exists partly to avoid the infringement of a child's constitutional rights, and partly to avoid the attachment of criminal stigma to children who may be amenable to rehabilitation.” Commonwealth v. Connor C., 432 Mass. 635, 642, 738 N.E.2d 731 (2000), citing Metcalf v. Commonwealth, 338 Mass. 648, 651, 156 N.E.2d 649 (1959). Based on our review of the act, we conclude that “the changes are sufficiently substantive, and affect so much more than mere procedure and the amount of punishment, as to lead us to apply them only prospectively in the absence of a clearly expressed intention to have them effective retroactively,” Nassar v. Commonwealth, 341 Mass. at 590, 171 N.E.2d 157; no such intention exists here. This determination makes it appropriate for us to consider the application of G.L. c. 4, § 6.

General Laws c. 4, § 6, provides, in relevant part:

“In construing statutes the following rules shall be observed, unless their observance would involve a construction inconsistent with the manifest intent of the law-making body or repugnant to the context of the same statute....

“Second, The repeal of a statute shall not affect any punishment, penalty or forfeiture incurred before the repeal takes effect, or any suit, prosecution or proceeding pending at the time of the repeal for an offence committed, or for the recovery of a penalty or forfeiture incurred, under the statute repealed.”

“Because we interpret an amendment of a penal statute to constitute an implicit repeal where ‘amended sections of a statute are inconsistent with the earlier provisions,’ [Commonwealth v. Dotson, 462 Mass. at 100, 966 N.E.2d 811, citing Nassar v. Commonwealth, 341 Mass. at 589, 171 N.E.2d 157], and deem a ‘punishment, penalty or forfeiture’ to be ‘ “incurred,” within the meaning of [G.L. c. 4,] § 6, Second, at the time the offence for which punishment is imposed is committed,’ [ Commonwealth v.] Dotson, supra, quoting Patrick v. Commissioner of Correction, 352 Mass. 666, 669, 227 N.E.2d 348 (1967), ‘a newly enacted [penal] statute is presumptively prospective.’ Commonwealth v. Galvin, [466 Mass.] 286, 290 (2013).” Commonwealth v. Bradley, 466 Mass. 551, 553, 998 N.E.2d 774 (2013). The...