Watts v. DuBois

• Decision Date: 02 June 1987
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 78-M-495.
• Citation: 660 F. Supp. 1246
• Parties: Jerry Wayne WATTS, et al., Petitioners, v. L.E. DuBOIS, Warden, FCI, Englewood, et al., Respondents.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Colorado

660 F. Supp. 1246

Jerry Wayne WATTS, et al., Petitioners, v. L.E. DuBOIS, Warden, FCI, Englewood, et al., Respondents.

Civ. A. No. 78-M-495.

United States District Court, D. Colorado.

April 24, 1987.

Order Amending Memorandum Opinion and Order June 2, 1987.

Daniel J. Sears, Vicki Mandell-King, Asst. Federal Public Defender, Denver, Colo., for petitioners.

Doug Curless, Asst. U.S. Atty., Denver, Colo., Claire Cripe, Gen. Counsel, U.S. Bureau of Prisons, Washington, D.C., Rockne Chickinell, Gen. Counsel, U.S. Parole Com'n, Chevy Chase, Md., John Shaw, Western Regional Counsel, U.S. Bureau of Prisons, Belmont, Cal., for respondents.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

MATSCH, District Judge.

On February 26, 1987, 654 F.Supp. 1147, this court entered a Memorandum Opinion and Order in this class action on behalf of inmates confined for treatment under the Youth Corrections Act ("YCA") at the Federal Correctional Institution, Englewood, Colorado. In that memorandum opinion, this court considered the scope of jurisdiction provided by 28 U.S.C. § 2241 in evaluating the petitioners' claims of a deprivation of due process in the "letter request procedure" used in making no further benefit findings on the request of the Bureau of Prisons. That letter procedure is described in that memorandum opinion. This court agreed with the conclusion of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Coates v. Smith, 746 F.2d 393 (7th Cir. 1984), both with respect to jurisdiction in habeas corpus proceedings, and the fundamental unfairness of issuing a no further benefit ruling without a hearing. At the hearing which resulted in that memorandum opinion this court was informed that when a YCA inmate was transferred to an adult institution under a no further benefit finding, he still would receive the benefits of equivalent treatment programs and the release determinations made by the Parole Commission would be consistent with the procedural and substantive requirements developed in prior orders of this court in this litigation. Accordingly, this court understood that the only interest adversely affected by such a finding was in housing separate from adult inmates. That understanding was made explicit in this court's opinion, and it was because only separate housing was involved that this court considered that the right to a hearing could be waived by a YCA inmate after adequate advisement of his rights and within certain procedural protections. Accordingly, this court issued a preliminary injunction preventing transfers pursuant to the "letter request procedure", and directing the parties to comment on a proposed form of waiver of the right to a no further benefit hearing before the sentencing judge.

On April 1, 1987, the respondents filed their response to this court's February 26, 1987 order. In that response, this court was informed that "once a YCA prisoner is transferred from FCI, Englewood to an adult institution, after the entry of a no further benefit finding, the Parole Commission does not use the special parole procedures in Watts v. DuBois for future parole determinations for the prisoner." In support of that position, the respondent Parole Commission further advised:

If a YCA "no further benefit" finding allows the Bureau of Prisons to withhold YCA treatment from the inmate, the Parole Commission should logically be exempted from the requirement that "response to treatment" be a determinative factor in parole decisions for Watts class members.

What is apparent then is that the effect of a no further benefit finding is to strip from a YCA inmate all of the special provisions for housing, treatment and conditional release that are provided in the YCA. In essence, the sentence is transformed into a regular adult sentence. That presents a fundamentally different question which requires this court to reconsider the position taken in the earlier opinion and order. Upon reexamination of the question of jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, this court continues to hold the view that the question is presented in the context of the execution of the original YCA sentence. By attacking the procedure used by the Bureau of Prisons to obtain a no further benefit finding in a transfer of a YCA inmate, the petitioner class is not challenging the validity of the original sentence. Accordingly, the challenge is not appropriate under the jurisdiction of the sentencing court under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Additionally, this court is not now considering the validity of any no further benefit findings made in the case of YCA inmates who have already been transferred from Englewood. Likewise, it is not for this court to determine the conflict among the circuits on the question of whether a YCA sentence can be altered without a conviction for subsequent criminal conduct.

The Supreme Court in Ralston v. Robinson, 454 U.S. 201, 102 S.Ct. 233, 70 L.Ed.2d 345 (1981), held that the YCA does not require YCA treatment for the remainder of a youth sentence where a judge imposes a subsequent adult sentence upon a finding that such treatment would not further benefit the offender. In United States v. Won Cho, 730 F.2d 1260 (9th Cir.1984), a divided court construed the Ralston ruling narrowly in holding that YCA sentences could not be changed into adult sentences in the absence of a subsequent conviction. That holding was based upon the perception that an adult sentence is more severe in its effects than a YCA sentence. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals applied Ralston to authorize the modification of a YCA sentence after a revocation of probation. The District of Columbia Circuit decided in In re Coates, 711 F.2d 345 (D.C.Cir.1983), that the sentencing judge could make a determination of no further benefit on the basis of misconduct reports within the institution.

This court agrees with the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals that an adult sentence is fundamentally different from a YCA sentence. The YCA established a treatment alternative to established sentencing objectives. In Dorszynski v. United States, 418 U.S. 424, 434, 94 S.Ct. 3042, 3048, 41 L.Ed.2d 855 (1974), the Supreme Court summarized the unique features of the YCA in this language:

An important element of the program was that once a person was committed for treatment under the Act, the execution of sentence was to fit the person, not the crime for which he was convicted. Classification agencies were to be established by the Director of the Bureau of Prisons to receive and study the person committed and make recommendations to the Director as to appropriate treatment. 18 U.S.C. § 5014, 5015. Further, the range of treatment available was made broad to provide maximum flexibility. The Director was authorized both to adapt numerous public facilities, and to contract with public or private agencies, in order to provide institutional treatment which the Director could vary according to the committed person's progress or lack of it. 18 U.S.C. §§ 5011, 5015. An integral part of the treatment program was the segregation of the committed persons, insofar as practicable, so as to place them with those similarly committed, to avoid the influence of association with the more hardened inmates serving traditional criminal sentences. 18 U.S.C. § 5011.

Indeed, it is these very differences which have been held to justify a longer commitment of and denying good time credits to a YCA inmate. In Watts...