Watts v. Goetz

• Decision Date: 21 October 2020
• Docket Number: Case No. 2D19-1002
• Citation: 311 So.3d 253
• Parties: Stephen J. WATTS, Appellant, v. Nicole L. GOETZ and Nicole L. Goetz, P.L., Appellees.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

311 So.3d 253

Stephen J. WATTS, Appellant,

v.Nicole L. GOETZ and Nicole L. Goetz, P.L., Appellees.

Case No. 2D19-1002

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

Opinion filed October 21, 2020.

Kristin A. Norse and Stuart C. Markman of Kynes, Markman & Felman, P.A., Tampa, for Appellant.

Amy L. Christiansen and Michael J. McGirney of Spector Gaden Rosen Vinci LLP, St. Petersburg, for Appellees.

SMITH, Judge.

Stephen Watts appeals the final summary judgment entered in favor of his former attorney, Nicole Goetz, and her law firm Nicole L. Goetz, P.L. (collectively "Goetz"), in this legal malpractice action arising out of a mediated settlement agreement (MSA) in his divorce. The trial court erred by finding, as a matter of law, Goetz could not have committed malpractice in failing to include a supportive relationship clause in the MSA because the parties were bound by the terms of their unchallenged prenuptial agreement in the divorce proceeding and that the statute of limitations began to run on Mr. Watts' legal malpractice claim when he signed the MSA. Because we reverse on these dispositive issues and remand for further proceedings, we decline to address the issues that remain.

I.

Mr. Watts and his former wife were married in Massachusetts on September 8, 2000. Prior to their marriage, on September 6, 2000, they entered into a prenuptial agreement, both parties being represented by counsel. Mr. Watts and his former wife moved to Florida in 2002, and they filed for divorce in 2012 after twelve years of marriage.

The alimony provision of the prenuptial agreement contained a contingency that required the parties' marriage to last at least one year. Upon the marriage lasting that one year, the former wife would be entitled to $100,000 in alimony per year for a duration equal to the number of years of the marriage. The alimony provision also allowed for cost of living adjustments (COLA). According to the prenuptial agreement, the alimony obligation would terminate upon the earlier of any of the following events: Mr. Watts' death, his former wife's death, the former wife's remarriage, or the expiration of the alimony duration period. The alimony provision, like the other provisions of the prenuptial agreement, was capable of being "modified or revoked but only by a written instrument executed by the parties," as set forth in Article II(C)(2) of the prenuptial agreement.

In 2012, Mr. Watts and his former wife filed for divorce and Mr. Watts retained attorney Goetz to represent him in the dissolution proceedings, which included review of his prenuptial agreement. Because the prenuptial agreement contained a Massachusetts choice of law provision, attorney Goetz consulted with a Massachusetts lawyer, who confirmed that the agreement, as it stated, could only be modified if agreed to in writing by the parties. Thereafter, on February 6, 2014, attorney Goetz represented Mr. Watts at the mediation where the parties renegotiated the terms of the prenuptial agreement, including the alimony provision, and entered into the MSA, agreeing to Florida as the choice of law.

The MSA includes an alimony provision similar to the one in the prenuptial agreement and provides that Mr. Watts will pay durational alimony in the amount of $100,000 per year for a period not to exceed twelve years. According to the MSA, the durational alimony will terminate earlier in the event of either the death of Mr. Watts or his former wife or the former wife's remarriage. There were, however, two key distinctions between the alimony provision in the MSA and the one in the prenuptial agreement.

First, the alimony provision in the MSA, unlike the prenuptial agreement, does not allow for the modification of alimony upon written agreement of the parties but instead contains a waiver of the parties' rights to modify the alimony obligation as to duration and amount, except in two specific circumstances, neither of which include the former wife's entering a supportive relationship. The waiver provides:

Except as set forth herein, the parties specifically waive all rights to modification of any kind whether as to amount or duration of the spousal support (alimony) payments set forth in this Agreement for any reasons whatsoever, except in the event of [Mr. Watts'] or [the former wife's] total or partial disability, or [Mr. Watts'] bankruptcy.

Second, unlike the alimony provision in the prenuptial agreement, there is no COLA provision in the MSA for the following reason: "[b]ased upon the parties' agreement of non-modifiability and Paragraph 9.1 [of the MSA,] the COLA provision [in the prenuptial agreement] is waived." Paragraph 9.1 of the MSA provides:

Novation on Terms of Prenuptial Agreement: The terms and conditions of this agreement shall supersede and replace the terms and conditions of the parties' Prenuptial Agreement dated September 6, 2000.

The MSA was incorporated into the final judgment of dissolution, which was rendered on April 15, 2014. Approximately one year later, sometime in the spring of 2015, the former wife moved in with her boyfriend. In March 2016, Mr. Watts learned that his former wife was expecting a child with her boyfriend and that the two had no plans to marry. Later that same month, in March 2016, Mr. Watts sought the legal advice of another family law attorney about his ability to modify or terminate his alimony obligation based on the former wife's cohabitation with her boyfriend. This attorney told Mr. Watts that while Florida law allows for alimony to be reduced or terminated when a supportive relationship can be established, the terms of Mr. Watts' MSA prohibited such relief. The Florida law regarding supportive relationships was in effect at the time the MSA was executed. See § 61.14(1)(b)(1), Fla. Stat. (2014) ("The court may reduce or terminate an award of alimony upon specific written findings by the court that since the granting of a divorce and the award of alimony a supportive relationship has existed between the obligee and a person with whom the obligee resides.").¹

After learning that the MSA precluded a reduction or termination of his alimony obligation based on his former wife's supportive relationship, Mr. Watts made an appointment to discuss the MSA with attorney Goetz. According to the summary judgment evidence identified by Mr. Watts, which we must accept as true, attorney Goetz admitted to not having discussed the inclusion of a supportive relationship clause with Mr. Watts; she apologized, saying she was not sure why a supportive relationship clause was left out of the MSA.² Mr. Watts' summary judgment evidence further revealed that both attorney Goetz and her paralegal testified in their depositions that it was standard in Goetz's family law practice to include a supportive relationship clause in MSAs and that Goetz's first draft of Mr. Watts' MSA included a supportive relationship clause.

Mr. Watts commenced the instant legal malpractice action against Goetz on April 24, 2017, alleging she breached her duty of care by not including a supportive relationship clause in the MSA, which could have allowed Mr. Watts to reduce or terminate his durational alimony obligation when his former wife moved in with her boyfriend and by making the MSA's alimony provision nonmodifiable, except in the event of the parties' disability or Mr. Watts' bankruptcy, thereby further precluding any ability to modify the alimony provision based upon a supportive relationship under section 61.14.

Goetz sought a dismissal of the legal malpractice action and, when that was denied, summary judgment. Both motions made the same two arguments. First, Goetz argued, as a matter of law, she could not have committed legal malpractice for failing to include a supportive relationship clause in the MSA because Mr. Watts was bound by the nonmodifiable prenuptial agreement, which expressly provided that alimony was only terminable on the event of Mr. Watts' death, the former wife's death, or the former wife's remarriage. Second, Goetz argued Mr. Watts' complaint was barred by the two-year statute of limitations for legal malpractice claims under section 95.11(4)(a), Florida Statutes (2014), because it was filed more than two years after he signed the MSA that did not include a supportive relationship clause. In support of her motion for summary judgment, Goetz attached only the prenuptial agreement and the MSA. Mr. Watts filed a memorandum in opposition to Goetz's motion for summary judgment, together with a number of deposition transcripts. Ms. Goetz did not present any summary judgment evidence to rebut the depositions filed by Mr. Watts.

After hearing argument on the motion for summary judgment, the trial court found:

Number one, ... it's impossible, unless you are challenging the validity of the prenup, to make changes to a prenuptial agreement. So it is therefore, impossible that [attorney Goetz] made this mistake because the alimony is nonmodifiable.... Secondly, I agree that I think the statute of limitations has run.

The trial court explained its ruling on the statute of limitations saying: "[Mr. Watts] should have known [of the mistake] immediately when he signed the agreement." Consistent with these findings, the trial court entered its final judgment:

2. The Court finds that the Pre-Nuptial Agreement signed by the Plaintiff and his ex-wife in 2000 was not challenged and was, therefore, controlling in the case and the Plaintiff cannot state a cause of action in this matter for malpractice.

3. The Court also finds that the Plaintiff did not timely file this action for malpractice within the statutory period stated in the statute of limitations for legal malpractice and the Plaintiff's malpractice action is barred.

This appeal followed.

II.

We review the order granting final summary judgment de novo. Volusia County v. Aberdeen at Ormond Beach, L.P., 760 So. 2d 126, 130 (Fla. 2000). A movant is entitled to summary judgment only where there are no genuine...