Watts v. New York City Police Dept.

• Decision Date: 26 September 1989
• Docket Number: No. 88 Civ. 7715 (RWS).,88 Civ. 7715 (RWS).
• Citation: 724 F. Supp. 99
• Parties: Linda G. WATTS, Plaintiff, v. NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York

724 F. Supp. 99

Linda G. WATTS, Plaintiff, v. NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT, Defendant.

No. 88 Civ. 7715 (RWS).

United States District Court, S.D. New York.

September 26, 1989.

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Chadbourne & Parke, New York City, for plaintiff; by Bernard W. McCarthy, Susan Jameson, Ann K. Bernhardt, of counsel.

Peter L. Zimroth, Corp. Counsel, New York City, for defendant; by Norma A. Cote, Howard Singer, of counsel.

SWEET, District Judge.

Pursuant to Rule 12(c), Fed.R.Civ.P., defendant New York City Police Department ("NYPD") moves for judgment on the pleadings to dismiss a Title VII sexual harassment complaint brought against it by a former female employee, Linda G. Watts ("Watts"). For the reasons set forth below, the motion is denied.

Prior Proceedings

Watts was employed by the NYPD as a probationary officer beginning on July 16, 1984. For reasons discussed below, Watts resigned from her position on August 20, 1984, while undergoing Police Academy training. Shortly following her resignation on September 18, 1984, Watts filed sexual harassment charges against the NYPD with the New York District Office of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"). Those charges were also filed with the New York State Division of Human Rights. Nearly four years later, in August 1988, Watts received from the EEOC a Notice of Right to Sue.

In October 1988, plaintiff, proceeding pro se, commenced this federal court action alleging she was sexually harassed by the NYPD in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended ("Title VII"). Following Watts' retention of counsel, an amended complaint was filed on December 21, 1988. NYPD submitted its answer and affirmative defenses on January 17, 1989, and moved for dismissal on March 31, 1989. The motion was heard and considered fully submitted on June 9, 1989.

The Facts as Pleaded

This law suit concerns a series of events alleged to have taken place at the NYPD Police Academy over the one month period from July 16, 1984 to August 20, 1984 in which Watts underwent police training as a probationary officer. Plaintiff contends that during that training she was subjected to several incidents of sexual harassment, primarily at the hands of a Police Academy instructor, Officer Ronald F. Casey ("Casey"), and a fellow probationary officer, Officer Flowers ("Flowers"), who was a classmate of Watts at the Academy.

The first incident occurred two weeks into Watts' training, on July 31, 1984, while plaintiff was attending marksmanship class. Casey, one of Watts' marksmanship instructors at the Academy, approached Watts from behind as she was practicing firing her gun, reached around Watts, and grabbed her left breast.¹ Watts repulsed Casey's advance and made it clear that it was unwelcome and offensive to her.

In reaction to Watts' protestations, Casey took a number of actions. That day he told Watt that she would fail her marksmanship test; yelled at her "to bend down further" while she was loading and unloading her gun, indicating that if she did not, he would "kick the shit out of her"; and refused to have her gun sent to the repair shop (although it was later found by another officer to be broken), claiming instead that the problem was that Watts "couldn't shoot". The following day, Casey told Watts that she had "better learn to shoot," and called her "stupid" and "a dumb broad." Watts telephoned the NYPD's Office of Equal Employment Opportunity that day to complain about the verbal (but apparently not the physical) harassment she had been subjected to by Casey. No action was taken by the NYPD respecting Watts' complaint against Casey, according to plaintiff.

The next day, August 2, 1984, while at the Academy, Watts was on two separate occasions assaulted by a classmate, Probationary Officer Flowers. Both times, Flowers grabbed Watts, pulled her up against his body, and told her that he wanted to feel her body and that her body felt good. In both instances, plaintiff struggled to free herself from Flower's grasp and verbally remonstrated against his unwelcome, offensive actions. In the second incident, Watts found it necessary to strike Flowers in the neck with a box of ammunition to gain release from his hold.

As a result of the actions of Casey and Flowers, Watts suffered severe and persistent headaches and stomach pains. On or about August 7, 1984, after consultations with her own doctor and a doctor employed at the NYPD, Watts took sick leave, remaining out of work for one week.

On August 14, 1984, the day she was to return to class, Watts telephoned the NYPD to advise the Department that she was not returning to work because she had been sexually harassed on the job. She was asked to come to the Academy to resign in person. Upon arrival at the Academy, Watts was taken to speak with the Equal Employment Opportunity ("EEO") Coordinator at the Academy. The EEO Coordinator convinced Watts not to resign but rather to file a complaint which Watts proceeded to do. The EEO Coordinator also told Watts that other women who had made similar complaints of sexual harassment at the Academy had all resigned before any investigation occurred and denied Watts' request that she be allowed to change her class schedule so that she would not have to remain near her assailant Flowers. A subsequent request by Watts to change classes was also denied by the NYPD, notwithstanding that there were numerous other classes in which Watts might have been placed.

Following her reporting of incidents of sexual harassment on August 14, 1984, Watts experienced further harassment in the form of verbal attacks and ostracization by her co-workers and supervisors, said to arise from the failure of the NYPD to keep her complaint confidential and to permit her to transfer classes. According to the complaint, a few hours after her meeting with the EEO Coordinator, one of Watts' instructors, a Sergeant Rosen, allegedly remarked to plaintiff, "What a way to go, Watts." Over the next days, Watts was ignored and isolated by her classmates. On August 17, 1984, as Watts walked by Flowers and other male probationary officers, one of them yelled to her that she was a "squealer." The previous day the EEO Coordinator had told Watts that Flowers, after admitting to grabbing her and holding her against his body, had been docked pay and been instructed to stay away from her.

On August 20, 1984 Watts tendered her resignation. In an apparent effort to alter her decision, an NYPD Captain advised her she would be permitted to change her classes if she stayed on. Watts rejected that offer, stating that it came too late, her request to transfer having twice before been refused. At a post-resignation meeting held on August 22, 1984, Watts alleges the Police Department down-played and belittled her charges in order to cover-up the sexual harassment that occurred but which, she states, the NYPD never adequately and seriously investigated.

Discussion

Sexual harassment is a type of sex discrimination forbidden under Title VII. Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 106 S.Ct. 2399, 91 L.Ed.2d 49 (1986). Plaintiff asserts her employer violated Title VII by subjecting her to three judicially cognizable forms of sexual harassment: "quid pro quo" harassment, harassment creating a hostile working environment, and harassing conduct compelling her forced resignation. Before evaluating whether Watts' complaint pleads facts sufficient to support one or more of these three theories of Title VII liability against NYPD's motion for judgment on the pleadings, a brief review of the standards governing such motions is warranted.

A. Standards Governing Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings

The standard for determining whether to grant a motion for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c), Fed.R.Civ.P., is the same as that governing a motion to dismiss made under Rule 12(b)(6). George C. Frey Ready-Mixed Concrete Inc. v. Pine Hill Concrete Mix Corp., 554 F.2d 551, 553 (2d Cir.1977). In deciding the merits of the motion, all material allegations composing the factual predicate of the action are taken as true, for the court's task is to "assess the legal feasibility of the complaint, not assay the weight of the evidence which might be offered in support thereof." Ryder Energy Distribution v. Merrill Lynch Commodities, Inc., 748 F.2d 774 (2d Cir. 1984). Thus, "unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of her claim which would entitle her to relief," NYPD's motion for judgment on the pleadings must be denied. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 101-102, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957). Accord, Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73, 104 S.Ct. 2229, 2232, 81 L.Ed.2d 59 (1984), quoted in H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., ___ U.S. ___, 109 S.Ct. 2893, 2906, 106 L.Ed.2d 195 (1989).

B. The Quid Pro Quo Theory

A claim for quid pro quo sexual harassment arises when an employer (or one exercising authority delegated by an employer) makes a decision affecting an employee's job status based upon the employee's willingness or refusal to submit to sexually harassing conduct. See Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 909, 911 n. 22 (11th Cir.1982); Christoforou v. Ryder Truck Rental, Inc., 668 F.Supp. 294, 302, 304 (S.D.N.Y.1987); Neville v. Taft Broadcasting Co., 42 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 1314, 1316, 1987 WL 9638 (W.D.N.Y.1987); EEOC Guidelines on Sexual Harassment, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)(2). To constitute prohibited sex-based discrimination such a decision must affect "tangible aspects of the employee's compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment." Henson, 682 F.2d at 909. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).

NYPD does not challenge that Watts' complaint adequately alleges conduct that amounted to sexual harassment. It does dispute that the complaint points to any tangible adverse employment decision made by NYPD following Watts'...