Watts v. United States, No. 8:00CV552 (D. Neb. 1/23/2002)
| Decision Date | 23 January 2002 |
| Docket Number | No. 8:00CV552.,8:00CV552. |
| Parties | RICHARD B. WATTS and DELORES L. WATTS, Plaintiffs, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Nebraska |
Richard K. Watts, Stephanie A. Payne, WATTS LAW FIRM, Lincoln, NE., for Plaintiffs
Ellyn Grant, ASSISTANT UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Omaha, NE., for Defendants
This matter is before the court on defendant's ("the government's") motion for partial summary judgment, Filing No. 23.1 This is a quiet title action against the United States pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2409a. At issue is title to certain tracts of land purchased by the government in connection with the Calamus Dam project. Plaintiffs assert that they are entitled to ownership of the land by adverse possession. The government asserts that the action is barred by a twelve-year statute of limitations. 28 U.S.C. § 2409a(g).
The uncontroverted evidence establishes that Donald and Jeanne Cain purchased certain real property in Garfield County, Nebraska, from Herman and Hazel Hood in 1959 (the "Cain property").2 That property was abutted to the south and east by a 798-acre tract of land, then owned by the Harold and Joan Charron, known as Tract CR 10. At the time the Cains purchased the property, a fence separated the Cains' property from the Charrons' property. Plaintiffs have shown that the fence line, although repaired from time to time, has never been removed or relocated and has continuously existed in its present location.3 Filing 27, Affidavits of Donald Cain and Richard Watts. Plaintiffs have further shown by affidavit that the Cains recognized these fence lines as the eastern and southern boundaries of their property and maintained open, notorious and exclusive possession of the land inside that fence line until 1987 and that the property was used for pasture, haying, and recreational purposes. Filing No. 27, Affidavit of Donald Cain.
In 1987, the Cains entered into a contract for installment sale of the property to the plaintiffs, Richard and Delores Watts. The Wattses took possession of the property and maintained open and exclusive possession of the property, similarly recognizing the fence line as the eastern and southern boundaries of the property. Filing No. 27, Affidavit of Richard Watts. Since 1987, the land has been used by Richard and Delores Watts for pasture, haying, storage and recreation, including hunting and use as a target range, and a portion has been developed as a trailer park and housing development.
The United States purchased various parcels of land during the latter part of 1978 in anticipation of construction of the Calamus Dam and consequent creation of the Calamus Reservoir. In 1978, Harold and Joan Charron conveyed Tract CR10 to the United States by warranty deed. The warranty deed was duly recorded in Garfield County, Nebraska, on August 18, 1978. The Cains had also conveyed a ten-acre tract of their property, known as Tract CR 12, to the United States in 1978. (The property conveyed from the Cains to the Richard and Delores Watts in 1987 did not include this parcel.) In preparation for the purchase of Tract 12, the United States conducted a survey of the tract. Filing No. 27, Affidavit of Donald Cain. The United States did not inform the Cains of any irregularity with respect to the placement of fence lines. Id. The affidavit of Eugene Schiltz, who surveyed the property in June 2000, establishes that "assuming the fence line separating the property being purchased by the Watts' and Tract CR 10 was in its present location when the parcel known as Tract CR 12 was surveyed by the United States of America, it would have been obvious to said surveyor that said fence line was off of the legal boundary and on to Tract 12 by some 85 feet where the same joins Tract CR 12 at its Southeast Corner." Filing No. 27, Affidavit of Eugene Schiltz.
In 1992, the Cains and the Wattses amended their contract for sale, reducing the acreage conveyed from 230 acres to 70 acres. Filing No 27, Affidavits of Donald Cain and Richard Watts. Pursuant to an addendum to the contract for sale, a survey of the property was conducted to ascertain the amended legal description of the property to be purchased by the plaintiffs. Id. The survey revealed that the fence line on the eastern edge of the property was not constructed on the boundaries of the property as set forth in the legal description. Id. The affidavits of Donald V. Cain and Richard B. Watts establish that this was the first time either of them knew the fence on the eastern boundary of the property was not constructed on the eastern property line. Filing 27, Affidavits of Donald Cain and Richard Watts.
In 2000, Eugene Schiltz surveyed the property at issue. Filing No. 24, Exhibit 2. He identified the tracts of land that were within the fence line but outside of the boundaries of the legal descriptions of the property that is the subject of the sale from the Cains to the Watts as two parcels, one amounting to approximately .9 acres and one amounting to 5.4 acres. Id. The affidavit of Richard Watts establishes that this was the first time he knew the fence on the southern boundary of the property was not constructed on the southern property line. The .9 acre parcel and the 5.4 acre parcel identified in the survey are the subject of this action.
Because jurisdiction is a threshold issue for the court, the district court has broader power to decide its own right to hear the case than it has when the merits of the case are reached. Bellecourt v. United States, 994 F.2d 427, 430 (8th Cir. 1993). For the court to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), the complaint must be successfully challenged either on its face or on the factual truthfulness of its averments. Titus v. Sullivan, 4 F.3d 590, 593 (8th Cir. 1993). In a facial challenge to jurisdiction, all of the factual allegations regarding jurisdiction would be presumed true and the motion could succeed only if the plaintiff had failed to allege an element necessary for subject matter jurisdiction. Id. In a factual attack on the jurisdictional allegations of the complaint, however, the court can consider competent evidence such as affidavits, deposition testimony, and the like in order to determine the factual dispute. Id. Because the parties have submitted evidence in support of their respective positions, this case presents a factual jurisdictional challenge. In such a challenge, this court is "free to weigh the evidence and satisfy itself as to the existence of its power to hear the case." Osborn v. United States, 918 F.2d 724, 729 (8th Cir. 1990). No presumptive truthfulness attaches to the plaintiff's allegations, and the existence of disputed material facts will not preclude the court from evaluating for itself the merits of jurisdictional claims. Id. The plaintiff has the burden of proving that jurisdiction does in fact exist. Id. at 730.
Jurisdiction is premised on the Quiet Title Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2409a ("QTA"). The QTA authorizes lawsuits against the federal government "to adjudicate a disputed title to real property in which the United States claims an interest." 28 U.S.C. § 2409a(a). The QTA is the exclusive means by which an adverse claimant can challenge the United States' title to real property. Block v. North Dakota ex rel. Bd. of Univ. & Sch. Lands, 461 U.S. 273, 286 (1983) (Block I). The QTA bars any action that is not commenced within twelve years of the date it accrued. 28 U.S.C. § 2409 (g). An action is "deemed to have accrued on the date the plaintiff or his predecessor in interest knew or should have known of the claim of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2409a(g). Because the QTA waives the government's sovereign immunity from suit, a challenge based on the statute of limitations is jurisdictional — a plaintiff must comply with the limitations period to effectuate that waiver. Spirit Lake Tribe v. North Dakota, 262 F.3d 732, 737 (8th Cir. 2001). In addition, the QTA's statute of limitations is to be strictly construed. Block I, 461 U.S. at 286.
The twelve-year limitations period begins when a plaintiff or his predecessor knew or should have known of the government's adverse land claim. Id. Whether a party "should have known" about the government's claim is subject to a test of reasonableness. Patterson v. Buffalo National River, 76 F.3d 221, 224 (8th Cir. 1996). This standard does not require the government to provide explicit notice of its claim, nor is knowledge of the full contours of the government's claim required — all that is necessary is a reasonable awareness that the government claims some interest adverse to the plaintiffs. Spirit Lake, 262 F.3d at 738. "Simply put, the limitations period is triggered when a landowner has reason to know that the government claims some type of adverse interest in that land." Id.
The government contends that the recording of the deed of the sale of Tract CR10 from the Charrons to the government in August 1978 triggered the statute of limitations and that any action to quiet title after August 1990 is thus barred. Plaintiffs contend that title to the disputed tracts of land had already passed to the Cains by adverse possession before the conveyance to the government and that the Charrons could not convey land over which they held no title. The relevant inquiry for purposes of this motion is not whether the deed in fact conveyed title to the United States, but whether recording of the deed conveyed sufficient notice of the government's claim to the disputed tracts. See, e.g., United States v. Mottaz, 476 U.S. 834, 843-44 (1986) (). Resolution of the jurisdictional issue, however, requires some discussion of the...
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