Watts v. Veneman

• Decision Date: 28 October 1971
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 1757-70.
• Parties: Ethel L. WATTS et al., Plaintiffs, v. John G. VENEMAN et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Columbia

334 F. Supp. 482

Ethel L. WATTS et al., Plaintiffs, v. John G. VENEMAN et al., Defendants.

Civ. A. No. 1757-70.

United States District Court, District of Columbia.

October 28, 1971.

Byron K. Welch and Rosalyn B. Bell, Washington, D. C., for plaintiffs.

Joseph M. Hannon, Lawrence S. Margolis, J. Michael McGarry, III, Asst. U. S. Attys., for defendants; Paul Merlin, Randolph W. Gains, Sarah L. Kemble, Social Sec. Div., Office of Gen. Counsel, U. S. Dept. of Health, Education and Welfare, Washington, D. C., of counsel.

OPINION AND ORDER

CORCORAN, District Judge.

I

This action is brought under § 205(g) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), to review two final decisions of the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare denying separate claims to child's insurance benefits under § 202(d) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 402(d). The first claim was asserted by Ethel L. Watts on behalf of Patricia and John T. Sumlin, minors; and the second claim was asserted by Audrey M. Marlowe on behalf of Lamont S., and Michelle L. and Michael T. Jones, minors. In each instance the issue is before the Court on cross motions for summary judgment.

II

The decision of both claims asserted herein rests in the interpretation and application of Section 202(d) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 402(d). That section accords benefits to the child of an individual who dies fully or currently insured if:

(A) an application has been filed for child's insurance benefits; and

(B) at the time such application was filed the child was unmarried; and

(C) the child had either

(1) not attained the age of 18 or

(2) was a full-time student who had not attained the age of 22 or

(3) was under a disability which began before he reached age 18; and

(D) the child was dependent upon the insured individual at the time the insured individual died.

"Child" is defined in § 216(e) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 416(e) as the child, the legally adopted child or the stepchild of an individual. Section 216(h) (2) (A) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 416(h) (2) (A), further provides that in determining whether an applicant is the child of insured individual, the Secretary shall apply such law as would be applied in determining the devolution of intestate personal property by the courts of the State in which the insured individual is domiciled at the time the application is filed or, if such individual is dead, by the courts of the State in which he was domiciled at the time of his death. An applicant who according to such law would have the same status relative to taking intestate personal property as a child shall be deemed such.

1965 Amendments to the Social Security Act enlarged the definition of child to include an illegitimate child who does not meet the pre-Amendment definition of "child," Section 216(h) (3), 42 U.S.C. § 416(h) (3). Under Section 216(h) (3) (C), an illegitimate child of an insured wage earner is deemed the child of such individual for purposes of child's benefits, but only if:

(1) the wage earner has acknowledged in writing that the applicant is his son or daughter; or

(2) the wage earner has been decreed by a court to be the father of the applicant; or

(3) the wage earner has been ordered by a court to contribute to the support of the applicant because the applicant is his son or daughter; or

(4) the wage earner is shown by satisfactory evidence to have been the father of the child and was living with the child or contributing to the support of the child at the time the insured individual died.

III

Since the challenges of the two plaintiffs to the denial of benefits vary somewhat in their thrust, we treat each claim separately.

A. THE CLAIM OF ETHEL WATTS

Plaintiff Watts filed two applications for child's insurance benefits on behalf of Patricia Sumlin and John T. Sumlin, the surviving children of John Sumlin, a fully insured wage earner. The Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare denied the first application dated May 3, 1966 and the plaintiff failed to appeal. The second application dated July 5, 1968 sought a reconsideration of the earlier denial of benefits. Reconsideration was had. A hearing, as requested by the plaintiff, was accorded to her. The Hearing Examiner made findings and denied relief. The Appeals Council affirmed the Hearing Examiner's decision and allowed it to stand as the final decision in the case.

Based on the evidence presented at the hearing on plaintiff's application, the Hearing Examiner found that neither Patricia nor John qualified as the "child" of the wage earner under Sections 216(e), 216(h) (2), or 216(h) (3) of the Social Security Act and therefore, concluded that said children were not entitled to child's insurance benefits under § 202(d) of the Social Security Act. Specifically, the Hearing Examiner determined that neither Patricia nor John qualified as the child of the wage earner under Section 216(h) (2) because he found that such children were illegitimate, that the wage earner was domiciled in the District of Columbia at the time of his death and that under the law of the District of Columbia¹ an illegitimate child does not inherit intestate personal property from his father.

In addition, the Hearing Examiner determined that neither Patricia nor John could qualify as the "child" of the wage earner under the broadened definition contained in Section 216(h) (3). The Hearing Examiner found no evidence on the record of an acknowledgment in writing by the wage earner that he was the father of Patricia or John T. Sumlin, or of a court decree pronouncing the wage earner to be the father of Patricia or John or directing the wage earner to contribute to their support. Finally, although the Hearing Examiner was satisfied that the evidence was sufficient to establish that the wage earner fathered Patricia and John, he found the record failed to establish that the wage earner was living with the children or contributing to their support at the time of his death.

The plaintiff does not challenge the findings of the Hearing Examiner as affirmed by the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare. Rather, the plaintiff complains that Patricia and John T. Sumlin were denied child's insurance benefits solely because they are illegitimate children and alleges that the provisions of the Social Security Act and of the District of Columbia law of intestate succession that dictate this discrimination violate the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. In support of this argument plaintiff relies chiefly on Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 88 S.Ct. 1509, 20 L.Ed.2d 436, reh. denied, 393 U.S. 898, 89 S.Ct. 65, 21 L.Ed.2d 185 (1968), and Glona v. American Guarantee & Liability Insurance Co., 391 U.S. 73, 88 S.Ct. 1515, 20 L.Ed.2d 441, reh. denied, 393 U.S. 898, 89 S.Ct. 66, 21 L.Ed. 2d 185 (1968).

In Levy the Supreme Court held that Louisiana could not, consistently with the equal protection clause, bar an illegitimate child from recovering for the wrongful death of its mother when such recovery by a legitimate child was authorized. In Glona the Court held invalid a statute that prohibited a mother from recovering for the wrongful death of her illegitimate son. Plaintiff urges that these decisions compel the conclusion that the illegitimate child must enjoy the same right to child's insurance benefits under the Social Security laws and the same right to share in the inheritance of his parent's estate under District of Columbia law that the legitimate child enjoys.

Insofar as plaintiff's complaint of unlawful discrimination hinges on the unconstitutionality of the District of Columbia intestate succession statute, it must fail. The Supreme Court in Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532, 91 S.Ct. 1017, 28 L.Ed.2d 288 (1971) recently affirmed the constitutionality of the Louisiana statute of intestate succession which discriminated against illegitimate children in a manner similar to that of the District of Columbia statute. The Supreme Court declined to extend the rationale of the Levy and Glona cases and stated, "Levy did not say and cannot fairly be read to say that a State can never treat an illegitimate child differently from legitimate offspring." 401 U.S. 536, 91 S.Ct. 1019, 28 L.Ed.2d 292. The Court concluded that discriminatory choices embodied in an intestate succession statute do not offend notions of equal protection of the laws when such choices are made by a state in the exercise of its "power to make rules to establish, protect, and strengthen family life as well as to regulate the disposition of property left in the state by a man dying there." 401 U.S. 538, 91 S.Ct. 1021, 28 L.Ed.2d 294. In view of Labine, this Court considers the District of Columbia intestate sucession statute constitutional.

The Court must further consider whether Section 216(h) (2) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 416(h) (2), which incorporates the District of Columbia law of intestate succession as part of the test of eligibility for child's insurance benefits, and Section 216(h) (3) of the Act, as applied by the Secretary in this case to deny child's insurance benefits to illegitimate children, offend the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The answer to this question turns on whether the discrimination against illegitimate children embodied in the statutory scheme is without any foundation in reason. The Due Process Clause bars only the "invidious discrimination" or the classification which is "patently arbitrary and utterly lacking in rational justification." Fleming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 611, 80 S.Ct. 1367, 1373, 4 L.Ed.2d 1435, 1445 (1960), Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okl., 348 U.S. 483, 489, 75 S.Ct. 461, 465, 99 L.Ed. 563 (1955), Gruenwald v. Gardner, 390 F.2d 591, 592 (2nd Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 982, 89 S. Ct. 456, 21 L.Ed.2d 445 (1968). On the other hand, a classification which has a reasonable relation to the object of the legislation does not violate due process.

The Court finds that there...