Waugh v. University of Hawaii

Decision Date31 December 1980
Docket NumberNo. 6098,6098
Citation63 Haw. 117,621 P.2d 957
PartiesJohn L. T. WAUGH, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. The UNIVERSITY OF HAWAII, a body corporate, the Board of Regents of the University of Hawaii, and Richard G. Inskeep, Defendants-Appellees.
CourtHawaii Supreme Court

Syllabus by the Court

1. Doctrine of sovereign immunity precludes suit against the state without the state's express consent.

2. The University of Hawaii is subject to suit only in the manner provided for suits against the state. HRS § 304-6.

3. The only suits to which the state has consented are defined in chapters 661 and 662 of Hawaii Revised Statutes; plaintiff's action must have been brought under one of these two chapters or else be barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity.

4. Actions brought under either chapter 661 or chapter 662 of Hawaii Revised Statutes are governed by two-year statutes of limitations; thus, court need not decide whether plaintiff's action sounded in tort or was based on some other theory, since it must have been brought under one of these chapters and if brought under either would be barred if commenced more than two years after the cause accrued.

5. A cause of action begins to accrue when the plaintiff knew or in the exercise of reasonable care should have discovered that an actionable wrong has been committed against his property.

6. Where plaintiff returned from sabbatical in September of 1970 and discovered that his vacuum rack and some of his research materials had been destroyed, plaintiff knew or reasonably should have known that an actionable wrong had been committed against his property.

7. In December of 1970, when plaintiff received four boxes from storage containing the remains of his laboratory and found that his missing research compounds were not in the boxes, he knew or should have known that his property was either damaged or missing and thus he could have filed an action against defendants.

8. A defendant or an agent of a defendant need not inform a plaintiff of the right to bring suit; therefore the date on which the University's Contracts Officer informed plaintiff of the State Tort Liability Act is irrelevant for purposes of determining date on which cause of action accrued.

9. Plaintiff knew upon his return to University that some of his materials had been destroyed and others were missing; such knowledge was sufficient in itself to form the basis for an action against the University and the ad hoc committee's report that it could not find missing materials could only serve to buttress plaintiff's knowledge.

10. One invoking equitable estoppel must show that he or she has detrimentally relied on the representation or conduct of the person sought to be estopped, and that such reliance was reasonable.

11. Where defendants never represented that recommendation of ad hoc committee would be followed and never represented that plaintiff's lost materials would be restored and where plaintiff did not file suit until six months after being informed by University Vice President that any further action on his claim must go beyond University channels, it is apparent that plaintiff was not relying on any representation of University in delaying the filing of suit.

12. "Rules" of practice which would be applicable to faculty claims for lost or damaged research materials would affect only staff and faculty of the University and not the private rights of or procedures available to the public, and thus are exempted from public rule-making procedures of the Hawaii Administrative Procedure Act.

13. The elements of a bailment are the intent to create a bailment, delivery of possession of the bailed items, and acceptance of the items by the bailee.

14. A trial court's finding of fact will not be set aside unless it is clearly erroneous and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge of the credibility of the witnesses. Rule 52(a), H.R.C.P.

15. A finding of fact is clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.

16. Trial court's finding of fact that plaintiff did not ask nor receive defendant's consent to store or otherwise safeguard plaintiff's personal effects negated the essential elements of a bailment.

17. In some situations courts will imply the existence of a bailment even though not every element of a consensual bailment is present.

18. The element of possession is necessary whether a bailment is actual or constructive.

19. In order to have possession, physical control and an intent to exercise that control must be shown.

20. In determining whether control exists, courts consider the subject matter's amenability to control, steps taken to effect control, the existence of power over the subject matter, the existence of power to exclude others from control, and the intention with which the acts in relation to the subject matter are performed.

21. Where plaintiff retained key to his office and laboratory and could have had personal effects removed at any time and where other University personnel also had access to plaintiff's office and laboratory, it cannot be said that defendant department chairman had sufficient possession of plaintiff's goods to impose doctrine of constructive bailment.

22. Duty is not sacrosanct in itself, but only an expression of the sum total of those considerations of policy which lead the law to say that the particular plaintiff is entitled to protection.

23. In determining whether or not a duty is owed, court must weigh the considerations of policy which favor one party's recovery against those which favor limiting other party's liability.

24. Where defendant was the chairman of a department and plaintiff a member thereof and where defendant had authority to assign office space and to order plaintiff's materials stored or otherwise moved and exercised that authority, defendant owed a duty of care towards plaintiff's property.

25. Where defendant issued general instructions and relied on a competent stockroom supervisor and an experienced glassblower to dismantle plaintiff's laboratory and vacuum rack, defendant acted as a reasonably prudent person would have acted under the circumstances.

26. Although not explicitly stated, in a bench trial, a motion to dismiss after the close of plaintiff's case is in essence a motion under Rule 41(b), H.R.C.P. Rule 41(b) vests trial courts with power to weigh and evaluate the evidence without special inferences favoring plaintiff, to resolve conflicts in the evidence, to determine where the preponderance of evidence lies, and to award judgment on the merits where appropriate. Rule 41(b), H.R.C.P.

Thomas P. Gill, Honolulu (Gill, Park & Park, Honolulu, of counsel), for plaintiff-appellant.

Ronald Y. K. Leong, Deputy Atty. Gen., Honolulu (Don G. Kessler, Deputy Atty. Gen., Honolulu, on brief), for defendants-appellees.

Before RICHARDSON, C. J., and OGATA and MENOR, JJ. *

RICHARDSON, Chief Justice.

This is an appeal by plaintiff John L. T. Waugh from an order by the trial court granting defendants' motion to dismiss at the close of plaintiff's case. The trial court held that the claims against defendant University of Hawaii and defendant Board of Regents were barred by the statute of limitations. The claim against defendant Richard G. Inskeep was dismissed on the merits. We affirm.

FACTS

Plaintiff-appellant, Dr. John L. T. Waugh, a specialist in inorganic and physical chemistry, joined the University of Hawaii's Department of Chemistry faculty in 1956. Dr. Waugh was assigned an office with a private connecting laboratory in Bilger Hall on the University's Manoa campus.

On June 9, 1969, Dr. Richard Inskeep, then Chairman of the Chemistry Department, issued a memorandum directing faculty members who were preparing for sabbatical leave, including Dr. Waugh, to clear their respective offices for temporary use by the Department during their absences. As he had done before leaving on a previous sabbatical, Dr. Waugh cleared his desk and certain storage and laboratory bench space. In his laboratory, Waugh left an assortment of personal equipment, as well as a variety of scientific apparatus and laboratory equipment provided by the University for his use as a faculty member. Dr. Waugh also left behind various containers, including covered beakers, vials, vacuum dessicators, and a large hexagonal vacuum rack of his own design. Some of these vessels contained rare chemical compounds of complex structure which Waugh had synthesized throughout his career.

The day before leaving on his sabbatical, Dr. Waugh returned to his University office to check his mail and clear up any remaining details. In doing so, he discovered that a few personal items and some laboratory equipment had been removed from his office and were being used by other members of the Department. Waugh located the equipment and demanded its return. He also filed a written complaint with Richard Takasaki, Acting President of the University, reporting the incident and asking that his office and laboratory not be further disturbed during his absence. Copies of the complaint were sent to Chairman Inskeep and other Chemistry Department faculty.

Professor George Andermann, whose office adjoined Dr. Waugh's, volunteered to store whatever items Waugh wanted to leave in his safekeeping. Waugh availed himself of Andermann's offer and transferred a four-drawer filing cabinet, its contents, and several small pieces of laboratory equipment to Andermann's office. Waugh left on sabbatical on June 18, 1969.

While Waugh was on sabbatical, his office was occupied by a visiting professor for a brief period of time. Dr. Inskeep then assigned the office and laboratory space to another member of the Chemistry Department, Dr. Carl Seff, for his permanent use. Inskeep did not...

To continue reading

Request your trial
60 cases
  • In re Holoholo
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Hawaii
    • April 13, 1981
    ...other relevant factors indicates otherwise. See Anthony v. Cleveland, 355 F.Supp. 789, 790 (D.Hawaii 1973); Waugh v. The University of Hawaii, 621 P.2d 957 at 965 (Hawaii 1980). The RCUH was established under chapter 307 of the Hawaii Rev.Stat. as a body corporate. The chapter provides that......
  • Blair v. Ing, No. 22401.
    • United States
    • Hawaii Supreme Court
    • February 27, 2001
    ...considerations of policy which lead the law to say that the particular plaintiff is entitled to protection. Waugh v. University of Hawaii, 63 Haw. 117, 135, 621 P.2d 957, 970 (1980); Kelley v. Kokua Sales & Supply, Ltd., 56 Haw. 204, 207, 532 P.2d 673, 675 (1975). Legal duties are not disco......
  • U.S. v. Real Property Located at Incline Village
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Nevada
    • April 28, 1997
    ...bailed, who manifests an intention to exercise that control to the exclusion of others, can be a bailee. Waugh v. University of Hawai`i, 63 Haw. 117, 621 P.2d 957, 969 (1980). Not one of those elements is present in the relationship between an owner of a self storage business and its custom......
  • 76 Hawai'i 454, Ross v. Stouffer Hotel Co. (Hawai'i) Ltd., Inc.
    • United States
    • Hawaii Supreme Court
    • August 30, 1994
    ...action, see Yamaguchi v. The Queen's Hospital Medical Center, 65 Haw. 84, 90, 648 P.2d 689, 693-94 (1982); Waugh v. University of Hawaii, 63 Haw. 117, 127, 621 P.2d 957, 966 (1980), but it would potentially sour employee/employer relations, thereby diminishing the possibility of an amicable......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT