Wawenock LLC v. State
| Decision Date | 11 September 2017 |
| Docket Number | DOCKET NO. BCD-CV-2017-14 |
| Parties | WAWENOCK LLC, et al. Plaintiffs, v. STATE OF MAINE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, Defendant. TOWN OF WISCASSET, Party-in-Interest |
| Court | Maine Superior Court |
STATE OF MAINE
CUMBERLAND, ss.
ORDER ON DEFENDANT STATE OF MAINE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS
This matter is before the Court on Defendant State of Maine Department of Transportation's ("MDOT") motion for judgment on the pleadings brought pursuant to M. R. Civ. P. 12(c). On July 7, 2017, Defendant MDOT moved for judgment on the pleadings on all counts brought against it by Plaintiffs Wawenock, LLC; Bermuda Isles, LLC; 48 Federal Street, LLC; and 32 Middle Street, LLC (collectively, "Plaintiffs."). Plaintiffs' Objection was timely received by the Court on July 27, 2017, and the Court received MDOT's Reply Memorandum on August 3, 2017. Pursuant to the discretion granted it by M. R. Civ. P. 7(b)(7), the Court chose to rule on the motion without hearing.
BACKGROUND1
Wiscasset (or the "Town") is a town located in Lincoln County, Maine. (Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint ¶ 3) (hereafter P.F.A.C. ¶ ___). In downtown Wiscasset lies Wiscasset Village, which is listed in the National Registry of Historic Places. (P.F.A.C. ¶ 6). Plaintiffs are limited liability companies that own property within Wiscasset Village. (P.F.A.C. ¶ 1). A Maine State highway, U.S. Route 1, passes through Wiscasset Village. (P.F.A.C. ¶¶ 9, 87). Wiscasset Village is protected by the Town's historic preservation ordinance and site planning ordinance, (P.F.A.C. ¶ 10), The Town's comprehensive plan calls for the preservation of the Town's historic character. (P.F.A.C. ¶¶ 10-12).
MDOT has proceeded to implement a street alteration and widening project in Wiscasset called the Wiscasset Downtown Improvement Project ("Project"). (P.F.A.C., "Summary of Claims" at 1). The Project involves street alterations to Route 1/ Main Street where it passes through Wiscasset Village. (P.F.A.C. ¶ 81). The Project also involves street alterations to Middle Street, Water Street, and Railroad Avenue in Wiscasset Village. (P.F.A.C. ¶¶ 82-85).
In a March 2016 public informational meeting, MDOT advised Town voters of its plans to widen and alter Route 1 in Wiscasset to help address summer disruption of regional traffic flow. (P.F.A.C. ¶ 12). At the same meeting, MDOT presented Town voters with two options it was considering undertaking to complete the Project, and assured Town voters that they could decide to accept either one of MDOT's options, or do nothing, by means of an advisory referendum vote. (P.F.A.C. ¶ 14). In June 2016, MDOT presented Wiscasset voters with an advisory referendum, and Wiscasset voters approved the proposed "Option 2 Project.2" (P.F.A.C. ¶ 16), After the vote, MDOT announced a number of material changes to the Project from what was presented at the March 2016 informational meeting. (P.F.A.C. ¶ 17), MDOT has assertedthat it intends to commence construction of the Project in 2017. (P.F.A.C. ¶ 22).
In August 2016, and again in September 2016, MDOT presented the Town Board of Selectmen ("Board") with a contract committing the town to pay for certain Project expenses. (P.F.A.C. ¶ 30). The Board did not sign the contract; however, the Board did acknowledge MDOT's "letter of intent" relating to the project. (P.F.A.C. ¶ 31).
On September 16, 2016, MDOT commenced its eminent domain taking process by sending Plaintiffs forms to submit to MDOT and advising Plaintiffs that the Project had been initiated, (P.F.A.C. ¶ 18), On December 3, 2016, MDOT sent Plaintiffs an eminent domain notice. Id.
Plaintiffs commenced suit by filing a Petition with the Lincoln County Superior Court seeking declaratory relief pursuant to 14 M.R.S.A. §§ 5951-5963 and invoking this Court's equity jurisdiction pursuant to 14 M.R.S.A. § 6051(13) for injunctive relief, claiming that there is no plain, adequate, and complete remedy available to Plaintiffs at law, (P.F.A.C. ¶ 4) The matter was later transferred to the Business and Consumer Docket.
In their First Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs pray for relief based on the following counts making these claims: (I) MDOT has failed to comply with statutes and regulations; (II) MDOT's breach of its legal obligations is inconsistent with any finding of public necessity to take Plaintiffs' property; (HI) MDOT wrongfully obtained Town Selectmen's "acknowledgement" of MDOT's letter of intent; (IV) Violation of 30-A M.R.S.A § 4352(6) as the Project does not comply with the Town's Historic Preservation Ordinance; (V) Violation of 30-A M.R.S.A § 4352(6) as the Project does not comply with the Town's Site Plan Review Standards; (VI) Violation of 30-A M.R.S.A § 4352(6) as the Project does not comply with the Town's comprehensive plan; (VII) MDOT has violated Plaintiffs' rights to due process; (VIII)MDOT has violated Plaintiffs' civil rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (IX) MDOT lacks requisite right, title, and interest to construct the Project.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
"After the pleadings are closed but within such time as not to delay the trial, any party may move for judgment on the pleadings." M. R. Civ. P. 12(c). A defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings "is the equivalent of a defendant's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim." Temple v. DiPietro, 2015 ME 166, ¶ 30, 130 A.3d 368 (citing MacKerron v. MacKerron, 571 A.2d 810, 813 (Me. 1990)). See M. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). "Both a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim and a motion for judgment on the pleadings test the legal sufficiency of the complaint." MacKerron, 571 A.2d at 813 (citing 1 Field, McKusick & Wroth, Maine Civil Practice, § 12.14 at 253 (2d ed. 1970)) (quotation marks omitted). For purposes of considering this motion, the Court must examine the complaint in the light most favorable to the Plaintiffs and assume that all factual allegations are true. Cunningham v. Haza, 538 A.2d 265, 267 (Me. 1988). However, the Court is not required to accept as true the Plaintiffs' conclusions of law. See, e.g., Seacoast Hangar Condominum II Ass'n v. Martel, 2001 ME 112, ¶ 16, 775 A.2d 1166; Larrabee v. Penobscot Frozen Foods, 486 A.2d 97, 98 (Me. 1984); Beckett v. Roderick, 251 A.2d 427, 430 (Me. 1969).
DISCUSSION
In Count I of their Complaint, Plaintiffs allege that MDOT has violated two State statutes, 23 M.R.S. §§ 73 and 651, as well as MDOT's own Rule enacted pursuant to 23 M.R.S.§73: 17-229 C.M.R., ch. 103, §4(A). Even assuming that there has been a violation,3 Plaintiffs cannot recover in a private action brought pursuant to the authority cited.
As a general matter, the absence of an express statutory private right of action means there is no private right of action, Charlton v. Town of Oxford, 2001 ME 104, ¶ 15, 774 A.2d 366. While in some instances the Court may imply a private right of action, our Law Court has stated that it is "hesitant to imply a private right of action" where it is not "expressly stated that a cause of action exists." Id. Absent such express language, "the key to determining whether there is an implied cause of action lies in the legislative intent, expressed either in the statute or the legislative history," Id.
Section 73 of Title 23 of the Maine Revised Statutes, also known as the Sensible Transportation Act ("STA"), see 23 M.R.S.A. § 73(1), requires a public participation process for expressing comments and concerns related to transportation planning decisions, capital investment decisions, and project decisions; and further demands that MDOT "shall take the comments and concerns of local citizens into account and must be responsive to them." 23 M.R.S.A. § 73(3)(3)(G). The MDOT has promulgated rules to implement the public participation requirements of the STA. See 17-229 C.M.R., ch. 103, § 4.
The STA contains no express language authorizing a private cause of action, Thus, the Court must then proceed in its inquiry into whether such a private right of action may be implied by looking to the legislative intent as expressed in either the text of the statute or the legislativehistory. As there is nothing in the text of the statute from which the Court can imply a private right of action, the Court proceeds to the legislative history for evidence of legislative intent to imply a private cause of action.
Here, it was the intent of the legislature that the STA never be made law: the STA was first presented to the Legislature's Committee on Transportation on a citizen's initiative, where the committee killed the bill with a unanimous vote of "ought not to pass." Committee Report, Committee on Transportation, L.D. 719 (115th Legis. 1991). The STA became law after it was approved by the voters in a State-wide referendum. 1991 T.B., c.1, § 1. Thus, pursuing the intent of the legislature is not a meaningful exercise. Because the text of the statute includes no language authorizing a private right of action or suggesting that the drafters intended there to be one, the Court declines to imply such a right. Regardless of whether there has been a violation of 23 M.R.S.A. § 73, Plaintiffs cannot recover under this statute.
The Court's finding that the STA lacks a private cause of action distinguishes the instant case from Roop v. City of Belfast, 2007 ME 32, 915 A.2d 966, In that case, the defendant city raised the argument that no private cause of action existed under the statute relied upon by plaintiffs for the first time on appeal during oral argument. Id. ¶ 9, n. 2. As such the case was decided on the issue of standing, not whether there was a private right of action available to plaintiffs. Here, because the Court explicitly finds that Plaintiffs cannot sue under the STA because the statute affords no private...
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