Way v. Department of Motor Vehicles of State of Neb.

• Citation: 351 N.W.2d 46,217 Neb. 641
• Decision Date: 22 June 1984
• Docket Number: No. 83-129,83-129
• Parties: Oscar F. WAY, Appellant, v. DEPARTMENT OF MOTOR VEHICLES OF the STATE OF NEBRASKA and Harry "Pete" Peterson, Director of the Department of Motor Vehicles, Appellees.
• Court: Supreme Court of Nebraska

Page 46

351 N.W.2d 46

217 Neb. 641

Oscar F. WAY, Appellant, v. DEPARTMENT OF MOTOR VEHICLES OF the STATE OF NEBRASKA and Harry "Pete" Peterson, Director of the Department of Motor Vehicles, Appellees.

No. 83-129.

Supreme Court of Nebraska.

June 22, 1984.

Syllabus by the Court

1. Administrative Orders: Appeal and Error: Proof. In a proceeding in the district court to review an order of the Department of Motor Vehicles under the Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act, Neb.Rev.Stat. §§ 60-501 et seq. (Reissue 1978 and Cum.Supp.1982), the burden is upon the plaintiff to show that the order of the department was invalid.

2. Bonds: Statutes. A bond required by statute will be construed in light of the purpose for which it is required as expressed in the statute.

3. Bonds: Statutes: Motor Vehicles. The security deposit required by statute to insure that any judgment against the uninsured motorist will be paid must be in an amount adequate for that purpose.

James H. Monahan, Omaha, for appellant.

Paul L. Douglas, Atty. Gen., and Henry M. Grether III, Lincoln, for appellees.

KRIVOSHA, C.J., and BOSLAUGH, WHITE, HASTINGS, SHANAHAN, and GRANT, JJ.

BOSLAUGH, Justice.

The plaintiff, Oscar F. Way, appeals from the order of the district court affirming the order of the Department of Motor Vehicles suspending his driver's license for failure to comply with the provisions of the Nebraska Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act, Neb.Rev.Stat. §§ 60-501 et seq. (Reissue 1978 and Cum.Supp.1982). The review in the district court was pursuant to § 60-503 (Reissue 1978).

While operating his pickup truck on December 22, 1981, Way was involved in a collision with another vehicle at the intersection of 30th and McKinley Streets in Omaha, Nebraska. Way was not insured. Reports filed with the department following the accident indicate that approximately $1,000 in property damage resulted to the other vehicle and that the driver of that vehicle struck his head on the windshield at the time of the collision.

From a review of the reports made in connection with the accident, the department determined there was a reasonable possibility that it could be found that Way failed to yield the right-of-way and that a judgment could be rendered against Way as a result of the accident. In accordance with the provisions of the Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act, the department required Way either to post a security deposit in the amount of $16,000 to satisfy any judgment against him or to comply with the other alternatives which are set out in the statute. Way failed to post the deposit and his license was suspended pursuant to § 60-507 (Reissue 1978).

On appeal Way contends that his right to due process was violated because he was required to bear the burden in the district court proceeding of showing the invalidity of the department's action. In Hehn v. State, 206 Neb. 34, 36-37, 290 N.W.2d 813, 815 (1980), where the same issue was raised, we said:

The next assignment of error we shall consider is the plaintiff's contention that the court erred in placing the burden on the plaintiff to attack the validity of the order. Plaintiff argues that, unless the director has the burden of showing that there is a reason to believe recovery can be had against a licensee, due process will be violated. Plaintiff does not specifically cite any cases which hold directly on that point. We merely note that the U.S. Supreme Court in Jennings v. Mahoney, 404 U.S. 25, 26 [92 S.Ct. 180, 181, 30 L.Ed.2d 146] (1971), said: "We held that, although a determination that there was a reasonable possibility that the motorist was at fault in the accident sufficed, 'before the State may deprive [him] of his driver's license and vehicle registration,' the State must provide 'a forum for the determination of the question' and a 'meaningful ... "hearing appropriate to the nature of the case." ' " The court did not indicate that the State must bear the burden of proof; indeed, the body of law seems to indicate that the burden is on the licensee. In Mackey v. Director of Department of Motor Vehicles, 194 Neb. 707, 235 N.W.2d 394 (1975), this court noted that the appealing licensee had the burden of pleading and proving the specific grounds on which he relied to establish a claim of invalidity of a license revocation under the former "points" statute, Neb.Rev.Stat. § 39-7,129 (Reissue 1968). See, also Lutjemeyer v. Dennis, 186 Neb. 46, 180 N.W.2d 679 (1970); 73 C.J.S. Public Administrative Bodies and Procedure § 206 (1951). We hold that the procedure specified by the District Court placing on the plaintiff the burden of proving the invalidity of the order of the director of the Department of Motor Vehicles was correct and does not violate the due process rights of plaintiff.

Way next contends that the amount of the bond was unreasonable in light of the evidence presented. A bond required by statute will be construed in light of the purpose for which it is required as expressed in the statute. State Surety Co. v. Peters, 197 Neb. 472, 249 N.W.2d 740 (1977). In Berg v. Pearson, 199 Neb. 390, 392-93, 259 N.W.2d 275, 277 (1977), we discussed the rationale behind the Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act:

[I]n Jennings v. Mahoney, 26 Utah 2d 128, 485 P.2d 1404, affirmed 404 U.S. 25, 92 S.Ct. 180, 30 L.Ed.2d 146 ... the court said: "It should be emphasized that the procedure provided under the Financial Responsibility Act is to...