Wayne State University v. Cleland
| Decision Date | 04 September 1980 |
| Docket Number | Civ. A. No. 7-70973. |
| Citation | 498 F. Supp. 468 |
| Parties | WAYNE STATE UNIVERSITY et al., Plaintiffs, v. Max CLELAND, Administrator, Veterans' Administration et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Michigan |
James K. Robinson, U. S. Atty., Charles J. Kalil, Asst. U. S. Atty., Jay E. Brant, Chief, Civ. Div., U. S. Atty. Office, Detroit, Mich., for plaintiffs.
Elmer Roller, Wayne State University, Detroit, Mich., Gordon A. Gregory, Detroit, Mich., Richard A. Fulton, C. William Tayler, Kenneth J. Ingram, Washington, D. C., for defendants.
A detailed procedural history of this case is set forth in this Court's earlier Opinion, Wayne State University v. Max Cleland, 473 F.Supp. 8 (E.D.Mich.1979) wherein the Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction on the remaining Constitutional issues was denied.1
Briefly stated, this litigation involves the College of Lifelong Learning, a weekend college program initiated by Wayne State University. Designed for those who, because of employment and/or marital responsibilities are unable to attend twelve hours of classes per week, the Program awards four credit hours for a weekly television course, four credit hours for weekly classroom study, and four credit hours for a weekend conference which meets two weekends per quarter.
On March 1, 1977, the Veterans' Administration, relying upon Veterans' Administration Regulations 14272(D) and 14200(G), advised Wayne State University that its Weekend College Program did not qualify for "full-time" benefits for those weeks when the students were not attending twelve 50-minute classroom sessions.2 Consequently, veterans enrolled in the Weekend College Program would receive "full-time" benefits only during those weeks when they were in attendance for twelve (12) or more hours.
Wayne State University and five students responded with this lawsuit, claiming that the regulation and implementation circular were beyond the Administrator's statutory authority and were unconstitutional. The Trial Court, after certifying the full time veteran students enrolled in the Program as a class, pursuant to Rule 23(b)(2) and 23(c)(1) Fed.R.Civ.P., determined that the Administrator had, indeed, exceeded his authority and enjoined enforcement of the regulation.
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit reversed the District Court's findings that the Administrator exceeded his statutory authority. The case was remanded for consideration of the Constitutional claims.3
Presently before the Court is the Defendants' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings or, in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment. On February 28, 1980, the parties presented oral arguments in support of their positions. Post hearing supplemental briefs have been submitted by both sides.4
The Defendants assert that Veterans' Administration Regulation 14272(D), 38 C.F.R. 21.4272(d) and its implementing Circular 20-77-16, do not violate the Constitutional rights of the Plaintiffs.
The Defendants initially address the First Amendment claims of the Plaintiffs that the Regulation restricts the veteran-student's right to freely associate, and that the Regulation is an unconstitutional intrusion upon the educational process.
The Defendants' position is straightforward. They do not believe that a First Amendment issue is legally presented beyond the mere allegations of the Complaint. They support this position by the fact that the Regulation neither dictates the content of ideas expressed in the classroom nor the student's choice as to how much time to devote to his education.
The Plaintiffs respond that the Regulation exerts a chilling effect on their First Amendment rights by limiting a veteran-student's right to freely associate with other students and educators in the educational context of his choice, by hindering a veteran-student from expressing himself in the educational context of his choice and by coercing the University with respect to the ways in which it chooses to organize its educational activities. The Plaintiffs claim that the affidavits of veteran-students which were submitted demonstrate the impact of the Regulation upon the students' association and academic rights.5 Additionally, the Plaintiffs contend that a review of the depositions of the Veterans' Administration officials reveal that there is no compelling state interest justifying the First Amendment intrusion.6
The Court has reviewed the affidavits on file, as well as the depositions in search of the Plaintiffs' claim that the First Amendment has been ignored. Those documents fail to support their position from a factual standpoint.
Moreover, case law fails to support Plaintiff's position from a legal standpoint. Not a single case cited by Plaintiffs legally supports their contention that the Veterans' Administration Regulation at issue restricts their freedom to associate and/or unconstitutionally interferes with the educational process.7
The Court finds that there is no genuine issue of fact as to Plaintiffs' First Amendment claims and, accordingly, grants Summary Judgment for the Defendants. 56(e), Fed.R.Civ.P. Additionally, the Court finds that Defendants are entitled to Summary Judgment on this issue as a matter of law. Rule 56(c), Fed.R.Civ.P.8
The Defendants next claim that the challenged Regulation does not violate the due process rights of the Plaintiffs. Citing Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 90 S.Ct. 1153, 25 L.Ed.2d 491 (1970), the Defendants state that the proper standard of review is the rational basis standard.9 To support its position that the Regulation in this case is rationally based, the Defendants rely upon the case of Cleland v. National College of Business, 435 U.S. 213, 98 S.Ct. 1024, 55 L.Ed.2d 225 (1978) where the Supreme Court found a Regulation, though not the same Regulation as in the instant cause, to be a rational response to past abuses of the Veterans' Administration Educational Assistance Programs.10
While the Defendants have stipulated that Wayne State University has not abused the Veterans' Administration Educational Assistance Program, they defend the Regulation at issue, in part because it was promulgated with all institutions, nationwide in mind, and not merely Wayne State University. They defend further by noting the Supreme Court's recognition in Cleland v. National College of Business, supra, of past abuses in the Veterans' Administration's Educational Assistance Programs.11
The Plaintiffs' response is that factual issues remain which prevent summary relief on the due process and equal protection issues. They claim that the "object" of the Regulation is a material issue of fact that this Court must determine.12 They rely upon the depositions of Veterans' Administration employees who testified that they did not know the purpose of the Regulation13 and the deposition of other employees who have differing explanations of the Regulation's purpose.14
The Defendants have stated that the object of the Regulation is to prevent abuse of the educational benefits program. As a correlative, and in further defense of the Regulation, the Defendants assert that "the regulation adjusts the level of benefits to the needs of veteran students in an objective and administratively feasible manner by insuring that maximum benefits go to veterans whose academic schedules allow them the least opportunity for supplementing their income through employment." The fact that individual employees of the Veterans' Administration do not understand its intent does not lead to the conclusion that the Regulation is not rationally based.
Plaintiffs further maintain that a fact issue remains as to whether the Regulation is reasonably related to its purpose, and Plaintiffs rely upon their experts' affidavits to show that the Regulation is contrary to accepted education practice. However, as previously set forth, the standard of review is whether there exists a rational basis for the Regulation. Even if the Plaintiffs can show, and in fact their experts' affidavits do state, that the Regulation is contrary to accepted educational practice, the Regulation does not then become irrational.15 Similarly, the Plaintiffs claim that a fact question remains as to whether the Regulations were properly applied to Wayne State University. However, the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to entertain this allegation.16
It is important to recall the language of the Sixth Circuit vis-a-vis the standards set forth in Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 91 S.Ct. 814, 28 L.Ed.2d 136 (1971), when it reversed the trial judge on the issue of whether or not the Administrator exceeded his statutory authority.17
The regulations also pass muster under the final two parts of the Overton Park standard. The regulations are not an arbitrary and capricious exercise of administrative authority. Rather, they are a rational and reasonable implementation of what is meant by a "semester hour." The regulations are also a reasonable means to insure that potential abuses in the administration of veterans' educational benefits are prevented.
590 F.2d 627, 634 (6th Cir. 1978).
While the Court of Appeals clearly did not reach the Constitutional issues, its conclusion that the Regulations are a reasonable means to prevent potential abuses of the educational benefits program cannot be ignored by this Court in passing upon the Plaintiffs' Fifth Amendment claims.
The Court has allowed discovery to reopen for over one year in its desire to grant to the Plaintiffs the fullest opportunity to establish their claims. The depositions, affidavits and arguments fail to raise any genuine issues of material fact. Indeed, when the Court denied the Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction, it was well aware of the burden the Plaintiffs faced, given the Sixth Circuit's conclusions as...
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