Wayne v. State, C9-92-1170

• Decision Date: 09 April 1993
• Docket Number: No. C9-92-1170,C9-92-1170
• Citation: 498 N.W.2d 446
• Parties: Michael WAYNE, f/k/a Michael Wayne Fenney, Appellant, v. STATE of Minnesota, Respondent.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

Page 446

498 N.W.2d 446

Michael WAYNE, f/k/a Michael Wayne Fenney, Appellant, v. STATE of Minnesota, Respondent.

No. C9-92-1170.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

April 9, 1993.

Syllabus by the Court

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant a new trial based upon newly discovered evidence.

John M. Stuart, State Public Defender, Lawrence Hammerling, Asst. State Public Defender, Minneapolis, for appellant.

Hubert H. Humphrey, III, Atty. Gen., Paul R. Kempainen, Special Asst. Atty. Gen., St. Paul, and Larry Collins, Waseca County Atty., Waseca, for respondent.

Heard, considered and decided by the court en banc.

TOMLJANOVICH, Justice.

This is a direct appeal of the order of the district court of Waseca County denying appellant's postconviction petition. The petition sought a new trial based upon newly discovered evidence. The issue presented to this court is whether the postconviction court abused its discretion when it denied the petition. We believe the district court did not abuse its discretion and affirm.

Appellant Michael Wayne ["Wayne"] ¹ was tried and convicted for the stabbing death of Mona Armendariz ["Armendariz"], a resident of the trailer court in Janesville, Minnesota. At trial, Wayne admitted he had been in Armendariz' trailer, but denied that he had committed the crime. The facts of the case and legal issues on the direct appeal are set forth in State v. Fenney, 448 N.W.2d 54 (Minn.1989). We will not repeat them here.

At appellant's original trial, a key defense theory was to implicate Steve Sack ["Sack"] as the murderer. However, when the defense attempted to question Sack as to knife threats he had made to third parties, the trial court ruled that this testimony would not be admissible because there was insufficient evidence serving as a foundation linking Sack to the crime. This court subsequently affirmed this ruling. Fenney, 448 N.W.2d at 62.

On October 17, 1990, Carolann Eggert gave a statement to a private investigator concerning Sack. In Eggert's statement and subsequent deposition, she testified that at 2:00 a.m. the night Armendariz was killed, Sack and another Janesville resident Wade Abraham showed up at her home. She testified that Abraham woke her up because he was pounding on the bedroom door of one of her sons, yelling that something terrible had happened. She testified that Sack had a bloody knife, which he washed off in her kitchen sink. She also testified that he had blood on his clothes and that he asked to use her washing machine to clean them. She was upset that he had come in the middle of the night and awakened her. She testified that she told him to leave and that he did, along with Abraham.

On cross-examination, the state explored several problems with the new evidence. Of critical interest to the state was why Eggert waited so long to come forward with the facts of this startling event that had allegedly happened in her home on the night of the murder. Furthermore, two of Eggert's sons had testified to the grand jury and one son testified at the trial that, although Sack had shown up in the middle of the night, he was not covered with blood and that Eggert herself had not been present but rather, had been asleep.

Emphasis was also placed on the size of the knife: Eggert testified that it was 8-12 inches long with a blade 1 1/2 inches wide. She described it as a butcher knife. At trial, however, the pathologist had concluded that the assault and murder could not have been committed with a knife this large. The defendant brought a petition for postconviction review asking for a new trial based upon this new evidence. The district court ruled that a new trial was not in order and denied the petition.

This court has set forth a four-part inquiry to be used when deciding whether a new trial should be granted based upon new evidence.

Generally, in order to obtain a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence, the defendant must establish (1) that the evidence was not known to him or his counsel at the time of trial, (2) that his failure to learn of it before trial was not due to lack of diligence, (3) that the evidence is material (or, as we have sometimes said, it is not impeaching, cumulative or doubtful), and (4) that the evidence will probably produce either an acquittal at a retrial or a result more favorable to the petitioner. The decision whether to grant a new trial based upon a claim of newly discovered evidence rests in the first instance with the trial court and we will not disturb the decision unless there is an abuse of discretion.

Race v. State, 417 N.W.2d 264, 266 (Minn.1987) (citations omitted). The parties do not dispute that the trial court properly found that factors (1) and (2) had been met. Thus the issues before us are whether the new evidence...