Weatherbed v. State
Decision Date | 22 November 1999 |
Docket Number | No. S99A1222.,S99A1222. |
Citation | 271 Ga. 736,524 S.E.2d 452 |
Parties | WEATHERBED v. The STATE. |
Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Craig L. Cascio, Alpharetta, for appellant.
John C. Pridgen, District Attorney, Thurbert E. Baker, Attorney General, Paula K. Smith, Senior Assistant Attorney General, H. Maddox Kilgore, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
Weatherbed appeals the trial court's denial of his motion for an out-of-time appeal. For the reasons which follow, we reverse.
On October 20, 1995, Weatherbed pled guilty to an accusation for malice murder and was sentenced to life in prison. He was represented by counsel and waived indictment in writing. On November 28, 1995, he filed a pro se "Motion for Extension to Appeal," which was denied. Through counsel, he filed a motion for an out-of-time appeal on August 13, 1998, asserting that his trial counsel was ineffective for not informing him of his right to appeal, and the court denied the motion.
"The judgment of a court having no jurisdiction of the person or subject matter, or void for any other cause, is a mere nullity and may be so held in any court when it becomes material to the interest of the parties to consider it." OCGA § 17-9-4. Because of the failure to indict Weatherbed, his conviction and sentence are void and must be reversed. OCGA § 17-7-70(a) provides:
In all felony cases, other than cases involving capital felonies, ... the district attorney shall have authority to prefer accusations, and such defendants shall be tried on such accusations, provided that defendants going to trial under such accusations shall, in writing, waive indictment by a grand jury.
OCGA § 17-7-70(b) states that:
Webb v. Henlery, 209 Ga. 447, 449, 74 S.E.2d 7 (1953) (overruled on other grounds, Garmon v. Johnson, 243 Ga. 855, 857, 257 S.E.2d 276 (1979)). After passage of the statute, the superior court remained without jurisdiction to dispose of a case involving a felony "punishable by death or life imprisonment" without an indictment, and when it does so, its judgment is void. Id.
Without an indictment, the trial court had no jurisdiction to accept Weatherbed's plea and sentence him. Darden v. Ravan, 232 Ga. 756, 758(1), 208 S.E.2d 846 (1974). A void judgment may be attacked at any time, and this is not a situation in which the limitations on this rule might apply. See Bennett v. State, 268 Ga. 849, 850, 494 S.E.2d 330 (1998).
(Emphasis in original.) Collins v. State, 239 Ga. 400, 402(2), 236 S.E.2d 759 (1977). This is also the definition that has been used in examining the precursor to OCGA § 17-7-70. See Garmon, supra ( ).
The fact that the State did not seek the death penalty does not take this case outside the ambit of OCGA § 17-7-70. Under the definition used in Collins, malice murder is a capital felony because it belongs to a class of case in which the death penalty can, under certain circumstances, be imposed. OCGA §§ 16-5-1(d); 17-10-30(b). See, e.g., Pruitt v. State, 270 Ga. 745, 514 S.E.2d 639 (1999). The fact that the State has chosen not to pursue the death penalty does not change the class of case to which it belongs. Further, such choice is not dispositive in any event; although the State did not seek the death penalty when Weatherbed was sentenced under the accusation, the death penalty could still be sought in this (or a similar) case, as the State is not necessarily precluded from seeking the death penalty should the defendant be indicted. See Griffin v. State, 266 Ga. 115, 119-120(3), 464 S.E.2d 371 (1995).
The State's argument that Weatherbed freely and voluntarily consented to the procedure and waived his right to indictment, even if true, is irrelevant. Parties cannot, by their consent, confer subject matter jurisdiction on a court that does not otherwise have it. Gray v. Gray, 229 Ga. 460, 461, 192 S.E.2d 334 (1972).
The case is returned to the superior court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Judgment reversed with direction.
All the Justices concur, except BENHAM, C.J., who concurs specially.
I am in full agreement with the majority opinion's holding that Weatherbed's guilty plea to murder could not be received by the trial court absent an indictment because OCGA § 17-7-70(b) does not permit the trial court to accept a guilty plea on an accusation charging a defendant with committing a felony that is "punishable by death or life imprisonment." I write separately because I believe the time has come for this Court to comply with the change in its appellate jurisdiction in non-capital murder cases brought about by passage of the 1983 Georgia Constitution, as recognized by this Court in State v. Thornton, 253 Ga. 524(1), 322 S.E.2d 711 (1984).
Prior to the enactment of the 1983 Constitution, the Supreme Court of Georgia was the appellate court with jurisdiction in "all cases of a conviction of a capital felony." 1976 Ga. Const., Art. VI, Sec. II, Par. IV. The 1983 Constitution expresses this Court's current appellate jurisdiction in criminal cases as follows: "All cases in which a sentence of death was imposed or could be imposed." 1983 Ga. Const., Art. VI, Sec. VI, Par. III(8). From the addition of new language, we presume that some change in the existing law was intended. Balest v. Simmons, 201 Ga.App. 605(1)(a), 411 S.E.2d 576 (1991). In State v. Thornton, supra, 253 Ga. 524(1), 322 S.E.2d 711, this Court recognized that the 1983 Constitution's grant to this Court of jurisdiction over "cases in which a sentence of death was imposed or could be imposed" does not embrace all murder cases, as the previous statement of jurisdiction had. See Collins v. State, 239 Ga. 400(2), 236 S.E.2d 759 (1977). In Thornton, the State appealed the trial court's order granting a murder defendant's motion to suppress evidence. The appeal was filed initially in the Court of Appeals, which transferred it to this Court on the ground that "a case wherein the defendant has been indicted for murder ... is a case `in which a sentence of death ... could be imposed.'" State v. Thornton, Case No. 68255, May 3, 1984 order. This Court disagreed with the Court of Appeals' jurisdictional rationale, finding that the appeal was properly filed in the Court of Appeals under the 1983 Constitution. This Court noted the effect of the then-recent change in appellate jurisdiction:
The district attorney did not give timely notice to the defense that the state intended to seek the death penalty, Unified Appeal, § II. A. 1., 246 Ga. at A-7, and for this reason this is not a case "in which a sentence of death was imposed or could be imposed." Constitution of Georgia of 1983, Art. VI, Sec. VI, Par. III(8). Hence, this appeal was properly filed in the Court of Appeals.
State v. Thornton, supra, 253 Ga. 524(1), 322 S.E.2d 711.
The Thornton court recognized that the 1983 Constitution did not give this Court appellate jurisdiction of an appeal wherein the defendant, though charged with murder, could not receive the death penalty. For policy reasons not identified in the opinion, however, the Court issued an order directing the Court of Appeals to transfer to this Court ...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Neal v. State, S11A1663.
...of the same constitutional language have expressed different views on what it means. Compare Weatherbed v. State, 271 Ga. 736, 741, 524 S.E.2d 452 (1999) (Benham, C.J., concurring specially) (the phrase “ ‘could be imposed’ ... speaks to the future and is applicable to those cases in which ......
-
Garcia-Jarquin v. State
...much further consideration until 1999. That year, then-Chief Justice Benham wrote a special concurrence in Weatherbed v. State , 271 Ga. 736, 739, 524 S.E.2d 452 (1999), in which he called on the Court to "comply with the change in its appellate jurisdiction in non-capital murder cases brou......
-
Jones v. State
...Terrell, 276 Ga. at 41(5), 572 S.E.2d 595. Accord Thomason v. State, 281 Ga. 429, 431(7), 637 S.E.2d 639 (2006). 28. Weatherbed v. State, 271 Ga. 736, 524 S.E.2d 452 (1999); Dungee v. Hopper, 241 Ga. 236, 236(2), 244 S.E.2d 849 29. See Muhammad v. State, 282 Ga. 247, 647 S.E.2d 560, 2007 Ga......
-
Hooks v. State
...was entitled to challenge his sentences as void or illegal. See Baker v. State, 284 Ga. 280, 663 S.E.2d 261 (2008); Weatherbed v. State, 271 Ga. 736, 524 S.E.2d 452 (1999); Hall v. State, 291 Ga.App. 649, 651, 662 S.E.2d 753 As the trial court recognized, the initial murder sentences were i......
-
Criminal Law - Franklin J. Hogue and Laura D. Hogue
...at 116-17. 157. Id. at 662, 534 S.E.2d at 117. 158. 241 Ga. App. 593, 526 S.E.2d 443 (1999). 159. Id. at 595, 526 S.E.2d at 446. 160. 271 Ga. 736, 524 S.E.2d 452 (1999). 161. O.C.G.A. Sec. 17-7-70(a) (1997). 162. 271 Ga. at 736, 524 S.E.2d at 452. 163. Id. at 738, 524 S.E.2d at 453. 164. O.......
-
Georgia's Constitutional Scheme for State Appellate Jurisdiction
...113. 253 Ga. 524, 322 S.E.2d 711 (1984). 114. UNIFORM SUP. CT. R. 34 (II) (A) (Unified Appeal Procedure). 115. See Weatherbed v. State, 271 Ga. 736, S.E.2d 452 (1999) (Benham, C. J., concurring specially). 116. See Phillips v. State, 133 Ga. App. 461, 462, 211 S.E.2d 411, 413 (1974). 117. S......