Weatherford v. State
| Decision Date | 10 September 2002 |
| Docket Number | No. 1 CA-CV-01-0289, No. 1 CA-CV-01-0496. |
| Citation | 203 Ariz. 313,54 P.3d 342 |
| Parties | Cheryl WEATHERFORD, as guardian ad litem for Michael L., a minor, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. STATE of Arizona; Claudette Washington, individually and in her capacity as an employee of the State of Arizona; Shirley Lewis, individually and in her capacity as an employee of the State of Arizona; Parthenia Gibson, individually and in her capacity as an employee of the State of Arizona, Defendants-Appellees. Michael L., a minor, by and through his guardian Cheryl Weatherford, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. State of Arizona, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Arizona Court of Appeals |
Laurence M. Berlin, Tucson, Attorney for Cheryl Weatherford.
Janet Napolitano, Attorney General by John Wolfinger, Assistant Attorney General, Paula S. Bickett, Assistant Attorney General, Phoenix, Attorneys for State of Arizona.
Wilenchik & Bartness, PC by Dennis I. Wilenchik, Phoenix, Attorneys for Claudette Washington and Shirley Lewis.
Martin, Hart & Fullerton by James R. Hart, II, Mesa, Attorneys for Parthenia Gibson.
¶ 1 In these consolidated appeals, we consider the scope of protective services workers' immunity for negligence claims against the State of Arizona and three individuals employed as social workers by Protective Services. We also address whether qualified immunity attaches to the social workers' activities when due process violations under 42 U.S.C. section 1983 (Supp.1996)(" § 1983") are alleged.
¶ 2 This case arises out of alleged sexual assaults on twelve-year-old Michael L. by two minors held with him at the Alice Peterson Shelter. The assaults reportedly occurred over the course of four months in 1996 and 1997.
¶ 3 On November 14, 1996, the State of Arizona removed Michael L. from his home because of unsanitary conditions. Claudette Washington was his intake social worker, and arranged for placement at the emergency shelter. In mid-December 1996, Parthenia Gibson became Michael's caseworker. Shirley Lewis supervised both Washington and Gibson.
¶ 4 It is undisputed that Gibson, Washington, and Lewis failed to:
1. Prepare an initial case plan, including a safety plan, until it was seventy-one days late and the alleged sexual assaults had purportedly begun;
2. Assess Michael L.'s needs and how he matched up to the other shelter residents;
3. Visit the shelter within twenty-four hours of Michael L.'s placement; and
4. Make more than two of the sixteen required weekly supervisory visits to the shelter between November 14, 1996 and disclosure of the alleged sexual abuse on March 4, 1997.
Based upon these facts, Cheryl Weatherford, as guardian ad litem for Michael L., sued the State of Arizona, Washington, Gibson, and Lewis (collectively "defendants") for negligence and violation of Michael L.'s constitutional rights under § 1983. The trial court granted separate summary judgment motions in favor of defendants based upon qualified immunity and protective services immunity and dismissed Weatherford's claims in a Judgment (the "Original Judgment") signed on April 4, 2001. Weatherford appealed this judgment on May 2, 2001.
¶ 5 After Weatherford filed her appeal, the trial court sua sponte reviewed its judgment granting immunity to the state. After its review, the trial court amended its judgment (the "Amended Judgment") stating that the state was not a "person" entitled to protective services immunity under A.R.S. § 8-546.04(A) (1988) (renumbered as A.R.S. § 8-805).
¶ 6 After appealing the Amended Judgment, the state filed a Motion to Determine Jurisdiction on the first appeal, and Weatherford responded. We ruled that in the Original Judgment, the trial court granted relief to the state and the three named appellees. Further, we ruled that the Amended Judgment was appealable by the state pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-2101(C) (1994). Moreover, we consolidated the appeals from the Original Judgment and the Amended Judgment and ordered the parties to brief the issues raised by both Judgments.
¶ 7 Accordingly, our tasks are to determine whether: (1) Weatherford's claims against the state are based only upon respondeat superior for the acts of Washington, Gibson, and Lewis; and (2) summary judgment was warranted on the protective services immunity and the qualified immunity defenses.1
¶ 8 We review the determination of the superior court's jurisdiction de novo. Samaritan Health Sys. v. Ariz. Health Care Cost Containment Sys. Admin., 198 Ariz. 533, 536, ¶ 13, 11 P.3d 1072, 1075 (App.2000).
¶ 9 The state also contends that Weatherford asserted only respondeat superior claims based upon the actions of Washington, Lewis, and Gibson. The record reflects otherwise.
¶ 10 Weatherford alleged in her Third Amended Complaint:
¶ 11 As Weatherford points out, state liability under the Third Amended Complaint does not arise entirely from the actions of Gibson, Lewis, and Washington. For example, part of the state's liability stems from improper licensing, which did not involve the individual social worker defendants. Moreover, other state employees were responsible for putting the perpetrators in the same residence with Michael L. Accordingly, these claims survive the summary judgments based upon the immunity of Washington, Lewis, and Gibson.
¶ 12 Weatherford also argues that a government entity may have liability apart from respondeat superior liability. As the Arizona Supreme Court recognized in City of Phoenix v. Yarnell, direct liability is available when the entity is "alleged to have caused a constitutional tort through `a policy statement, ordinance, regulation or decision officially adopted and promulgated by that body's officers.'"2 184 Ariz. 310, 317, 909 P.2d 377, 384 (1995)(quoting City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 121, 108 S.Ct. 915, 99 L.Ed.2d 107 (1988)). Instead of identifying such an official statement or policy, Weatherford contends that the state's independent liability derives from "the combined acts and omissions of its employees." A fair reading of the Third Amended Complaint likewise convinces us that Weatherford raises no attack on an official policy or statement. Rather, the thrust of this pleading is that the state social workers failed to follow the policies and procedures in place. Accordingly, we reject Weatherford's argument that the Third Amended Complaint alleges liability on this basis.
¶ 13 The defendants further argue that summary judgment was warranted on the immunity issues. On appeal from a summary judgment, we must determine de novo whether there are any genuine issues of material fact, and if not, whether the trial court erred in applying the law. Saenz v. State Fund Workers' Comp. Ins., 189 Ariz. 471, 473, 943 P.2d 831, 833 (App.1997). We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the party against whom summary judgment was entered. Angus Med. Co. v. Digital Equip. Corp., 173 Ariz. 159, 162, 840 P.2d 1024, 1027 (App.1992). Qualified immunity is a question of law subject to de novo review. Yvonne L. v. New Mexico Dep't of Human Servs., 959 F.2d 883, 891 (10th Cir.1992).
¶ 14 Arizona Revised Statutes § 8-546.04(A)(1989)3 provides:
Any person making a complaint, or providing information or otherwise participating in the program authorized by this article shall be immune from any civil or criminal liability by reason of such action, unless such person acted with malice or unless such person has been charged with or is suspected of abusing, abandoning or neglecting the child or children in question.
¶ 15 The trial court concluded that the defendants were "participating in the program authorized by this article," and consequently were shielded by qualified immunity. Weatherford contends, however, that they are not immune because that provision is inapplicable.
¶ 16 Because liability of public servants is the rule and immunity is the exception, courts must construe statutory immunity provisions in a restrained and narrow manner. Fid. Sec. Life Ins. Co. v. Ariz. Dep't of Ins., 191 Ariz. 222, 225, ¶ 7, 954 P.2d 580, 583 (1998). By its terms, the immunity in A.R.S. § 8-546.04(A) extends only to conduct under the "article," meaning Article 3 of Title 8, Chapter 5 covering "Protective Services." This article does not apply to Weatherford's claims, which deal with the defendants' duties of care, protection, and supervision after Michael L. was taken from his home. Rather, these claims arose under the "Child Welfare and Placement" statutes in Article 1 of Title 8, Chapter 5 which were in effect. See generally A.R.S. § 8-511(A),(B)(Supp.1996) (); 8-511(C)(Supp.1996)(requiring the case plan's submission no later than the hearing on the juvenile dependency petition).4
¶ 17 The legislative history...
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Weatherford ex rel. Michael L. v. State
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