Weatherhead v. Lessee of Bledsoe's Heirs

• Decision Date: 30 June 1815
• Citation: 2 Tenn. 352
• Parties: WEATHERHEAD AND DOUGLAS v. THE LESSEE OF BLEDSOE'S HEIRS.
• Court: Tennessee Court of Appeals

2 Tenn. 352

WEATHERHEAD AND DOUGLAS

v.THE LESSEE OF BLEDSOE'S HEIRS.

Supreme Court of Errors and Appeals of Tennessee.

June, 1815.

Quaere, whether any and what connected chain of title between the grant and the deed under which the party in possession claims, is required to sustain the bar of the statute of limitations under 1715, 27, and 1797, 43?

Overton, J., was of opinion that no connection, either in law or equity, was necessary.

Cooke, J., thought that a connection, good either in law or equity, was required.

Roane, J., thought that such a connection should be shown as would satisfy a jury.

[Cited in: 2 Ov., 391, 392; Peck, 250; M. & Y., 403, 407, 410.]

Ejectment in Error.

Overton, J., delivered the following opinion:

The land in dispute was granted to the ancestor of the defendants. Douglas obtained a judgment against Bowman; execution issued; a part of the land thus granted was sold as the property of Bowman. Douglas became the purchaser, and obtained a sheriff's deed. Douglas sold and conveyed to Lyons; who sold and conveyed to Weatherhead, the tenant in possession. Under the general issue, Weatherhead relies on seven years' possession as a bar.

On the part of the defendants, it is insisted that the limitation of seven years will not be available, unless the plaintiff can show a regular chain of paper title from the grantee to Weatherhead. This question having been frequently argued in several cases, both in the Federal and State courts, and having long had it under advisement, an opinion is formed, from which it is not probable any further argument will induce a departure. In legal phraseology, the point involved in this contest may truly be termed vexata questio. It will be considered, first, in relation to the true construction of the Act of Limitations, 1715, c. 27, sections 1, 2, 3 and 4, independently of the decisions on that statute.

Secondly, with a view to those decisions, and

Thirdly, an exposition of the explanatory Act of Tennessee, 1797, c. 43, section 4. The first and second sections of the Act 1715, are entirely retrospective. The first section is the preamble, and contains a recital of the mischiefs. It speaks of patents from the governor of Virginia, the quit rents of which had never been paid, or the lands deserted by the first patentees, or former entries, or patents granted in the government of North Carolina.

The second section proceeds to the confirmation of claims by possession. The language employed is, “that all possessions of, or title to any lands, tenements, or hereditaments whatever, derived from any sales made either by creditors, executors, administrators of any person deceased, or by husbands and their wives, or husbands in right of their wives, or by indorsement of patents, or otherwise, of which the purchaser or possessor, or any claiming under them, have continued or shall continue in possession of the same for the space of seven years, without any suit at law, be and are hereby ratified, confirmed, and declared good and legal to all intents and purposes whatever, against all and all manner of persons.”

In the case of Armour v. White, 2 Hay. 69, it is said by Haywood, J., “That this section of the Act of Limitations relates only to the cases of irregular conveyances made before the act passed, and confirms them, when accompanied with a seven years' possession before the act, or where the possession was then continuing, and should complete seven years after the act; but it extends to no case arising since the act.” Thus it appears, not only from this opinion, but in a note annexed to the same, which afterwards occurred in page 91, that these seections are entirely retrospective; but it will be attempted to be shown, in the examination of the second proposition before mentioned, that to confine the confirmation, intended by the Legislature, to irregular conveyances, is too narrow for the plain words of this section as well as the whole scope of that act. In this place, however, it is not improper to remark, that the possessions confirmed go far beyond the first section or preamble; nor can the plain words of this section be restrained by the mischiefs recited in the preamble, 1 P. W. 320; Bac. Ab. tit. Statute I, 2 unless the not restraining the enacting clause by the preamble be attended with absurdity or inconvenience. 1 Atk. 174. The enacting words of this section are not doubtful, and the not restraining of them to the mischiefs referred to in the preamble would be so far from being attended with absurdity or inconvenience, that the giving the words employed their usual acceptation would be most conformable to the reason of the common law. Bac. Ab. tit Statute I, 4 Com. dig. tit. Parliament, R. 12.

Section third of the Act of 1715, is in these words: “That no person or persons, or their heirs, which hereafter shall have any right or title to any lands, tenements, or hereditaments, shall thereunto enter or make claim, but within seven years after his, her, or their right or title, which descend or accrue; and in default thereof, such person or persons, so not entering or making default, shall be utterly excluded and disabled from any entry or claim thereafter to be made.” The fourth section contains the usual saving in favor of infants, &c., who are authorized within three years after disabilities shall cease, to “commence his or her suit, or make his or her entry,” as might have been done before the passage of the act. Persons beyond sea allowed eight years after returning; “but that all possessions, held without suing such claim as aforesaid, shall be a perpetual bar against all and all manner of persons whatever, that the expectation of heirs may not, in a short time, leave much land unpossessed, and titles so perplexed that no man will know from whom to take or buy land.”^a1It is conceded by Haywood, J., in 2 Hay. 90, that these two clauses, viz., third and fourth, are prospective.

Is the plain and evident meaning of the words used in the third and fourth sections to be restrained by the preamble? To which it is answered, that it is not, unless a most palpable absurdity or inconvenience is involved, which is not the case in the present instance; see 5 Cranch, 9. Nor by parity of reasoning can the prospective clauses be ground in confirmation of titles in the retrospective second section. 5 Cranch, 55.

If the Legislature was competent to take broader ground in confirmation of title in the retrospective second section than the mischiefs recited in the preamble or first section, for the same reasons it had the power to take broader ground in the prospective enactments of the third and fourth sections than either the preamble or retrospective second clause afforded.

In some cases there might be reason for this discrimination; but it will be seen, in the development of this question, that the basis on which the second section rests is more extensive than that of the third and fourth, in the single case of disabilities contemplated in the fourth section.

In the confirmatory clause there is no saving in favor of infants, &c. The circumstances of these cases were under the eye of the Legislature, and it was thought reasonable to make an absolute confirmation, without any saving; but this information could not exist respecting cases that had not occurred, which were contemplated in the third and fourth sections, and consequently a saving is provided for them. This accounts for the manner in which the lawgivers legislated, by dividing their enactments into retrospective and prospective clauses; and it is believed this is the only difference which by any reasonable construction can be made to arise, in the view of the Legislature, between its “retrospective” and “prospective” enactments.

Taking the whole of the second retrospective section together, it covers all kinds of bona fide possessions of granted lands. The expression “or otherwise” put this point beyond a doubt. From these expressions, it is evident that the Legislature meant to exclude a mere trespasser or squatter, claiming no title, which is frequent in new countries. All the instances previously put in the act, as “derived from sales made,” &c., show that the Legislature meant to protect only such as should appear to be bona fide holders; either by legal presumption arising from seven years, possession with claim of title, agreeably to the third and fourth sections; or by positive proof of fairness in the acquisitions of the land, as payment of consideration, showing a deed, &c. It is believed that a mere trespasser, or person claiming no title, can not make his possession available in communicating right, agreeably to the limitations acts of any country.

Why then, it may be asked, did the Legislature undertake, in many instances in the second section, to specify the particular kinds of possession it meant to ratify and confirm? It was useless, it is alleged, if all kinds of possessions were intended. The answer is obvious. In conveying ideas either verbally or in writing, by assemblies or individuals, different modes of expression are adopted.

As it respects statutes, there is no set form. In some of the oldest statutes of England, we find no recital or relation of the mischiefs which induced the Legislature to act. When the influence of the people was more felt in the Legislature, preambles were adopted in order that they might be informed of the grounds on which the Legislature acted. The dependence of the legislator on his constituents, in more modern times, produced another method of giving this information; and a minute specification of cases and grievances, in the form of preambles and other parts of statutes, has nearly fallen into disuse.

In the confirmatory second section, the Legislature expresses all the particular kinds of cases that then occurred, and which it meant to confirm for the satisfaction of individuals thus circumstanced;^a1 but as it was designed to confirm...