Weathersby v. Kentucky Fried Chicken Nat. Management Co.

• Decision Date: 28 March 1991
• Docket Number: No. 704,704
• Citation: 86 Md.App. 533,587 A.2d 569
• Parties: Serita J. WEATHERSBY v. KENTUCKY FRIED CHICKEN NATIONAL MANAGEMENT COMPANY, et al. Sept. Term 1990.
• Court: Court of Special Appeals of Maryland

Page 533

86 Md.App. 533

587 A.2d 569

Serita J. WEATHERSBY v. KENTUCKY FRIED CHICKEN NATIONAL MANAGEMENT COMPANY, et al.

No. 704 Sept. Term 1990.

Court of Special Appeals of Maryland.

March 28, 1991.

Alan Banov and David Fishman, Washington, D.C., for appellant.

Dorothy R. Fait (Barbara A. Kestenbaum and Fait & Malament, on brief), Rockville, for appellees.

Argued before WILNER, C.J., and FISCHER and DAVIS, JJ.

DAVIS, Judge.

This case involves the circumstances surrounding the decision of Serita J. Weathersby, appellant, to resign from her employment with appellee, Kentucky Fried Chicken Management Company (KFC). After her resignation, appellant brought suit against KFC and its agent, appellee Lee Watts (Watts). Watts was appellant's immediate supervisor at KFC.

In an eight count complaint, appellant alleged the following: Count I--Wrongful Suspension and Demotion; Count II--Sexual Harassment and Reprisal; Count III--Discrimination on Account of Handicap; Count IV--Racial and Sexual Discrimination; Count V--Wrongful Constructive Discharge; Count VI--Breach of Employment Contract; Count VII--Defamation; and Count VIII--Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress.

Prior to trial, appellant withdrew the sexual harassment element of Count II, Count IV, sexual and handicap discrimination, and Count VII, defamation. Appellees moved for summary judgment on the remaining counts. The trial court having granted the motions as to Counts I and V, wrongful suspension and wrongful constructive discharge, trial proceeded on the counts for reprisal, racial discrimination, breach of employment contract, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.

At the conclusion of appellant's case, appellees moved for judgment on the five remaining counts and the trial court heard additional argument on the wrongful constructive discharge cause of action. The lower court granted the motion for judgment as to the reprisal claim, and denied the motions as to the remaining counts.

At the close of their case, appellees renewed their motions for judgment; the trial court reserved ruling on the motions and submitted the issues to the jury. The jury returned verdicts in favor of appellees on the breach of contract and race discrimination count, and in favor of appellant on the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim, awarding her $145,000 in damages. The trial court granted appellees' motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict as to the intentional infliction of emotional distress count.

On appeal, appellant presents the following questions for our review:

1. Whether the Circuit Court erred by dismissing appellant's claims of public policy torts by appellees in disciplining her for objecting to an illegal polygraph test.

2. Whether the Circuit Court erred by dismissing appellant's claim that appellee Kentucky Fried Chicken violated the Montgomery County Human Relations Law, Montgomery County Code, § 27-19, by disciplining her in reprisal because she complained about appellee Watts' romantic relationship with Ms. Miller.

3. Whether the Circuit Court abused its discretion by overturning the jury verdict for appellant on her claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Given the nature of the issues presented on appeal, appellant's version of the facts relating to her employment and eventual resignation shall be set forth in some detail.

In 1979 appellant began her employment with KFC. In October 1987, at her request, appellant was transferred from her position as area manager for KFC's franchise services to training store manager at a store on University Boulevard in Wheaton, Maryland. From October 1987 to February 1988, appellant's immediate supervisor was appellee Lee Watts.

Prior to appellant's transfer in October 1987, new "interchangeable core" locks were installed on the doors of the Wheaton store. An interchangeable core lock, which is operated by a key, is located in the middle of an existing lock and may be removed and replaced as necessary. Once replaced, a new key is needed to operate the core lock. Under KFC policy, core locks were to be changed by KFC area managers whenever there was a management change in the store. On October 27, 1987, Watts, an area manager, had the core locks changed. After this change, Watts informed appellant that the locks were under his control and she should make no effort to have the locks changed. The locks were not changed after October 27, despite further changes in management at the store.

Also in October 1987, Watts developed a romantic relationship with an assistant manager at the Wheaton Store. Others at the store were aware of, and commented about, this relationship. Under KFC's Human Resources Manual, romantic relationships between KFC managers and subordinates were discouraged, were to be reported to higher authorities, and required movement of one of the parties to another store. In November 1987, appellant informed Watts that she believed he was having a romantic relationship in contravention of KFC's policies. She informed Watts that she believed the relationship was having a detrimental effect on the operation of the store.

According to appellant, after she registered her complaint about the relationship, Watts began harassing her. This harassment included, among other things, falsely stating that customer complaints were made against appellant forcing appellant to work from December 2 to December 24 without a day off and assigning sub par assistant managers to her.

On January 14, 1988, there was a theft from the Wheaton store safe. There was no indication of forcible entry. Appellant reported the theft to Watts. On January 20, appellant was informed that she was scheduled for a polygraph examination with respect to the theft. Although appellant objected to the test, Dave Davis, KFC Operations Manager for the Baltimore-Washington region, insisted that she submit to the polygraph examination. Appellant took the polygraph test on January 25. Davis demanded that appellant take another polygraph test after appellant informed the polygraph examiner that Watts had not changed the locks on the doors of the Wheaton Store since October 1987 despite managerial changes, and that Watts himself had keys to the core locks at the store.

On January 26, 1988, appellant asked Watts if he had informed the polygraph examiner that he (Watts) had not changed the store's locks since October 1987, and why he had not scheduled a polygraph examination for himself. At a meeting on January 27 between appellant, Watts, and Peter Davis, KFC's regional security director, appellant explained to Davis that Watts knew the locks had not been changed since October 1987 and the time of the theft in January 1988. She also informed Davis of Watts' relationship with the assistant store manager.

On or about January 28, Watts confiscated appellant's store keys and, without explanation, suspended her for ten days without pay "pending an investigation" of the theft.

On February 7, 1988, appellant was informed that, due to "serious misconduct," she was being demoted to assistant manager. As a result of this demotion, appellant's salary was reduced by $11,000. In addition, appellant was assigned to a different store managed by someone appellant had once supervised.

On February 9, appellant sought psychiatric treatment as a result of the events which transpired at her workplace. The doctor she consulted certified that she was unable to work. On February 11, appellant was again certified as unable to return to work. While she was unable to work, appellant requested payment of Short Term Disability (STD) benefits, which KFC refused to pay. Under KFC's employment manual, managers, after 90 days or more of continuous service, are entitled to STD pay for six months upon notice of excused absence due to illness. A doctor's supporting statement certifying an inability to work is all that is required. Despite having been given the required certification, KFC required appellant to obtain a second opinion and made payment of benefits to her contingent upon obtaining same. There is no written requirement under KFC policy that a second opinion be obtained as to inability to work to be entitled to STD benefits. Accordingly, appellant objected to submitting to a second psychiatric examination.

On March 28, appellant was hospitalized at the Psychiatric Institute of Montgomery County. On April 12, she was diagnosed as being in a state of major depression, with psychotic features, and as having a borderline personality disorder. On or about May 8, 1988, appellant was discharged from the Institute. In the meantime, appellee KFC continued to refuse to pay STD benefits unless appellant would submit to an examination by a psychiatrist of its choosing.

In October 1988, appellant finally submitted to an examination by a psychiatrist selected by KFC. The doctor confirmed that appellant had been unable to work since February 1988. In December 1988, KFC paid appellant STD benefits, though at an assistant manager's rate and for only part of appellant's period of incapacitation.

By letter dated January 15, 1989, appellant resigned from her employment with KFC. Appellant's suit followed, and she appeals from the decisions of the circuit court.

I. WRONGFUL DISCHARGE

Considering first the issue of whether the lower court erred in dismissing appellant's wrongful discharge claim, we are called upon to revisit our holding in Moniodis v. Cook, 64 Md.App. 1, 494 A.2d 212 (1985), in light of a modification of Md.Ann.Code art. 100, § 95 (1985, 1989 Cum.Supp.), which prohibits the use of a lie detector test as a condition of employment.

Appellant argues that the trial court should not have dismissed her claims for wrongful suspension and wrongful constructive discharge. Appellant contends that although § 95(b), (d), (e), and (f) provide administrative remedies for violation of the statute, the...