Weatherspoon v. Tillery Body Shop, Inc., No. 1081131 (Ala. 2/12/2010)

• Decision Date: 12 February 2010
• Docket Number: No. 1081131.,1081131.
• Parties: Debra Weatherspoon v. Tillery Body Shop, Inc.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

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Debra Weatherspoon v. Tillery Body Shop, Inc.

No. 1081131.

Supreme Court of Alabama.

Decided February 12, 2010.

Appeal from Tuscaloosa Circuit Court, (CV-05-444).

LYONS, Justice.

Debra Weatherspoon appeals from the Tuscaloosa Circuit Court's dismissal of her claims against Tillery Body Shop, Inc. ("Tillery"). The trial court dismissed the claims, finding that they were preempted by federal law. We affirm.

Factual Background and Procedural History

On April 9, 2005, Weatherspoon sued Tillery, Dennis Horton, and several fictitiously named defendants. Her complaint alleged the following facts. Weatherspoon, a resident of Hale County, owned a 1995 Chevrolet Blazer sportutility vehicle ("the Blazer"). In December 2002, Weatherspoon's adult son used the Blazer and, without Weather spoon's knowledge, left it in the parking lot of a restaurant in Tuscaloosa, where it remained for several days. The Tuscaloosa Police Department determined that the Blazer was an abandoned vehicle and directed Tillery to tow it from the parking lot. Tillery did so.

On December 30, 2002, without knowledge that Tillery had towed the Blazer, Weatherspoon contacted the Hale County Sheriff's Department and reported the Blazer missing. In April 2003, Tillery published notice in The Tuscaloosa News for three consecutive weeks that the Blazer would be sold at public auction. An auction was held on April 26, 2003, and Horton purchased the Blazer from Tillery. Tillery reported to the Tuscaloosa Circuit Court that the Blazer had been sold in compliance with the requirements of Ala. Code 1975, § 32-13-1 et seq., which governs the sale of abandoned vehicles. In January 2005, an entity known as Action Automotive and Towing notified Weatherspoon that it had possession of the Blazer and that the Blazer would be sold at auction unless she paid approximately $3,000 in towing and storage fees. It is unclear from the complaint whether Weatherspoon alleged that Action Automotive and Towing was acting independently or on Horton's behalf.

In her complaint, Weatherspoon stated claims of negligence and wantonness; depravation of possession of the Blazer under § 6-5-260, Ala. Code 1975; recovery of chattel in specie; conversion; negligent and wanton supervision; and fraudulent suppression. Weatherspoon based her negligence and wantonness claims on several theories, including Tillery's alleged breach of the standard of care in failing to investigate the identity of the Blazer's owner; improperly selling the Blazer; and failing to comply with the requirements of § 32-13-4, Ala. Code 1975, regarding the notice of sale of abandoned vehicles. Regarding the fraudulent-suppression claim, Weatherspoon alleged that Tillery had a duty to disclose to her that it had possession of the Blazer, a duty arising, she alleged, from notice Tillery had by virtue of the vehicle-identification number and tag number of the Blazer and "the requirements placed upon entities such as [Tillery] by Alabama law regarding the sale of vehicles that are presumed to be abandoned." Weatherspoon sought $50,000 in damages as to each claim asserted in her complaint. Weatherspoon also sought a judgment declaring that she was the owner of the Blazer and that she was entitled to possession of it.

Tillery and Horton each answered the complaint. On June 9, 2008, Tillery moved to dismiss the claims against it under Rule 12(h) (3), Ala. R. Civ. P.¹ Tillery argued that the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over Weatherspoon's claims against it because, it argued, those claims were preempted by the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994 ("the FAAAA") and the ICC Termination Act of 1995 ("the ICCTA"). Weatherspoon responded, and, on February 11, 2009, the trial court dismissed Weatherspoon's claims against Tillery, finding that they were preempted. On April 14, 2009 at Weatherspoon's request, the trial court certified its February 11, 2009, order as final pursuant to Rule 54(b), Ala. R. Civ. P. Weatherspoon filed a timely notice of appeal to this Court.

Standard of Review

"In Mewman v. Savas, 878 So. 2d 1147 (Ala. 2003), this Court set out the standard of review of a ruling on a motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction:

"`A ruling on a motion to dismiss is reviewed without a presumption of correctness. Nance v. Matthews, 622 So. 2d 297, 299 (Ala. 1993). This Court must accept the allegations of the complaint as true. Creola Land Dev., Inc. v. Bentbrooke Housing, L.L.C., 828 So. 2d 285, 288 (Ala. 2002). Furthermore, in reviewing a ruling on a motion to dismiss we will not consider whether the pleader will ultimately prevail but whether the pleader may possibly prevail. Nance, 622 So. 2d at 299.'

"878 So. 2d at 1148-49."

Pontius v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 915 So. 2d 557, 563 (Ala. 2005). See also Ex parte Alabama Pep't of Transp., 978 So. 2d 17, 21 (Ala. 2007).

49 U.S.C. § 14501 (c)

Section 601 of the FAAAA amended Title 49 of the United States Code to, among other things, add § 11501 (h), which was later recodified as § 14501 (c). Section 14501 (c) provides, in relevant part:

"(1) General rule.—Except as provided in paragraphs (2) and (3), a State, political subdivision of a State, or political authority of 2 or more States may not enact or enforce a law, regulation, or other provision having the force and effect of law related to a price, route, or service of any motor carrier . . . or any motor private carrier, broker, or freight forwarder with respect to the transportation of property.

"(2) Matters not covered.—Paragraph (1)—

"....

"(C) does not apply to the authority of a State or a political subdivision of a State to enact or enforce a law, regulation, or other provision relating to the price of for-hire motor vehicle transportation by a tow truck, if such transportation is performed without the prior consent or authorization of the owner or operator of the motor vehicle."

(Emphasis added.)

"[W]here `federal law is said to bar state action in fields of traditional state regulation, ... we have worked on the "assumption that the historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress."'" California Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr. M.A., Inc., 519 U.S. 316, 325 (1997) (quoting New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 655 (1995), quoting in turn Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)). The Supreme Court has, however, concluded that preemption under § 14501(c) (1) is broad and far-reaching. See Rowe v. New Hampshire Motor Transp. Ass'n, 552 U.S. 364, 128 S. Ct. 989 (2008).²

Based on the language of § 14501(c) (1) and on its earlier decisions, the Supreme Court in Rowe discussed the broad-reaching nature of the preemption effectuated by the statute. Discussing Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374 (1992), a decision interpreting identical preemption language from the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1302(a) (4) and 1302(a) (9), the Supreme Court explained:

"In Morales, the Court determined: (1) that `[s]tate enforcement actions having a connection with, or reference to' carrier `"rates, routes, or services" are pre-empted,' 504 U.S., at 384 (emphasis added); (2) that such pre-emption may occur even if a state law's effect on rates, routes or services `is only indirect,' id., at 386 (internal quotation marks omitted); (3) that, in respect to pre-emption, it makes no difference whether a state law is `consistent' or `inconsistent' with federal regulation, id., at 386-387 (emphasis deleted); and (4) that pre-emption occurs at least where state laws have a `significant impact' related to Congress' deregulatory and pre-emption-related objectives, id., at 390. The Court described Congress' overarching goal as helping assure transportation rates, routes, and services that reflect `maximum reliance on competitive market forces, ` thereby stimulating `efficiency, innovation, and low prices,' as well as `variety' and `quality.' Id., at 378 (internal quotation marks omitted). Morales held that, given these principles, federal law pre-empts States from enforcing their consumer-fraud statutes against deceptive airline-fare advertisements. Id., at 391. See American Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 513 U.S. 219, 226-228 (1995) (federal law pre-empts application of a State's general consumer-protection statute to an airline's frequent flyer program)."

552 U.S. at ___, 128 S. Ct. at 995. Based on the authority of Morales, the Supreme Court determined that § 14501(c) (1), in the same manner, preempted the state regulation before it.

Based on the language of § 14501(c) (2), the United States Supreme Court has agreed that "tow trucks qualify as `motor carrier [s] of property'" within the meaning of § 14501(c) (1). City of Columbus v. Ours Garage & Wrecker Serv., Inc., 536 U.S. 424, 430 (2002). See also 49 U.S.C. § 13102 (14) ("The term `motor carrier' means a person providing motor vehicle transportation for compensation.").

Analysis

The trial court in the present action concluded that "[t]he state tort claims brought by [Weatherspoon] against [Tillery] constitute enforcement of state law within the meaning of the preemptive provision of 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)." The trial court concluded that Weatherspoon's claims against Tillery were preempted and that the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the claims. In her brief on appeal, Weatherspoon contends that the trial court's decision should be reversed because, she argues: 1) § 14501(c)(1) is unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause, Art. I, § 8, c. 3, and the Tenth Amendment to the United States Constitution; 2) in enacting the FAAAA and the ICCTA, the United States Congress did not intend to preempt private, state-law claims; 3) no binding authority from an Alabama court...