Weatherwax v. Koontz

• Decision Date: 20 March 1996
• Docket Number: No. 94-708,94-708
• Citation: 545 N.W.2d 522
• Parties: Donald E. WEATHERWAX II, Individually and as Administrator of the Estate of Sara S. Weatherwax, and Donald E. Weatherwax III, By Donald E. Weatherwax II, His Father and Next Friend, Appellants, v. Whealan KOONTZ, Appellee, and Steven H. Griffith, Defendant.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Page 522

545 N.W.2d 522

Donald E. WEATHERWAX II, Individually and as Administrator of the Estate of Sara S. Weatherwax, and Donald E. Weatherwax III, By Donald E. Weatherwax II, His Father and Next Friend, Appellants, v. Whealan KOONTZ, Appellee and Steven H. Griffith, Defendant.

No. 94-708.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

March 20, 1996.

Tom Riley and Charles C. Brown, Jr., of Tom Riley Law Firm, P.C., Cedar Rapids, for appellants.

Lawrence E. Blades and Charles Blades of Blades, Carmichael, Rosser & Benz, Cedar Rapids, for appellee.

Considered by HARRIS, P.J., and LARSON, CARTER, NEUMAN, and ANDREASEN, JJ.

HARRIS, Justice.

We continue to face complaints that a jury verdict does not correctly reflect the agreement of the jury, or is erroneous for some other reason. In sorting through these complaints, the threshold question is whether the inquiry is appropriate. At one extreme, matters within the jurors' reasoning process are said to inhere in the verdict and are obviously inappropriate for examination. At the other extreme, questions concerning outside influences improperly introduced into jury deliberations can be shown in an attempt to impeach the verdict because they are thought to poison the process. In closer cases, such as the present one, the line between the two types of inquiries is less easily discerned.

This medical malpractice case was submitted to the jury under the Comparative Fault Act. Iowa Code ch. 668 (1993). Under this statutory scheme the jury is to determine the various degrees of fault among the parties and to assess the amount of total resulting damages. On the basis of these findings, the judge is thereafter to compute any liability of the parties under the principles of comparative fault. By means vigorously challenged on appeal, the plaintiffs sought to show that, after assessing damages, the jury itself made the comparative-fault computation and erroneously entered the adjusted amount of its verdict rather than their agreed total assessment. Thus, it is claimed, the comparative-fault computation later entered by the trial court was for a fraction of the correct amount. Plaintiffs sought a reformation of the verdict or, alternatively, a new trial. The trial court considered the plaintiffs' proffered evidence, but nevertheless rejected the posttrial motion. We find no reason to interfere and thus affirm. So doing, we vacate a court of appeals decision that would have directed a new trial.

Plaintiffs Donald Weatherwax, II and Donald Weatherwax, III sued Steven Griffith and Whealan Koontz, both medical doctors, for the wrongful death of Sara Weatherwax alleging lost chance of survival as a result of a misdiagnosis. The Weatherwaxes settled with Griffith, and their claim against Koontz proceeded to trial. After weighing all of the evidence presented, the jury returned a verdict finding Koontz ten percent at fault. In response to the interrogatory asking "[t]he present value of the opportunity to receive early treatment and the chance of realizing any resulting gain in life expectancy and physical or mental comfort," the jury indicated $96,134. The trial judge accepted the verdict and discharged the jury late on a Friday afternoon.

Acting ex parte over the weekend, without knowledge of the court or opposing counsel, plaintiffs' counsel questioned the discharged and dispersed jurors about the verdict. Based on these discussions, counsel fashioned a form affidavit and presented it to each individual juror for signing and notarization. The affidavit stated among other things that the jury found plaintiffs' total damages to be $961,340, and it was their intention to award plaintiffs $96,134 based on Koontz's ten percent comparative fault. The Weatherwaxes then filed a motion to reform the verdict so as to comply with the intent of the jury. The form affidavits signed by all jurors were submitted with the motion. The motion was later amended to seek a new trial as an alternative.

The trial judge promptly summoned counsel and asked for suggestions from both sides regarding how to proceed in the matter. The judge concluded an evidentiary hearing was proper and invited both counsel to submit suggested questions in writing for consideration by the jurors. At the hearing the trial judge questioned the jurors and each seemed to indicate the $96,134 damage award was a portion of some larger amount. There was however no consensus on what this larger amount was, other than that the jury agreed on $96,134 in damages after considering comparative fault. The district court ruled:

There remains the issue with regard to whether the jury's misunderstanding of the court's instructions resulted in the verdict rendered by them. Therefore, the motion as amended is overruled in its entirety. This determination is premised on the fact that there was not a consensus determination by the jury with regard to the basis upon which to reform the verdict or grant a new trial with regard to the damage issue.

Thus the district court accepted the jury verdicts and entered judgment against Koontz in the amount of $96,134. The Weatherwaxes appealed.

The appropriateness of any inquiry into jury deliberations is a legal question which we review on error. Iowa R.App.P. 4; Lund v. McEnerney, 495 N.W.2d 730, 732 (Iowa 1993). The trial court's ruling on the motion for new trial was discretionary, and we reverse only on a finding of abuse. Iowa R.App.P. 14(f)(3); Kiner v. Reliance Ins. Co., 463 N.W.2d 9, 13 (Iowa 1990).

I. The underlying question--what deliberative matters, because they inhere in the verdict, are inappropriate for judicial scrutiny--may seem more substantive than evidentiary. Most courts, including our own, nevertheless more commonly approach the question as an evidentiary one. In other words, the policy which protects the finality of jury verdicts is approached as an evidentiary issue, but the evidentiary approach demonstrates how strongly the courts view the policy in which the approach is grounded. Lund, 495 N.W.2d at 733-34; Prendergast v. Smith Lab., Inc., 440 N.W.2d 880, 884 (Iowa 1989); Ryan v. Arneson, 422 N.W.2d 491, 494-95 (Iowa 1988); Iowa R.Evid. 606(b). See Annotation, Competency of Juror Statement or Affidavit to Show That Verdict in Civil Case Was Not Correctly Recorded, 18 A.L.R.3d 1132 (1968). These and a host of other authorities make it clear that a juror's testimony can be received to show that (1) a verdict was not correctly recorded or (2) external matters were improperly brought into deliberations. It cannot be received to show the jury's thinking processes were incorrect. State v. Rouse, 290 N.W.2d 911, 916-17 (Iowa 1980). Except for the rare exceptions already noted, evidence is inadmissible to impeach a jury verdict. State v. Johnson, 445 N.W.2d 337, 341 (Iowa 1989) ("conduct or occurrences which are within tolerable limits are said to 'inhere in the verdict' or constitute no grounds for 'impeachment of the verdict' "); Harris v. Deere & Co., 263 N.W.2d 727, 730 (Iowa 1978) (same).

II. Courts become decreasingly inclined to allow impeachment of a verdict after discharge and dispersal of a jury. In Rutledge v. Johnson, 282 N.W.2d 111 (Iowa 1979), a case involving a sealed verdict under Iowa rule of civil procedure 203(c), we approved the recall of a dispersed jury, but carefully limited that authority to apply only for two classifications of what we described as "amendable omissions." The first, involving ministerial errors, applied only where (1) the form of...