Weaver v. Bratt
| Decision Date | 15 March 2006 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 00-01099 (RCL). |
| Citation | 421 F.Supp.2d 25 |
| Parties | Jane WEAVER, Plaintiff v. Robert BRATT, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Columbia |
Jane Weaver, Arlington, VA, Pro se.
Marina Utgoff Braswell, U.S. Attorney's Office, David Patrick Durbin, James Francis Jordan, Jordan, Coyne & Savits, Washington, DC, for Defendants.
This matter comes before this Court on three separate motions: (1) Federal Defendants' Motion [25] to Dismiss, or in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment; (2) Defendant Kator's Motion [20] to Dismiss; and (3) Federal Defendants' Motion [23] to Unseal. There are also four ancillary motions: (1) Federal Defendants' Motion [38] for Further Enlargement of Time; (2) Federal Defendants' Motion [41] to Strike; (3) Federal Defendants' Motion [40] for Enlargement of Time; and (4) Plaintiff's Motion [43] Concerning Electronic Evidence and Docket Access. Plaintiff Jane Weaver filed a four-count complaint on May 16, 2000, in which she claimed violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO"), Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA"), and asserted two claims pursuant to the Supreme Court's holding in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971), against a long list of federal employee defendants. In addition, the plaintiff alleged legal malpractice against her former attorney, Michael Kator. All defendants subsequently filed motions to dismiss on August 8, 2000 and August 4, 2000, respectively, asserting that the plaintiff had failed to state a claim on any of the four counts set forth in her complaint. The federal defendants also filed a Motion to Unseal the case on August 7, 2000. The plaintiff filed a single opposition to all three motions on September 7, 2000. In response, the federal defendants filed a Motion for Further Enlargement of Time in which to reply to the plaintiff's opposition, and subsequently filed a Reply to Plaintiff's Opposition to Federal Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and a Reply to Plaintiff's Opposition to Federal Defendants' Motion to Unseal on October 27, 2000. Defendant Kator also filed a Reply in Support of his Motion to Dismiss on September 18, 2000. The plaintiff filed a Consolidated Sur-Reply to the three motions on November 16, 2000, and the federal defendants responded with a Motion to Strike the Sur-Reply, arguing that it was unwarranted. In addition, the federal defendants filed a Motion for Enlargement of Time on November 22, 2000, in which they asked the Court for ten days following the Court's ruling on federal defendants' Motion to Strike in which to respond to plaintiff's surreply if the motion to strike was not granted. Finally, the plaintiff filed a Motion Concerning Electronic Evidence and Docket Access, in which she asked the Court: (1) for permission to file exhibits on computer diskettes or on CD-ROM; (2) for permission to view copies of the docket sheet or documents filed in this case; and (3) to require that the Clerk's office notify her by telephone or email so that she could respond more quickly to motions or orders.
Upon consideration of each party's filings, the applicable law, and the entire record herein, the Court concludes that (1) the federal defendants' Motion to Dismiss will be GRANTED; (2) defendant Kator's Motion to Dismiss will be GRANTED; and (3) the federal defendants' Motion to Unseal will be GRANTED. The Court agrees with the defendants' assertion that the plaintiff has failed to state any claim upon which relief may be granted. The Court further agrees with the federal defendants' contention that it is unnecessary to continue to seal the entire record in this case.
In October 1995, Plaintiff Jane Weaver was assigned to Barbara Corprew's supervision in the Fraud Section of the Criminal Division in the United States Department of Justice ("DOJ"). (Compl.10.) Weaver was assigned some responsibilities with respect to the Voluntary Disclosure Program ("VDP"), a program designed to deter and uncover fraud through allowing government contractors to voluntarily admit to fraudulent activity in exchange for certain benefits, such as reduction of damages, reduced chance of debarment and an additional level of review before criminal prosecution. (Id. at 6.) Weaver alleged that during the course of her employment she became aware that her supervisors were behaving unethically and fraudulently with respect to the VDP; that is, Weaver alleged, among other things, that her supervisors testified untruthfully before Congress, failed to keep adequate records, and disregarded VDP policies. (Id. at 8-12.) In response, Weaver began to disclose to various higher-level supervisors what she perceived as her supervisors' fraudulent activities. (Id. at 13.) As a result, Weaver claims that her supervisors retaliated against her in the form of poor performance evaluations, reprimands, transfers, searches of her office and computer, and lockouts from her office. (Id. at 14-16, 19-21.) In response to the alleged retaliation, Weaver hired Michael Kator, an employment attorney, in December 1996, to represent her and provide her with advice regarding her situation at the DOJ. (Def. Kator's Mot. Dismiss 1.) Over the next several months, Kator provided advice to Weaver and negotiated the terms of a settlement agreement between Weaver and the DOJ. (Pl.'s Resp. 26-31.) However, Weaver alleged that Kator violated ethical standards. (Id. at 59-60.) Consequently, Weaver fired Kator on June 2, 1997. (Compl.19.)
On June 3, 1997, Weaver entered into the settlement agreement with the DOJ, which provided for her resignation and prohibited her from filing any claims against the DOJ arising out of her employment with the DOJ or claiming that the DOJ had engaged in any improper conduct. (Defs.' Ex. 4 at ¶ 1, 10.) In exchange for these promises, the DOJ agreed to withdraw her negative performance evaluations and expunge her reprimand, as well as to increase her salary and detail her to the United States Attorney's Office for the District of Columbia for not less than 410 days. (Id. ¶ 12, 5-7.) Nevertheless, Weaver claimed her supervisors' retaliation against her prevented her from disclosing their fraudulent actions and as such, constituted duress and coercion in the formation of the settlement agreement. (Pl.'s Reply 41-42.) However, the federal defendants contend that Weaver's status as a licensed attorney combined with the fact that she was represented by counsel until the day she signed the agreement proves that the settlement agreement was not the product of duress and coercion, but is instead a valid contract barring all of Weaver's claims relating to her employment with the DOJ. (Defs.' Mot. Dismiss 6-9.) Furthermore, the federal defendants argue that even if Weaver's claims are not barred by the settlement agreement, she has failed to state any claim for which relief may be granted. (Id.) Defendant Kator also argues that Weaver failed to state a claim in legal malpractice against him for which relief may be granted. (Def. Kator's Mot. Dismiss 2-3.)
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), when considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, this Court must construe the allegations and facts in the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and must afford the plaintiff the benefit of all inferences that can be derived from the facts alleged. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957); Barr v. Clinton, 370 F.3d 1196, 1199 (D.C.Cir.2004) (citing Kowal v. MCI Communications Corp., 16 F.3d 1271, 1276 (D.C.Cir.1994)). Nevertheless, this Court need not accept asserted inferences that are unsupported by the facts set forth in the complaint, nor "legal conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations." Kowal, 16 F.3d at 1276.
Settlement agreements are governed by state contract law. See Perez v. Goldin, 360 F.Supp.2d 12, 15-16 (D.D.C. 2003); Dodge v. Tr. of Nat'l Gallery of Art, 326 F.Supp.2d 1, 9 (D.D.C.2004) (Lamberth, J.) (citing Sirmans v. Caldera, 138 F.Supp.2d 14, 19 (D.D.C.2001) (Lamberth, J.)). In the District of Columbia (and as a general rule of contract law), a party's signature on a contract binds that party to the terms of the contract, even if that party is ignorant of the terms of the contract. Emeronye v. CACI Int'l, 141 F.Supp.2d 82, 86 (D.D.C.2001). However, a contract is voidable at the option of the innocent party if that party's assent was induced by a misrepresentation, whether fraudulent or innocent. Id.; see also REST (2D) CONTRACTS § 164. Nevertheless, "a misrepresentation, even if relied upon, has no legal effect unless the recipient's reliance on it is justified." Id. To prove fraudulent misrepresentation, the plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating that: (1) the defendant made an assertion that was not in accordance with the facts; (2) the assertion was material; (3) the plaintiff relied upon the assertion to her detriment; and (4) the plaintiff was justified in relying on the assertion in manifesting her asset. Barrer v. Women's Nat'l Bank, 761 F.2d 752, 758 (D.C.Cir.1985). The burden is on the party seeking to rescind a contract for fraud or misrepresentation to prove that she signed the contract in reliance upon the truthfulness of the representations. 27 Richard A. Lord, WILLISTON ON COTRACTS § 69:33 (4th ed.1997); see also 2215 Fifth St. Assocs. v. U-Haul Int'l, Inc., 148 F.Supp.2d 50, 55 (D.D.C.2001) ().
A contract is also voidable at the innocent party's option when...
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