Weaver v. Cheung

• Decision Date: 03 April 1998
• Docket Number: No. S-96-506,S-96-506
• Citation: 576 N.W.2d 773,254 Neb. 349
• Parties: Nancy J. WEAVER, Appellant, v. Dr. E.C. CHEUNG and Platte Valley Medical Group, P.C., Appellees.
• Court: Nebraska Supreme Court

Page 773

576 N.W.2d 773

254 Neb. 349

Nancy J. WEAVER, Appellant, v. Dr. E.C. CHEUNG and Platte Valley Medical Group, P.C., Appellees.

No. S-96-506.

Supreme Court of Nebraska.

April 3, 1998.

Syllabus by the Court

1. Summary Judgment. Summary judgment is proper only when the pleadings, depositions, admissions, stipulations, and affidavits in the record disclose that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact or as to the ultimate inferences that may be drawn from those facts and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

2. Limitations of Actions: Appeal and Error. The determination of which statute of limitations applies is a question of law that an appellate court must decide independently of the conclusion reached by the trial court.

3. Malpractice: Limitations of Actions. If the facts in a case are undisputed, the issue as to when the professional negligence statute of limitations began to run is a question of law.

4. Malpractice: Limitations of Actions. In a medical negligence action, the 2-year period of limitations specified in Neb.Rev.Stat. § 44-2828 (Reissue 1993) begins to run when the treatment rendered after and relating to the allegedly wrongful act or omission is completed.

5. Malpractice: Limitations of Actions. When a medical negligence action is 6. Limitations of Actions: Words and Phrases. "Discovery," in the context of statutes of limitations, refers to the fact that one knows of the existence of an injury or damage, regardless of whether there is awareness of a legal right to seek redress in court.

filed outside the 2-year limitation period, a party seeking to invoke the 1-year discovery exception in Neb.Rev.Stat. § 44-2828 (Reissue 1993) must establish that the cause of action was not and could not reasonably have been discovered within the 2-year period.

7. Limitations of Actions: Words and Phrases. Discovery of a cause of action occurs when there has been discovery of facts constituting the basis of the cause of action or discovery of the existence of facts sufficient to put a person of ordinary intelligence and prudence on inquiry which, if pursued, would lead to the discovery.

P. Stephen Potter, P.C., Grand Island, for appellant.

William M. Lamson, Jr., and David J. Schmitt, of Kennedy, Holland, DeLacy & Svoboda, Omaha, for appellees.

WHITE, C.J., and CAPORALE, WRIGHT, CONNOLLY, GERRARD, STEPHEN, and McCORMACK, JJ.

STEPHAN, Justice.

This is a professional negligence action brought by Nancy J. Weaver against Dr. E.C. Cheung and Platte Valley Medical Group, P.C. (Platte Valley). Weaver appeals from an order of the district court for Buffalo County granting summary judgment in favor of Cheung and Platte Valley based upon its finding that Weaver's claim was barred by the statute of limitations. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the district court.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In her petition filed on January 19, 1995, Weaver alleged that Cheung, while employed by Platte Valley, was negligent in providing medical diagnosis and treatment. Specifically, Weaver alleged that Cheung erroneously determined that she suffered from cirrhosis of the liver and thereafter treated her for that condition. She further alleged that another physician subsequently advised her that she did not have liver disease, but, rather, a condition known as celiac sprue. Weaver claimed permanent injury resulting from the misdiagnosis and improper treatment, for which she sought general and special damages. Cheung and Platte Valley filed an answer in which they generally denied Weaver's allegations of negligence and asserted as an affirmative defense that the action was "barred by the applicable statute of limitations, Neb.Rev.Stat. § 44-2828 (Reissue 1993)." Weaver did not file a reply.

Cheung and Platte Valley moved for summary judgment on grounds that Weaver was unable to sustain her burden of proof and that her action was time barred. At a hearing on April 22, 1996, Cheung and Platte Valley narrowed the scope of the motion to their statute of limitations defense, and the district court received evidence pertaining to that issue. The evidence is summarized as follows:

Weaver consulted Dr. David Hult of Gothenburg, Nebraska, on December 4, 1991, with complaints of severe fatigue and swelling of her abdomen and lower extremities. Tests ruled out cancer. Weaver was admitted to Good Samaritan Hospital in Kearney on December 16, 1991, where she was examined by Cheung and Dr. G.K. Bascom, both of whom were associated with Platte Valley at that time. After additional diagnostic studies were done and medication was prescribed by Cheung, Weaver was discharged from the hospital on December 23, 1991. She was readmitted to Good Samaritan Hospital on January 17, 1992. After performing a liver biopsy which was reported as normal, Cheung diagnosed cirrhosis of the liver and treated Weaver based upon that diagnosis. Weaver recalled that she was last treated by Cheung sometime in May 1992. Cheung stated in his affidavit that he treated Weaver "through at least April 27, 1992" and that he "may have also rendered care and treatment through May of 1992." There is some evidence that Weaver may have received treatment from another physician at Platte Valley Weaver's health problems persisted following this period of treatment. She was seen by Hult at various times in 1992 and 1993. Weaver arranged to be examined by Dr. John Bloor at the Hepatology Clinic at University Hospital in Denver, Colorado, on February 1, 1994. Bloor performed additional diagnostic studies and advised Weaver on the following day that in his opinion she did not have liver disease. On April 13 or 14, 1994, Weaver was advised by another physician in Colorado that she suffered from celiac sprue, a disorder which made her allergic to certain foods. Bloor concluded that Weaver also suffered from restrictive lung disease and dysphagia, two chronic medical problems resulting from "severe prolonged malnutrition caused by the delay in treatment of her celiac sprue."

in June or July 1992, but not later than July 14, 1992. At approximately this time, Cheung moved to another state and did not return to Nebraska.

In its order of April 25, 1996, granting the motion for summary judgment, the district court held that the 2-year limitations period contained in Neb.Rev.Stat. § 44-2828 (Reissue 1993) began to run on Weaver's claim no later than July 14, 1992, the last possible date on which she could have been treated by Cheung. The district court further determined that Weaver discovered her cause of action within the 2-year period and that her claim was therefore barred when the action was commenced on January 19, 1995.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

Weaver contends that the district court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Cheung and Platte Valley based upon its determination that her cause of action against them was barred by the statute of limitations.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment is proper only when the pleadings, depositions, admissions, stipulations, and affidavits in the record disclose that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact or as to the ultimate inferences that may be drawn from those facts and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Darrah v. Bryan Memorial Hosp., 253 Neb. 710, 571 N.W.2d 783 (1998); Farmers Union Co-op. Ins. Co. v. Allied Prop. & Cas., 253 Neb. 177, 569 N.W.2d 436 (1997); Schendt v. Dewey, 252 Neb. 979, 568 N.W.2d 210 (1997).

The determination of which statute of limitations applies is a question of law that an appellate court must decide independently of the conclusion reached by the trial court. Central States Resources v. First Nat. Bank, 243 Neb. 538, 501 N.W.2d 271 (1993). If the facts in a case are undisputed, the issue as to when the professional negligence statute of limitations began to run is a question of law. Tiwald v. Dewey, 221 Neb. 547, 378 N.W.2d 671 (1985).

ANALYSIS

This case is controlled by the Nebraska Hospital-Medical Liability Act, Neb.Rev.Stat. § 44-2801 et seq. (Reissue 1993). Section 44-2828 of the act provides in part:

[A]ny action to recover damages based on alleged malpractice or professional negligence or upon alleged breach of warranty in rendering or failing to render professional services shall be commenced within two years next after the alleged act or omission in rendering or failing to render professional services providing the basis for such action, except that if the cause of action is not discovered and could not be reasonably discovered within such two-year period, the action may be commenced within one year from the date of such discovery or from the date of discovery of facts which would reasonably lead to such discovery, whichever is earlier.

We have held that with respect to a professional negligence claim against a physician, the 2-year period of limitations specified in this statute begins to run when the treatment rendered after and relating to the allegedly wrongful act or omission is completed. Kocsis v. Harrison, 249 Neb. 274, 543 N.W.2d 164 (1996); Healy v. Langdon, 245 Neb. 1, 511 N.W.2d 498 (1994); Ourada v. Cochran, 234 Neb. 63, 449 N.W.2d 211 (1989); Barry v. Bohi, 221 Neb. 651, 380 N.W.2d 249 (1986).

Weaver contends that Cheung negligently misdiagnosed her condition as cirrhosis of the liver on or about January 17, 1992, and treated her for this condition "until at least May of 1992." Brief for appellant at 4. The district court correctly determined that while there was conflicting evidence as to when the period of treatment ended, it could have been no earlier than April 27, 1992, and no later than July 14, 1992. We agree with the district court that regardless of whether the 2-year limitations period is computed from the earlier or the later of these dates, it had expired before this action was commenced on January 19, 1995.

Weaver contends that her petition was timely...