Weaver v. Franklin County

• Decision Date: 07 March 2007
• Parties: Ronald D. WEAVER, Appellant v. FRANKLIN COUNTY.
• Court: Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court

918 A.2d 194

Ronald D. WEAVER, Appellant v. FRANKLIN COUNTY.

Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania.

Submitted on Briefs December 22, 2006.

Decided March 7, 2007.

Ronald D. Weaver, appellant, pro se.

Suzanne B. Merrick, Pittsburgh, for appellee.

BEFORE: COLINS, President Judge, and SIMPSON, Judge, and LEAVITT, Judge.

OPINION BY Judge SIMPSON.

Ronald D. Weaver (Plaintiff), a state prison inmate representing himself, appeals an order of the Court of Common Pleas of the 39th Judicial District, Franklin County Branch (trial court),¹ sustaining preliminary objections and dismissing Weaver's civil complaint for money damages. Plaintiff's four-count complaint alleges unnamed employees of Franklin County (Defendant) committed acts of conspiracy, negligence, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and libel in the prosecution and imprisonment of Plaintiff for sexual assault. The trial court held Defendant is immune from Plaintiff's claims. We agree, and further conclude Plaintiff's poorly pleaded civil rights claim fails.

Plaintiff's complaint sets forth the following averments. In 1983, a district justice and other individuals devised a plan to convict Plaintiff of sexual assault. Compl. at ¶¶ 6-7. Notwithstanding the lack of probable cause, the district justice bound Plaintiff over for trial. Id. at ¶ 9. The Franklin County District Attorney thereafter filed a criminal information against Plaintiff despite knowledge of the false allegations. Id. at ¶¶ 12; 30. Plaintiff's counsel attempted to bribe both the court and the District Attorney to drop the charges. Id. at ¶ 13.

At the start of Plaintiff's jury trial, the presiding judge allowed Plaintiff's counsel to withdraw and denied Plaintiff adequate time to obtain competent counsel. Id. at ¶¶ 15-16; 18. After Plaintiff retained new counsel, the case was heard before a jury not of Plaintiff's choosing. During the trial, Plaintiff alleges, he was denied certain documents and the right to present exculpatory evidence. Id. at ¶¶ 22-23; 25; 32. The witnesses who testified against Plaintiff gave false testimony under threat of prosecution. Id. at ¶ 27. The jury found Plaintiff guilty. Id. at ¶ 33.

Plaintiff appealed to the Superior Court; however, Defendant withheld court documents to impede appellate review. Id. at ¶ 36. The Superior Court affirmed Plaintiff's conviction. Id. Notwithstanding, the Court remanded the case to the trial court for appointment of counsel and a hearing on Plaintiff's ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Id. at ¶ 37.

In 1986, Plaintiff filed a malpractice action against original and subsequent trial counsel, as well as eight other actions which the Prothonotary's Office suppressed. Id. at ¶¶ 41-43. The court dismissed one of Plaintiff's actions, and an appeal followed. Id. at ¶ 45.

In March 1987, Plaintiff filed a petition under the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA)² challenging his sexual assault conviction. Id. at ¶ 42. A hearing on the petition was scheduled two years later; but, without notice, was changed to a remand hearing. Id. at ¶ 46. In addition, the court quashed Plaintiff's subpoenas for individuals who failed to attend Plaintiff's trial and for appellate counsel. Id. at ¶ 47. The court failed to dispose of Plaintiff's objections. Id.

In July 1990, a federal public defender, acting in concert with Defendant, informed Plaintiff that he would not be released from prison unless he withdrew his claims. Id. at ¶ 48. Thereafter, in late 1990, Plaintiff filed private criminal complaints with the District Attorney alleging Defendant's Prothonotary violated the Crimes Code. Id. at ¶¶ 49-50.

In March 1992, Plaintiff filed a writ of habeas corpus. Id. at ¶ 51. The court denied the writ, and further ordered Plaintiff to amend his PCRA petition. Id. Sporadic hearings were held on Plaintiff's amended PCRA petition, and Plaintiff sought the presiding judge's removal due to a conflict of interest. Id. at ¶¶ 54-56. Plaintiff alleges that he was denied evidence and that his appointed counsel refused to follow instructions during the PCRA proceedings. Id. at ¶¶ 54; 70-80. The court ultimately denied Plaintiff's PCRA petition. Id. at ¶¶ 60; 66-68. On appeal, the Superior Court failed to make an independent review of the lower court's falsified record. Id. at ¶¶ 63; 66-67; 81. Plaintiff alleges he remains in prison as a direct result of the PCRA court's actions and the Superior Court's refusal to ascertain the accuracy of the record of Plaintiff's criminal proceedings. Id. at ¶¶ 80-81. In addition, PCRA counsel negligently filed an appeal with the Supreme Court which deprived Plaintiff review of his prosecutorial misconduct claims. Id. at ¶¶ 85-86.

In May 1993, Plaintiff filed a complaint in mandamus against the District Attorney seeking enforcement of the previously filed private criminal complaints. Id. at ¶ 53.

In 1995, Plaintiff attempted to serve an amended malpractice complaint against original and subsequent trial counsel. Id. at ¶ 84. At that time, Plaintiff alleges, he learned Defendant destroyed the amended complaint and his 1986 malpractice complaint did not appear on the docket. Id. at ¶ 102.

Plaintiff filed a second PCRA petition in early 1997 that remains suppressed by Defendant's Clerk of Courts. Id. at ¶¶ 95-96. Plaintiff filed a second writ of habeas corpus in January 2004, alleging inadequate remedies under the PCRA. Id. at 105. Plaintiff avers numerous motions and petitions remain outstanding and the 2004 writ of habeas corpus does not appear on the court docket. Id. at ¶ 108. In addition, Plaintiff filed a civil suit against a court-appointed psychiatrist, who allegedly made a false report of Plaintiff's mental health during the criminal proceedings. Id. at ¶ 114. Plaintiff alleges he is defamed by the psychiatric report when the trial court's docket is viewed. Id. at ¶¶ 116-17.

While incarcerated, Plaintiff alleges, he was harassed, searched naked in front of a female officer, battered, forced to live in unsanitary quarters, humiliated, degraded and denied meals. Id. at ¶¶ 59; 107. In addition, Plaintiff alleges he was denied parole due to Defendant's influence. Id. at ¶ 94.

Particularly relevant to this appeal, Plaintiff alleges he is unable to individually identify Defendant's employees responsible for his illegal incarceration. Therefore, he invokes respondeat superior, or the master-servant rule.³ Id. at ¶ 121. Defendant's failure to train, supervise, and discipline its employees resulted in Plaintiff's false imprisonment. Id. at ¶¶ 87-91; 135; 140-42.

Based upon the above actions, Plaintiff filed the instant complaint in April 2006 alleging Defendant's conduct constitutes civil conspiracy, negligence, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and libel.⁴ Id. at ¶¶ 151-60. He seeks millions of dollars of monetary damages for each year since 1984.

Not surprisingly, Defendant filed preliminary objections to Plaintiff's complaint asserting immunity pursuant to Section 8541 of the Judicial Code (Code), 42 Pa. C.S. § 8541. Alternatively, Defendant alleged Plaintiff's claims are merely a collateral attack of his sexual assault conviction; therefore, his exclusive means of redress is the PCRA. As an additional defense, Defendant asserted Plaintiff's claims are barred by the two-year statute of limitations. 42 Pa.C.S. § 5524.

The trial court, relying on Ferber v. City of Philadelphia, 661 A.2d 470 (Pa. Cmwlth.1995),⁵ sustained Defendant's preliminary objections on the ground Defendant is immune from suit. Plaintiff appeals.⁶

Plaintiff raises two issues on appeal. First, he contends the trial court erred by dismissing his constitutionally based tort complaint. Second, he asserts the court erred by failing to afford him a due process hearing or an opportunity to amend his complaint. Of further significance, we recognize Plaintiff's complaint alleges a civil rights violation, namely, access to the courts.

I.

A. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, Libel, and Negligence

We first address Plaintiff's intentional tort and negligence claims. At the outset, Section 8541 of the Code, 42 Pa. C.S. § 8541, provides:

Except as otherwise provided in this subchapter, no local agency shall be liable for any damages on account of any injury to a person or property caused by any act of the local agency or an employee thereof or any other person.

The Code defines "local agency" to include "[a] government unit other than the Commonwealth government." 42 Pa.C.S. § 8501. Accordingly, Defendant is a local agency immune from damages.

However, where the General Assembly specifically waives immunity, liability may attach. 42 Pa.C.S. § 8541. Liability may be imposed where damages are recoverable at common law or under a statute creating a cause of action if the injury was caused by a person not protected by immunity; the injury was caused by negligent acts of the local agency, or its employees acting within the scope of their duties; and, the claim falls within one of eight enumerated exceptions in 42 Pa.C.S. § 8542(b).⁷ Granchi v. Borough of N Braddock, 810 A.2d 747 (Pa.Cmwlth.2002). These exceptions are strictly construed and narrowly interpreted. Id.

In this case, even if Plaintiff sufficiently pleaded his claims of civil conspiracy, intentional infliction of emotional distress and libel, they are not negligent acts exposing Defendant to liability. See Wakshul v. City of Phila., 998 F.Supp. 585 (E.D.Pa.1998) (intentional infliction of emotional distress did not fall within enumerated exceptions to immunity); Brown v. Blaine, 833 A.2d 1166 (Pa.Cmwlth.2003) (libel does not fall within any enumerated exceptions to immunity); cf. Burnside v. Abbott Laboratories, 351 Pa.Super. 264, 505 A.2d 973 (1985) (proof of malice, i.e., an intent to injure, is an essential element in order to prove conspiracy). Furthermore, while there is statutory abrogation of immunity of individual employees for intentional torts, it does...